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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the visual discourse between Cuba and the United States
that has helped shape the foreign relations between the two countries over the last
fifty years. Images celebrating proximity and metaphorical connections, produced
before the 1959 Cuban revolution, assisted in fortifying linkages between the two
nations; whereas after the revolution, adversarial imagery further splintered the
relation between the two countries. I argue that the visual culture produced in Cuba
and the United States are not just “windows to the past,” but were also “active agents”
of dialogue that both reflected and shaped an evolving transnational relationship.
This relationship was characterized not only by state-to-state diplomacy, economic
exchange, and military intervention, but also by the dissemination of popular
representations that produced and reinforced the essence of foreign relations at a more
intimate level. While traditional diplomatic history tells the story of such relationships
at the official level, popular visual culture provides for a better understanding of how
the U.S. and Cuban general public perceived of these relationships through
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representations and metaphors of family, gender, race, and class, often not visible in
the textual record. It is through the interpretation of the time period’s visual culture—
advertising, billboards, comic books, films, photographs, political cartoons, posters,
and television shows—that the history of foreign relations between Cuba and the
United States as an intimate popular experience comes most clearly into focus. It is
this personal, intimate connection to foreign relations produced by the visual culture
of both societies that I evoke in this project.
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INTRODUCTION

We are disturbed not by events, but by the
views which we take of them.
—Epictetus
As a matter of general theory it is useful to
recognize that means of communication are
themselves means of production.
—Raymond Williams
Art is not a mirror which reflects the
historical struggle, but a weapon of that
struggle.
—Dziga Vertov

At 8:46 in the morning on September 11, 2001, hijackers deliberately crashed
American Airlines Flight 11 into the north tower of the World Trade Center.
Seventeen minutes later hijackers flew a second plane into the south tower while two
other planes crashed into the Pentagon and into a field in Pennsylvania. The 9/11
attacks shattered the popular perception that the United States was somehow immune
from a large-scale terrorist attack. The horror of the day unfolded in real-time images
on television screens across the globe. News programs continuously replayed footage
of the aircraft striking the buildings, of people jumping to their deaths to escape the
flames, and of the Twin Towers collapsing again and again, etching the pain and fear
of the moment into the collective memories of millions. Nine days after the attacks,
President Bush appeared before a joint meeting of the U.S. Congress and declared
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that all nations were “either with us, or with the terrorists.” The War on Terror had
begun.1
In the weeks and months that followed, innumerable images of bearded,
turban-clad, AK-47 rifle-toting “Islamic terrorists” became pervasive throughout U.S.
popular culture—in films, Internet videos, political cartoons, and television shows—
visually identifying this new threat for the U.S. public. Names of people and places
previously unknown to the majority of Americans—Osama bin Laden, Taliban, alQaida, Kabul, Fallujah, and Abu Ghraib—entered into the U.S. lexicon through a
myriad of images as the world once again trained its gaze on the Middle East. The
media bombarded the U.S. public with visions of Iraq and Afghanistan as enemies
now subject to U.S. scorn and attacks. Ironically, during the 1980s, the United States
had considered both of these newly declared enemies as allies.2
This switch from ally to enemy was not a new phenomenon in U.S. history,
and neither was the creation of a good-versus-evil binary, through the use of rhetoric
and images. Historians and the popular media often presented the Cold War between
the United States and the Soviet Union as a Manichean struggle throughout the entire
conflict (1945-1989). Although this conflict between the United States and the Soviet
1

For a description of the attacks see Nancy Gibbs “If You Want To Humble
An Empire” September 14, 2001, Time Magazine, Available at http://www.time.com
/time magazine/article/0,9171,1000761-1,00.html, (Accessed January 13, 2010);
George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,
September 20, 2001, Washington, D.C.,” Whitehouse Archives, Available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov /news/releases/ 2001/09/200109208.html, (Accessed January 13, 2010).
2

On the images produced to define “terrorists” following 9/11, see Peter
Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, Islamophobia: Making Muslims the Enemy,
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008).

2

Union ended twelve years before the 9/11 attacks, residues of that struggle, including
the U.S.-Cuban conflict, remained. Amidst the retaliatory attacks in Afghanistan and
efforts at regime change in Iraq, the Bush administration also increased its hostility
towards one of the United States’ few remaining Cold War adversaries: Cuba. Only a
few months after the twin towers collapsed, Bush and his Under Secretary of State,
John Bolton, included Cuba as part of the “adjunct axis of evil,” and publicly
speculated about the possibility that the Cuban government might produce chemical
weapons to use against the United States.3
Along with this increasingly hostile rhetoric, President Bush tightened
controls on who could travel to Cuba and limited the amounts of money that Cuban
exiles could send to their relatives on the island. As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
intensified, the U.S. searched for a place to detain captured “enemy combatants.”
Ignoring outrage and protests from resident Cubans, the U.S. government converted
the Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay into a terrorist holding pen. The U.S. Interest
Section in Havana further angered the Castro government with a Christmas light
display that included the number seventy-five, for the number of political prisoners
incarcerated in Cuba in 2004. Cuban agencies responded by erecting massive
billboards in front of the U.S. Interest Section in Havana displaying images of Iraqi
prisoners undergoing torture in Abu Ghraib and images of President Bush juxtaposed
with Nazi swastikas. In January 2006, the U.S. Interest Section installed an electronic
message board in the upper story windows of their building that flashed five-foot3

For John Bolton’s speech on Cuba as part of the Axis of Evil see, John
Bolton, “Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” speech delivered at The Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, May 6,
2002, Available from the Acronym Institute, (Accessed September 13, 2009).
3

high letters that spelled out continuous messages in Spanish such as “Democracy in
Cuba,” quotes from Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King Jr., and political
messages critical of Cuba’s leadership. After the U.S. officials refused Cuban
demands to turn off the scrolling marquee, the Cuban government constructed a
memorial of a hundred and thirty-eight black flags with a single star dedicated to
Cuban martyrs who had died fighting U.S. imperialism. The flags, placed directly in
front of the U.S. Interest Section obscured the messages of the marquee from view.4
Although the U.S. War on Terror triggered this latest round of diplomatic
gamesmanship between the United States and Cuba, the “billboard war” was just the
most recent part of a fifty-year battle of rhetoric and images waged between these two
nations. In this work, I explore the visual discourse between Cuba and the United
States that has helped shape the foreign relations between the two countries over the
last fifty years. Cuban and U.S. visual culture played an integral part in naturalizing
their relationship both as allies, before 1959, and as enemies after the diplomatic
break. Images celebrating proximity and metaphorical connections, produced before
the 1959 Cuban revolution, assisted in fortifying linkages between the two nations;
whereas after the revolution, adversarial imagery further splintered the relation
between the two countries. I argue that the visual culture produced in Cuba and the

4

For the War of the Billboards see Alfredo Prieto, “The Billboard Wars,”
Havana Times, August 2, 2009, Available from Havana Times
http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=12340, (Accessed September 13, 2009); see also
Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Havana's Flags Prove Mightier Than the Billboard In U.S.Cuba War of Ideas, Castro Blocks Envoys' Sign,” Washington Post, May 13, 2006,
Available from Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/12/ AR2006051201879.html, (Accessed September 13,
2009).

4

United States are not just “windows to the past,” but were also “active agents” of
dialogue that both reflected and shaped an evolving transnational relationship.5
This relationship was characterized not only by state-to-state diplomacy,
economic exchange, and military intervention, but also by the dissemination of
popular representations that produced and reinforced the essence of foreign relations
at a more intimate level. Cuban and U.S. artists created images that allowed for a
sense of personal connectivity and immediacy to the foreign relationship that texts
alone did not. It is this personal, intimate connection to foreign relations produced by
the visual culture of both societies that I evoke in this project. While traditional
diplomatic history tells the story of such relationships at the official level, popular
visual culture provides for a better understanding of how the U.S. and Cuban general
public perceived of these relationships through representations and metaphors of
family, gender, race, and class, often not visible in the textual record.6 It is through

5

Stephen Greenblatt takes this view that “representations are not only
products but producers, capable of decisively altering the very forces that brought
them into being,” see his, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 6; See also Raymond Williams,
Problems in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays (London: Verso, 1980), 50; I
also build on María del Carmen Suescun Pozas concept of images being “active
agents,” in her essay “Imperialism in the Visual Arts” in Gilbert Joseph, Catherine
Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, editors, Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the
Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations, (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1998), 551.
6

Louis Pérez Jr. makes a fantastic case for the use of visual as well as textual
metaphors as an arena where the general public comes to understand the power
relations in foreign relations. See his Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor
and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008);
Christina Klein, Melani McAlister, and Alan Nadel also point to the power of images
to normalize power relations between different countries. See Christina Klein, Cold
War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003); Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture,
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the interpretation of the time period’s visual culture—advertising, billboards, comic
books, films, photographs, political cartoons, posters, and television shows—that the
history of foreign relations between Cuba and the United States as an intimate
popular experience comes most clearly into focus.7
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many U.S. leaders saw Cuba
as a “natural” extension of U.S. territory and echoed the cries of the Cuban elite who
urged for annexation to the United States.8 The geographic proximity of the two
nations created a transnational contact zone, a borderland of exchange—cultural,
commercial, and personal.9 As historian Louis Pérez, Jr. has eloquently argued, Cuba

Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000, (Berkeley: University of
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Several other authors have also used popular visual culture to assess how
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and Popular Culture (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2001); George Black, The
Good Neighbor: How the United States Wrote the History of Central America and the
Caribbean (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988); Ariel Dorfman and Armand
Mattelart, How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic
(New York: International General, 1971); John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race
and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1987); Ronnie D. Lipschultz,
Cold War Fantasies: Film, Fiction, and Foreign Policy (New York: Rowman and
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Nationality, and Culture (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999);
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World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Allan West, Tropics of
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Mary Louise Pratt used the term “contact zone” to describe “the space in
which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each
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became part of the “American imagination,” and the United States was an integral
part of “becoming Cuban.” Cuba and the United States came to define their
relationship through a set of economic, political, and cultural “ties of singular
intimacy.” Images within the popular culture of each nation bolstered and defined
Cuban and U.S. citizens’ collective view of these ties, creating an initial intimate
connection between the two nations. These real and metaphoric ties created a
relationship that favored U.S. economic, military, and cultural dominance on the
island from 1898 until 1959.10 This connectivity manifested itself visually in
advertisements, maps, and promotional literature, reinforced by metaphors of family,
gender, race, and class. These metaphors were contained in such visual sources as I
Love Lucy, tourism advertisement, and early heroic visions of Fidel Castro.
As much as borderlands can facilitate exchange and cooperation, they can also
be contested sites (or perhaps more appropriately for my study, “sights”) of

other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion,
radical inequality, and intractable conflict.” Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel
Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992), 6-7. Gilbert Joseph
further explains “contact zones” as the multitude of arenas that U.S. power affects
Latin America: “Contact zones are not geographic places with stable significations;
they may represent attempts at hegemony, but are simultaneously sites of
multivocality; of negotiation, borrowing, and exchange; and of redeployment and
reversal.” Gilbert Joseph, “Close Encounters: Toward a New Cultural History of
U.S.-Latin American Relations,” in Gilbert Joseph, Catherine Legrand, and Ricardo
D. Salvatore, editors, Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of
U.S.-Latin American Relations, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 5.
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competing sovereignties.11 When the Cuban revolution disrupted U.S. political and
economic domination on the island, both countries quickly sought to re-imagine their
relationship. The official reordering of this relationship played out through U.S.
military intervention and economic isolation of the island, and the Cuban military and
economic alliance with the Soviet Union. This diplomatic reordering also facilitated
the production of a torrent of images in both countries that utilized archetypal enemy
imagery, applied and adjusted to fit this new Cold War battlefield.12
In this context, the Castro government made a concerted effort to literally
wipe visions of U.S. domination clean from the Cuban people’s line of sight. The
United States responded with several campaigns to visually discredit the new Cuban
government in the United States and abroad. In both countries, politicians and imagemakers alike reconfigured the metaphors of proximity, once touted as a natural
advantage for trade, into visions of hazard and risk. The media also replaced
metaphors of familial connectivity between the two nations with images of
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dysfunctionality, lasciviousness, and homosexuality. The U.S. press turned images of
Castro and the 26 of July Movement leadership’s masculine heroic actions on their
heads, and portrayed them as barbaric and insane. Ricky Ricardo’s wholesome
family-man image was replaced by Scarface’s anti-father figure, Tony Montana.
Family ties were also literally severed by the revolution as hundreds of
thousands of Cubans fled the island into exile in the United States. The resulting tide
of émigrés from Cuba to the United States became a third stage on which images
were produced and consumed. Resident Cubans looked upon their expatriate citizens
as the worst traitors, to be vilified and scorned, while the exiles viewed their
homeland from across the Florida Straits as a hijacked and ruined memory. Family
disputes, like the custody battle for Elián González, created images that continued to
reinforce the metaphorical and physical battle for the custody of the island itself.

Literature
The Cuban revolution and the U.S. response to the revolution represent a
pivotal moment in the history of the global Cold War. An important starting point for
examining shifts in U.S.-Cuban relations is the large body of traditional diplomatic
histories that examine the various aspects of the relationship between these two
countries.13 Traditional diplomatic studies have ranged from the broadest
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Traditional histories of U.S. foreign relations relied heavily on political,
military, and economic studies primarily from U.S. sources and perspectives. A
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chronological studies of the entire two hundred years of diplomatic relations to
studies that examine critical periods such as the U.S. military occupation (1898-1902)
or the breakdown in diplomatic relations (1959-1961).14 These histories provide an
indispensable grounding necessary for the study of popular culture within foreign
relations. Out of the multitudes of studies, Louis Pérez, Jr.’s Cuba and the United
States: Ties of Singular Intimacy remains one of the best and most concise histories of
the relationship between the United States and Cuba from the 1750s to the 1990s.
Pérez shows how the U.S. doctrine of “no transfer” from Spanish possession to a third
party (including the Cubans themselves) was one of the central political points that

Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” The Journal of
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has continued to drive U.S.-Cuban policy.15 In many ways the legacy of this
eighteenth century policy led to the U.S. government’s violent reaction against the
revolutionary government’s much-needed economic and social reforms on the island.
Instead of working towards a compromise with the new Cuban government, the U.S.
leadership chose to militarily oppose the revolution and Fidel Castro. This opposition
drove the Cuban government towards the Soviet Union for protection and support.
Another superior diplomatic history is Thomas Paterson’s Contesting Castro:
The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution. Patterson’s work
examines the intricacies of the political conflict that grew out of the revolution.
Paterson provides a critical overview of the period from 1956 to 1962, showing how
the U.S. government incorrectly gauged the level popular support for the revolution.
This widespread support would eventually become the basis for the power that Castro
and the 26 of July Movement would harness to move the revolution forward in
defiance of Washington’s ultimatums and aggression.16
At the beginning of the revolution, this widespread support for Castro and the
26 of July Movement was not limited to Cuban citizens. Historians and the U.S. press
often forget or purposely omit the fact that the Cuban revolution enjoyed high esteem
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in the United States from 1957 until 1959. A fantastic book that illuminates the
revolution’s popularity in the U.S. at this time is Van Gosse’s Where the Boys Are:
Cuba, Cold War America, and the Making of a New Left. Gosse demonstrates that the
revolution became part of a wider leftist political awakening in the United States from
the late 1950s into early 1960s. Gosse also shows how the 26 of July movement’s
leadership cultivated financial and media support in the United States critical to the
revolution’s success. Like my own study, Gosse’s work illustrates how various media
outlets produced images that became part of the rebel’s arsenal to be used against the
government of Fulgencio Batista. For a brief moment these images strengthened the
intimate connection between the United States and Cuba through the celebration of
the same movement that would eventually rip the relationship apart.17
Like Van Gosse, many historians acknowledge the power of popular culture to
influence political events. As historian Gilbert M. Joseph has declared, “any adequate
history of the global Cold War must be a social and cultural history, one that takes
seriously the actions, identities, and beliefs of ordinary people, as well as of elites.”18
Images produced about these events often influenced popular beliefs. Increasingly,
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historians are answering the call by cultural historian Peter Burke and others to take
the evidence of such images more seriously. As Burke asserts, “historians tend to
treat them [images] as mere illustrations, reproducing them in their books without
comment. In cases in which the images are discussed in the text, this evidence is often
used to illustrate conclusions that the author has already reached by other means,
rather than to give new answers or to ask new questions.”19
Of the works that have answered Burke’s and Joseph’s challenges, and use
images as well as other forms of popular culture to examine U.S.-Cuban relations,
Louis Pérez, Jr.’s On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture, and Cuba
in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos, stand out. In On
Becoming Cuban, Pérez successfully analyzes the multiple types of popular culture
and their impacts on the national consciousness of Cuba from 1850 to 1950. In Cuba
in the American Imagination, Pérez examines U.S. visual metaphors of Cuba that
constructed the island as part of the U.S. sphere of influence from the eighteenth
century to the present. Pérez’s studies demonstrate that culture in its many
manifestations helped to foster the relationship between the two countries in a more
immediate and intimate way than economics and political connections alone. Pérez
does an excellent job of underscoring the importance of popular culture in creating
the relationship between the two countries before 1959. My dissertation builds on his
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work, while extending the time frame to examine how popular culture subsequently
shaped and defined the antagonism between the two nations after 1959.
No single work has examined how Cuba and the United States constructed
one another as enemies through popular visual culture; however, studies on other
parts of the world have provided important models for my dissertation. John Dower’s
War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War examines the different ways
that the U.S. and Japanese popular images dehumanized each other during World War
II. Both the Japanese and U.S. governments produced propaganda that presented the
other nation as non-human and racially inferior in order to facilitate mass killing.
Dower’s work demonstrates how popular culture can be utilized to create perceptions
of an enemy through archetypal images that have been consistently used in various
conflicts. Sam Keen’s book, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile
Imagination, also examines the myriad of ways that societies have invoked image
archetypes when creating enemies in historical conflicts.20
Several other recent works reach beyond the official state documents to utilize
popular culture as a means to examine the everyday encounters of foreign relations.
In particular, Melani McAlister’s Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S.
Interests in the Middle East is a fantastic example of how multiple forms of popular
culture work to produce meaning in foreign relations. McAlister demonstrates how
image-makers in the United States have transferred U.S. racial stereotypes to images
of the Middle East to support U.S. corporate and political agendas. This was not a
20
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conspiracy, he argues, but rather a “messy intersection” that combined cultural forms
with economic and political interests to support U.S. objectives in the region. This
type of “messy intersection” between U.S. culture, commerce, and foreign relations
was also evident in the visual images produced in Cuba and the United States prior to
1959.
Christina Klein’s work on Asia in the U.S. imagination, and Alan Nadel’s
treatment of the popular culture of the U.S. domestic Cold War, also inform my
study. 21 Klein and Nadel demonstrate how popular culture normalized the view of
foreign relations for the U.S. general public. Klein’s Cold War Orientalism: Asia in
the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961 shows how popular culture created
connections between the United States and Asia following World War II, while at the
same time reinforcing U.S. notions of superiority over Asians. Nadel’s Containment
Culture: American Narrative, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age examines how
Cold War metaphors of containment penetrated the U.S. public’s psyche through
popular narratives that equated containment of communism with dominant U.S.
metaphors of family, gender, and race. Both of these authors strive, as I do here, to
show how everyday citizens forged a more personal understanding of U.S. foreign
relations through images and metaphors contained in popular culture.
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Chapters
To illustrate how images have served to create the relationship between Cuba
and the United States, I have organized my dissertation into five thematically distinct
chapters that overlap chronologically. My first chapter, “Border Relations, No
Passports, and Lucky Guys: Connections Between the United States and Cuba, 19451959,” examines the years following World War II when Cuba was the cornerstone of
U.S. dominance in the Caribbean Basin. During this time period, U.S. and Cuban
commercial interests produced images that helped construct a sense of connection
between the two nations. These images came from tourist maps and consumer
advertisements, which created the perception of geographic connectivity as well as
shared values and societal norms. Drawing on dominant U.S. notions of gender, race,
and class, these images served to naturalize U.S. dominance over Cuba. This
dominance, meanwhile, bred economic disparity in Cuba and would contribute to
widespread discontent that manifested itself in full-scale rebellion on the island.
My second chapter, “Robin Hood, Reporters, and Real Men: Fidel Castro’s
Honeymoon with the U.S. Media, 1955-1959,” begins as the island exploded into
revolution. Although Fulgencio Batista’s commanders claimed Fidel Castro had been
killed upon arrival in Cuba, Castro and the 26 of July leadership survived but
desperately needed funding and popular support to continue their fight. The 26 of July
Movement received the needed publicity from a wave of U.S. newspaper and
television reporters who sprinted to Cuba for the chance to interview Castro and the
“real men” fighting in the Sierra Maestra mountains. These reporters told stories
about Castro and the revolution in the guise of a real-life adventure unfolding next
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door. These stories contained gendered metaphors of “true manhood” revered in the
United States. The images produced during this period continued the intimate
connection between the two countries through metaphors of shared masculine virtue
and family values. These shared metaphors would soon be overturned by the conflict
between Cuba and the United States.
Chapter Three, “From Smiling Face to Most Dangerous Place: The
Destruction of U.S. and Cuban Relations and the Nature of the Enemy, 1959-1963,”
examines the splintering of the relationship between the two nations and the creation
of one of the most dangerous and enduring standoffs of the Cold War. Cuban and
U.S. images of mutual friendship gave way to images of mutual animosity. A hostile
environment between Cuba and the United States festered and spawned images
through which both sides demonized and dehumanized the other, evoking many of
the same enemy archetypes of past hot war conflicts. These hostile images bounced
back and forth across the Florida Straits as each nation redefined itself in opposition
to the other. The images during these first few years set the tone for the visual
animosity that has continued to the present day.
My fourth chapter, “Sources of Maximum Danger: Cuba, the United States,
and the Struggle for Hearts and Minds, 1959-1989,” examines the importance of
image-making efforts to win public approval in Cuba, the United States, and Latin
America. The revolution quickly turned from being a military operation against
Batista to a conscious effort to reshape Cuban society and identity. The creation of
images was crucial to a re-imagined and re-envisioned Cuban national identity and
“New Man” based on socialist ideals separated from U.S. influence. In the United
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States, image-makers seared the idea of Cuba as a new enemy into the public
imagination through films, political cartoons, and television specials. The U.S.
government viewed Cuba as part of the larger Soviet threat and produced images in
an effort to thwart “another Cuba” from happening elsewhere in the western
hemisphere.
The fifth and final chapter of my dissertation, “Martyrs, Murderers, and
Miracles: Images of the Cuban Exile Within and Without, 1959-2000,” examines the
special role that the exile community in the United States has played in the production
of images in the United States and Cuba. Both Cuba and the United States have used
the exiles as political pawns over the last fifty years. Resident Cubans envision those
who have abandoned the revolution as an enemy even more contemptuous then the
U.S. government, traitors to be forever scorned. The U.S. government and U.S. public
have viewed the exiles as both heroes and political liabilities. Images of their
presence in the United States have changed over time, embodied first in the
bandleader and family man Ricky Ricardo, and later in the drug dealer and gangster
Tony Montana. The conflict between the exiles and the Castro government continues
to be one of the most personal and intimate battlefields between the two nations.
The prolific amount of images produced on both sides of the Florida Straits,
has significantly shaped foreign relations between Cuba and the United States. The
story that follows provides a heretofore-absent examination of the visual dialogue that
took place between Cuba and the United States during a time of tremendous change
and conflict. The production of images of alliance and antagonism has both bound
and divided these two border nations. It is within the visual culture of both countries,
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not just the textual record, that the intimate nature of the relationship between the two
nations can be best perceived.
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CHAPTER ONE
Border Relations, No Passports, and Lucky Guys:
Connections Between the United States and Cuba, 1945-1959

Cuba’s nearness to the United States makes it of
easy access for residents of that country…The
inborn hospitality of the Cuban people, to be noted
even the government institutions and the authorities,
insures a friendly welcome.
—Cuba: Ideal Vacation Land (1953)
In Cuba I’m Cuban, In the USA I’m a Yank
Wherever I am I’m home and I’ve got you to
thank… I’m a lucky guy!
—“Ricky Ricardo” (Desi Arnaz) I Love Lucy
(1956)
U.S. forms penetrated so deeply through habitual
usage and became so much a part of everyday life
so as to be indistinguishable from what passed as
commonplace, but most of all what passed as
Cuban.
—Louis A. Pérez Jr. On Becoming Cuban: Identity,
Nationality, and Culture (1999)

From 1898 until 1959, the United States and Cuba were bound together by
what President William McKinley described as “ties of singular intimacy.”1 Although
economic, political, and military links were at the core of the official government
relationship, the intimate relationship between Cuba and the United States that was

1

William McKinley, December 5, 1899, Available from, The American
Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index, (Accessed May 16, 2008).
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forged in the hearts and minds of each country’s citizens came into focus through
popular images in advertising, film, television, and most importantly tourism. The
physical proximity made the ocean boundary between Cuba and the United States
porous and easy to bridge, enhancing economic and cultural exchange. This
arrangement favored the dominant status of North American businesses and products,
and offered preferential treatment for U.S. tourists. Throughout the first half of the
twentieth century, images and industries that bridged the Straits of Florida came
together in a symbiotic harmony that produced as well as reflected the ties of singular
intimacy that President McKinley had observed in 1899.
During the 1950s, the intimate relationship between Cuba and the United
States dearest to the hearts of the U.S. public was a marriage between a Cuban
bandleader and his redheaded-wannabe-starlet wife in the wildly popular television
show I Love Lucy.2 The show’s plot centered on the relationship between Ricky
Ricardo, a successful Cuban entertainer living in New York and the antics of his zany
wife Lucy. Lucy’s aspirations for stardom, combined with her lack of talent, were
often the cause for chaos and comedy in the Ricardo household. Lucy’s slapstick and
Ricky’s Cuban accent and rapid-fire Spanish combined to form a television comedy
behemoth.
Desi Arnaz and Lucille Ball were both an on-screen and off-screen mixed race
couple. CBS television executives originally feared that the show would break too
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many racial taboos for 1950s U.S. society and would not garner a large TV audience.3
However, the connection between Cuba and the United States was so entrenched that
a mixed-race couple was perhaps more acceptable with our closest neighbor. In
addition, Arnaz was a very light-skinned Cuban and did not pose the same challenge
that an Afro -Cuban and a white American couple would have. The characters of
Ricky and Lucy also fulfilled many of the normal gender roles for a middle-class U.S.
family in the 1950s. Ricky was portrayed as a loyal breadwinner and ultimately in
control of the family. Lucy was a stay-at-home mom and homemaker who would
push Ricky’s buttons but would eventually give into her husband’s demands. The
Ricardos enabled a broad U.S. audience to internalize the relationship between the
two countries as a metaphoric marriage that despite the differences had a core
sameness that allowed the relationship to flourish. The show vaulted to number one in
the Nielson ratings and served as a popular reminder of the intimacy of the U.S.Cuban connection in the United States.
On December 3, 1956, an episode of I Love Lucy, entitled “The Ricardos Visit
Cuba,” directly addressed many of the real and imagined intimate connections
between Cuba and the United States. In the episode, the Ricardos as well as their
ever-present neighbors, Ethel and Fred Mertz, flew from New York to Havana aboard
the Pan Am Clipper so that Lucy could meet more of Ricky’s extended family.
Ricky’s family members were portrayed as white Cubans fluent in English as well as
Spanish. The fictional hotel entertainment was presented in English as it actually
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would have been for a U.S. tourism audience in the 1950s, and not a single Afro Cuban was present in the entire episode. This absence perpetuated the racial myth that
Cuba was primarily a white country. The reality was that Afro -Cubans were literally
in the background in elite Cuban society, considered second-class citizens, and barred
from many hotels and clubs except as workers, just as many of their AfricanAmerican counterparts were in the mid-1950s.4
At the end of the show Ricky played a concert at the Hotel Nacional Casino
Parisien with his son Lil’Ricky. Ricky summed up his own fictional Cuban-American
connection with his song, “I’m a lucky guy” and in doing so illustrated the connection
between the two countries as perceived by U.S. citizens. Ricky crooned,
You see un hombre afortunado
Which means you’re looking at a lucky guy
In Cuba I’m Cuban
In the USA I’m a Yank
Wherever I am I’m home and I’ve got you to thank.
You never see me homesick ‘cause from home I’m never away
Wherever I am I’m home in Cuba or the USA
I’ve got two places to hang my hat
Two verandas on which to snooze
And in two languages a welcome mat
Say hello to my shoes
In New York or Havana
People make me feel I belong
Wherever I am I’m home I can go but I can’t go wrong
Just name me one other chap with a girl like Lucy on his lap
And a diet of hot tamales and apple pie
You see un hombre afortunado
Which means you’re looking at a lucky guy
I’m a lucky guy!5
4
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Ricky’s song illustrated the real ability of North Americans and to a more limited
degree wealthy Cubans in the 1950s to move between the two cultures.
The boundary between the Cuba and the United States in the late 1950s was
porous especially for North American goods and travelers. For many Americans, the
ninety miles of ocean stretching between Cuba and the United States seemed easier to
culturally bridge than the ninety meters of river that separated the United States and
Mexico. Ironically, on the day before the Ricardos landed in Cuba on U.S. television
sets, another very real military landing was taking place on the eastern side of the
island. When Fidel Castro and eighty-one members of the 26 of July Movement ran
aground on December 2, 1956, Cuba was an island dominated by wealthy “Ricky
Ricardo” Cubans, “lucky guy” U.S. tourists, and U.S. commercial interests—a
constructed island paradise for foreign consumption thoroughly incorporated and
influenced by U.S. concepts of modernity and identity. The U.S. and Cuban public
came to know each other through popular culture images like I Love Lucy that
contained dominant North American constructions of family, gender, class, and racial
hierarchies. Ultimately, these images helped support and produce a relationship that
favored U.S. citizens over their Cuban neighbors.

Products, Power, and No Translation Necessary
The influence that the U.S. sought to exercise over the island can be traced
back to the desires of the U.S. founding fathers. John Adams stated that the
Season 6 Episode 9. I Love Lucy Season 6 Disc 2 CBS Home Entertainment,
released to DVD May 2, 2006.
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annexation of Cuba was “indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the
Union,” while Thomas Jefferson commented that Cuba would make a “most
interesting addition” to the United States. Although the United States failed to annex
Cuba, the U.S. government took measures to ensure that the island never fell under
the control of any other country after Spain. This policy of “no transfer” included the
Cuban people themselves and set the stage for U.S. intervention during the CubanAmerican-Spanish War of 1898 and the fifty-year conflict with the revolutionary
government after 1959. 6
Following World War II, the United States assumed a position of global
power and influence unprecedented in its past. Through its economic and military
power, the U.S. was able to influence trade relations, strategic agendas, and cultural
forms in much of Latin America. The strength of their northern neighbor forced
smaller Latin American countries like Cuba to operate in an economic, political, and
cultural space that was largely controlled from the exterior. Although not officially
part of the United States, U.S. authority over the island manifested itself in a variety
of forms. Sugar, Cuba’s primary export, remained at the heart of U.S. trade and
influence on the island; indeed almost ninety percent of Cuba’s sugar was bought by
the United States. U.S. control over sugar paved the way for U.S. control over other
industries such as transportation, utilities, and consumer goods on to the island.
During the first half of the twentieth century, Cuba became ever more dependent on
the United States as a primary trading partner. Economic dominance led to further
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cultural assimilation of Cuba into the North American sphere of influence and the
intertwining of these border nations. 7
Throughout the twentieth century the United States and Cuba forged closer
cultural ties to the point that middle and upper class Cubans, especially in Havana,
came to judge their own progress and success based on U.S. standards. Cubans
embraced many types of U.S. culture—including baseball, films, television
programs—and a wide range of consumer products, all of U.S. origin, became staples
in Cuba. These products and customs had been coming into Cuba since before the
U.S. intervention in 1898 and had grown more and more prominent after the end of
Spanish colonial rule. By the 1950s, Cuba’s elite classes were emulating North
American consumption patterns. Their key reference points in terms of status and
progress were linked to definitions of progress and modernity as envisioned by the
multitude of U.S. advertisements and U.S. tourist on the island. Part of what drove
Cubans to accept and clamor for North American cultural forms was a rejection of
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Spanish colonial norms in favor of the perceived modernity linked to North American
customs and products. 8
Not only were the products themselves North American in origin but so were
the ways they were marketed and advertised. U.S. advertising firms set up offices in
Havana almost immediately after the Spanish surrendered the island in 1898. Over
the next fifty years, advertisements for U.S. products found in popular Cuban
periodicals became one of the primary means that idealized visions of U.S. culture
were spread on the island. Advertisers sought to reflect the popular aspirations and
values of its intended audience as a way to connect to the viewer as well as to create
desire for the product being advertised. Advertisements did not reflect a true reality of
U.S. society but rather an idealized and stylized version of what upper-middle class
Americans valued and aspired to be like. These ideals and aspirations were then
transferred to a Cuban audience. In this way advertisers transplanted the commodified
“American Dream” of prosperity and a happier life to Cuban consumers in an effort
to create a “Cuban Dream” that normalized American consumer patterns for upper
and middle class Cubans.9
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Advertising images also linked the more well-off segments of Cuban and U.S.
society through the emphasis in the ads themselves on white, affluent, patriarchal
family units. By having the same visual discourses in the United States and Cuba,
advertisers were constructing a similar frame of reference that connected U.S. and
Cuban consumers. This image-based cultural connection went above the official
diplomatic agreements between the two countries to join segments of the U.S. and
Cuban public at visual everyday level. Just as I Love Lucy served as a popular
reminder of the intimate connection between the two nations through the fictional as
well as real marriage between Lucille Ball and Desi Arnaz, advertising of U.S.
products also made a visual connection between the two nations through the stylized
images as well as the availability of the actual products.10
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, print advertisement
continued to rise in importance along with popular newspaper and magazine
readership. Better economic conditions in the United States and Cuba after World
War II also facilitated competition for advertisers to spur consumption. In the United
States two of the larger mainstream periodicals, Time and Life Magazines, contained a
vast amount of advertisements that reached over three million homes. In Cuba,
Bohemia magazine, which had was first printed at the beginning of the twentieth
Nationality, and Culture (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press,
1999), 130-134.
10
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century, became the island’s largest magazine with a circulation of over a million
copies in 1959.11 Bohemia was read primarily by Cuba’s educated wealthy and
middle-classes. Comparison of the advertisements in Bohemia to those in Time and
Life reveal a multitude of product promotions that were literally mirror images of one
another, with only the advertising copy changed from English to Spanish. Because the
images were essentially the same, Cubans were repeatedly exposed to U.S.
constructions of race, class, gender, and family models. In many of these
advertisements the images reveal dominant North American social constructions, not
actual realities but an idealized vision of a “step up” from reality that the product
could supposedly provide.12 The ads were also drawn to show how a certain products
would make the consumer more modern and advanced because of the purchase. If
there were people depicted in the advertisements, they were usually young, white, and
affluent. In many advertisements wholesome family—units a man and a woman with
two children, a boy and a girl—were also pictured. The advertisements portrayed
these families as having been made happier by the purchase of whatever product was
being promoted.
U.S. and Cuban advertisements often touted new products or services as a way
to make family life better. The idealized families in advertisements were visual
clichés—white, happy, good-looking—that did not reflect the class and racial realities
11
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of either society. These idealized families were also male-dominated, with father
figures playing the central role in the advertisements as they were assumed to play
within a family unit. By constantly repeating these idealized visions of families, they
were normalized in both societies. In a 1957 U.S. Keds advertisement from Bohemia
a family of four is depicted as walking hand in hand, made apparently all the more
joyous because of the Keds shoes on their feet. [See Figure 1.1] In the illustration the
father is depicted as holding both of his children by the hand; the mother holds only
the hand of the youngest. This places the father as breadwinner and protector of his
children at the center of the family circle, the ultimate authority, having provided the
means for the shoes that the family now wears. This type of patriarchal image was
often repeated in Cuban and U.S. advertisements for a multitude of products
including banks, cars, gasoline, soda, televisions, travel, and tires to name but a few.
In an advertisement for Pan American airlines, advertisers envisioned a
similar family circle, this time flying to Europe for a vacation via New York. [See
Figure 1.2] Even though the majority of Cubans in the 1950s would have been
unable to afford this type of vacation, the image still communicated what an idealized
version of a family looked like. In this advertisement the father was pictured as
pointing at something through the window for his oldest child to look at like the
father is the teacher. The mother in the advertisement also looks from a window but is
far more passive, busy instead with two younger children. This ad again visually
places the father as the most important member of the family. The idealized
patriarchal family, like the Ricardos in I Love Lucy, where husbands and fathers were
ultimately in control, bound both countries in the same fiction through idealized
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definitions of shared family values.13 These idealized visions of family with subtexts
of patriarchy and masculinity would play a continuous role in the relationship
between the two nations.
One place where advertisers assumed 1950s women in both U.S. and Cuban
cultures to have control without the aid of men was in the kitchen. The marketing of
U.S. appliances in Cuba provides several examples of consumer products promoted
as central to domestic happiness. At the turn of the century, the U.S.-owned Cuban
Electric Company began electrifying the island using the same current (110 volts) as
the United States, making appliances immediately transferable between the two
countries.14 U.S. appliance makers could literally plug their products in on the island.
A multitude of U.S. brands of dishwashers, blenders, mixers, and toasters were
marketed to Cubans as the key to domestic bliss and as part of a modern family unit.
Household appliances like Frigidaire refrigerators were advertised with the same
appeal of convenience and luxury with only slight differences in approach. [See
Figures 1.3 and 1.4] In each of the 1957 Frigidaire advertisements a stylized white
woman stood over the appliances. She was dressed in eveningwear to emphasize the
idea of sophistication and luxury of the product. Both advertisements emphasized the
“sheer look” of the product, as if the appliance itself could become an extension of
the sophistication of the consumer and a means of self-expression. Although most
consumers would not normally wear formal clothes, the dressing of the models in this
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fashion connected the viewer to an idealized lifestyle a step up from their own. This
step up was also apparent in the contents of the Cuban refrigerator. The appliance was
a modern day cornucopia overflowing with every type of food imaginable. In filling
the refrigerator, advertisers were suggesting abundance for the Cuban consumer and
the better life that a modern appliance could bring. This differed from the U.S.
advertisement, showing empty shelf space that was assumed would be eventually
filled but did not need to be illustrated with food in order for the product to still
appeal to a U.S. audience.
Advertisers used similar images in marketing a variety of products—Emerson
televisions, Esso gasoline, General Electric appliances, and Goodrich tires, to name
but a few. Cubans were also encouraged to literally consume, like their North
American neighbors, through advertisements for packaged food products such as
Coca Cola, Del Monte vegetables, and Kellogg’s Corn Flakes. Fashion, personal
hygiene, and leisure were also advertised in similar ways in both Cuba and the United
States with images of white men and women portrayed as the primary consumers.
U.S. products outnumbered Cuban products almost ten to one reflecting and
normalizing U.S. commercial dominance on the island.

“Cuba: Holiday Island of the Tropics”
In addition to consumer goods, tourism also created a point of contact
between the two nations. Like the fictional trip of the Ricardos took to Havana in I
Love Lucy, tourists from the U.S. frequently made the short trip by cruise ship, car
ferry, or plane to Cuba. Tourism promoters planned the primary destinations for U.S.
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tourists in Cuba, Havana and Varadero Beach, to include music, food, and
accommodation that were all familiar to the U.S. consumers. Cuban and U.S. tourism
promoters marketed the island to U.S. consumers in two main ways, as a foreign
destination that was still familiar and close to the United States, and as a place for
North Americans to escape from the moral confines and rules of U.S. society. The
tourism industry filtered and normalized Cuban culture for the U.S. tourism market
and became a constant source of Americanized images of Cuba for U.S. citizens,
while creating another avenue for U.S. culture to permeate the island. Like U.S.
product importation and advertisement, mass tourism created another “contact zone”
between the two cultures and became another way that the two countries were
intimately connected in a relationship that ultimately favored the United States over
Cuba through the creation of laws, places, and promotions that encouraged U.S.
tourists to know Cuba not as an equal neighbor but as a product to be consumed.15
U.S. tourism to Cuba increased steadily after World War I. In 1919, the Cuban
government set up the Cuban Tourist Commission to promote U.S. tourism to the
island. The commission would eventually have offices in Havana, Miami, and New
York. Part of the early boom in U.S. tourists to Cuba was based on Havana’s
15

For an explanation of the term “contact zone” as a site of negotiation and
exchange see Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation
(New York: Routledge, 1992), 6-7; Cuban tourism promotion promoted all things
familiar to North American tourists. See for example, Cuban Tourist Commission,
Guia Nacional Del Viajero/Travelers Guide to Cuba, 1941-1942 (Havana: Cuban
Tourist Commission, 1941); Cuban Tourist Commission, Cuba: Ideal Vacation
Land, Tourist Guide, 1949-1950 (Miami, FL: Cuban Tourist Commission, 1949);
Cuban Tourist Commission, Cuba: Ideal Vacation Land, Tourist Guide, 1953-1954
(Miami, FL: Cuban Tourist Commission, 1953); For discussions on U.S. tourism’s
impact in Cuba see Louis A. Pérez, On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and
Culture (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999),166-198.
33

popularity during U.S. Prohibition (1920-1933). During Prohibition, North Americans
knew Cuba as a place to get away from U.S. liquor laws and gamble. Images of travel
to the island in Hearst newsreels from the 1930s featured U.S. visitors gambling,
dancing, and drinking in what was dubbed the “carefree and gay center of the
Americas.” Images of drinking were also highlighted in another Hearst newsreel on
the horseracing season in Havana. The abundance of liquor was almost as important
as the races, as the commentator stated, “if you lose, it doesn’t matter; there’s plenty
of drink to drown your sorrows.” This reputation that the island laid outside the
bounds of U.S. laws and morality would remain a popular U.S. perception of the
island until the 1959 revolution. 16
After World War II, the Cuban government aggressively pushed to increase
U.S tourism to the island. The Cuban government supported corporate efforts of
companies building hotels by granting them tax breaks and gaming licenses. On May
26, 1948, the Cuban government passed one of the most important tourism
development laws. Known as “Presidential Decree Number 1798,” this law exempted
hotels from paying taxes to the Cuban government. Because many of the hotels were
owned and operated by U.S. hotel entrepreneurs, this decree allowed for more capital
16
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to be exported back to the United States. These types of tax incentives spurred hotel
development on the island and paved the way for an influx of U.S. tourists in the
1950s. In addition to hotel development, from 1951 until 1957 the Cuban government
spent over fifteen million pesos on tourism infrastructure improvements. These
projects included new and improved roads, bridges, airports, aqueducts, parks, and
buildings. In addition, public health improvements such as sewers, paved streets, and
mosquito fumigation were undertaken with the goal of making Cuba more appealing
for U.S. tourists.17
The Cuban government also worked with U.S. investors to create other tourist
destinations on the island. One example of this type of cooperation was the tourist
resort of Varadero Beach. Varadero is located one hundred and forty kilometers east
of Havana, approximately ninety minutes by car. Irénée DuPont, president of the
DuPont Chemical Corporation, originally bought land in Varadero in 1926 to grow
henequen in order to make rope. DuPont became enamored with Varadero and
commissioned a large estate to be built for his family called “Xanadu.” By 1931,
DuPont had bought up the majority of the land on the peninsula and began developing
an exclusive resort for DuPont and General Motors executives. These developments
included roads and an aqueduct that brought water from the San Juan River to the
peninsula to service his estate. By the mid-1940s, DuPont had sold off large portions
of the peninsula to tourism investors. The Cuban government participated with U.S.
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business owners to develop the resort area for foreign visitors and Cuba’s elite. In
1949, “Presidential Decree No. 2904” established the “Via Blanca Project” to link the
cities of Havana and Varadero. This multi-million dollar road project was designed
to connect the two main tourism hubs in order to facilitate travel between both
locations.18
With increased government spending, corruption also became widespread in
the Cuban tourism industry, especially under the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista
(1952-1959). Batista helped pass several laws encouraging hotel construction on the
island by offering investors a Cuban gaming license with any hotel costing more than
a million dollars. The resulting explosion in casino building and Batista’s friendly
relationship to organized crime figures in the United States encouraged a mass
migration of the U.S. Mafia to the island. Although the U.S. Mafia had been active in
Havana since prohibition, Batista’s outright dealings with the crime syndicates
greatly increased its presence and influence on the island during the 1950s. Meyer
Lansky, the famous Jewish gangster and “Lucky” Luciano’s right-hand man, went to
Cuba after his release from prison in 1953. Batista had lived just up the road from
Lansky’s illegal casino in Daytona Beach, Florida, in the 1940s and welcomed the
gangster to Havana with open arms, appointing him as his national gaming
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supervisor. Gangsters ran hotels throughout the island: Meyer Lansky at the Rivera,
Jake Lansky at the Nacional, Santo Trafficante at the Sans Soucí. Cuban tourism’s
association with organized crime reinforced for Americans the image of the island as
a place where U.S. tourists could participate in any number of illicit activities.19
During the 1950s, the economic upsurge in the United States made travel not
only appealing but also financially possible for a larger segment of the U.S.
population. In June of 1956, the New York Times reported that approximately fifty
million people, roughly one third of the U.S. population, would be taking a summer
holiday. This shift in custom from a smaller traveling public to a larger mass tourism
culture in the United States helped to create a new generation of American tourists
who increasingly headed south to Cuba. Tourism to Cuba from the United States
reached its pre-revolutionary zenith in 1957 with over 350,000 arrivals. More than
85% of all tourists to Cuba before 1959 came from the United States. Tourism
allowed for personal connections between the two cultures while the multitude of
images produced in tourism promotions that celebrated these linkages. 20
The North American public’s visions of Cuba was often shaped through
images in travel magazines and tourism advertising whether the readers traveled to
19
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the island or not. Because of the proximity of each country to the other, one of the
main selling points was the ease of travel between the two countries. Tourist
advertisers promoted the idea that Cuba was geographically connected to the United
States—just a short jump from New York or Miami. Advertisers and travel writers
continuously heralded this proximity as a benefit to both countries, emphasizing it on
maps and magazine descriptions.21 In an Esso Oil Touring Map, Cuba was drawn
with lines connecting it as if by bridges to Miami, New York, and New Orleans. [See
Figure 1.5] The lines emanating from the cities create an image of movement and
visual linkages between the two countries. The map also includes illustrations of
commodities that would be flowing on the lines and tourism points of interest and
activities. An Omni Bus Traveler’s Guide includes pictures of an airplane, cruise
ship, and bus in Havana. [See Figure 1.6] The illustration emphasizes the different
types of transportation that were readily available to the U.S. tourist to conveniently
travel to the island and on it after arrival.
Transportation technologies were one of the keys to mass tourism to Cuba.
Daily ferry service from Key West, Miami, and New Orleans connected the two
countries and allowed passengers to bring their own automobiles to use upon
arrival.22 Technological advances in airplanes, which had been improved out of
21
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wartime necessity, further spurred Cuba’s popularity as a travel destination.
Construction of airfields during the 1940s provided the infrastructure for air travel
after the war.23 Multiple airlines vied for the tourist business between the U.S. and
Cuba. Braniff International Airways, Cubana de Aviación, Delta Airlines, National
Airways, Pan American Airways, and Royal Dutch Airways (KLM) all flew to
Havana and emphasized the speed of daily flights between the two countries: from
Key West forty-five minutes, from Miami sixty-five minutes, and from New York
five hours direct.24 Airline advertising touted the latest advances in technology to take
people, with optimum speed and efficiency, to their holiday destinations. The speed
of air travel allowed U.S. tourists to enjoy weekend getaways to the island.25 The
Varadero International Hotel marketed itself as an ideal place to come just for a
weekend:
Varadero Beach is as close to New York as your nearest airport. From Havana
by air 30 minutes, by car 2 hours. In fact, it's a matter of hours from any part
of the U.S. Its accessibility makes it possible for you to come down just for a
weekend.26
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Airlines made the geographic proximity of the two countries seem even closer. Now
the ninety miles of water was reduced to mere minutes. The image of an almost
effortless connection to the island was further cemented into U.S. public viewpoint.
Cuban travel laws and policies also favored status enjoyed by U.S. tourists on
the island. This status included the flexible entrance requirements for United States
citizens traveling to Cuba. In 1946, U.S. tourists were allowed to stay up to six
months on the island and needed only proof of U.S. citizenship (no passport or visas)
to enter Cuba.27 By the middle of the 1950s U.S. tourists could enter and leave Cuba
multiple times for up to two and a half years with the same tourist card.28 By contrast,
Guatemala, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic permitted U.S. tourists to stay
thirty days while El Salvador allowed U.S. tourists to stay for only eight days. U.S.
and Canadian tourists traveling to Cuba were required to have a landing card, a birth
certificate, a round trip ticket, but no passports.29 These policies applied only to U.S.
and Canadian tourists and allowed U.S. tourists to see Cuba more as an extension of
U.S. territory than as a separate country. This perception was strengthened even
further by the more standard requirements for tourists from other nations. Citizens of
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countries in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere in Latin America all needed passports and a
visa to visit the island.30
Other policies strengthened the message of familiarity and safety for U.S
travelers who, like Ricky Ricardo, were made to feel “at home” in Cuba. U.S. visitors
were not required to exchange currency on the island because the Cuban peso was
valued at the same rate as the U.S. dollar and was accepted in lieu of pesos
throughout Cuba. Just as dollars were a translatable form of currency, tourist
promoters assured visitors that English was widely spoken throughout Cuba. Tourists
were also assured that a branch of the Cuban national police known as “the Tourist
Police” would give them special protection. The police were there for U.S. tourists
and were identified with an armband marked “National Police-Speak English.” If any
dispute arose between a U.S. tourist and a Cuban national, the tourist police would
intervene. And if need be, a delegate from the Cuban government’s Cuban Tourist
Commission would represent the tourist in Cuban court.31
Travel advertisements, magazines, and guidebooks promoted this privileged
status of Americans traveling to Cuba. Many of the advertisements and photographs
in U.S. travel magazines and newspapers represented Cuba’s landscape as devoid of
the local population. In some advertisements featuring Cuban beaches, the images did
not contain any people at all. Advertisers and travel magazines depicted Cuban
beaches as empty, naturally beautiful, an unknown paradise apparently waiting to be
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discovered by U.S. tourists.32 One travel map of the Caribbean described it as “a vast
playground for island-hoppers,” while another proclaimed: “The tourist, 457 years
after Columbus, is rediscovering the West Indies.”33 In the same way that Cuban
tourist policies and laws cleared the way for the U.S. tourist industry, the images and
metaphors of the island as an undiscovered land also reinforced that Cuba was ripe
for the taking by U.S. tourists.
If and when Cuban nationals were pictured, it was most often serving U.S.
tourists. Cubans in these photographs were often darker skinned than the U.S.
tourists. These images reflected and reinforced racial and class hierarchies between
the two countries. Cubans were seemingly in their own country to serve the needs of a
U.S. tourist audience. A February 1949 issue of Holiday Magazine featured an article
on touring the West Indies, and contained two pages devoted to photos of Varadero
Beach. The middle of the page proclaimed, “In winter, Varadero Beach turns into an
American Colony.” The photos featured North American tourists enjoying themselves
in different ways on the beach. There were photos of a Cuban man cutting a little
boy’s hair, an older couple from the United States enjoying the beach, a Cuban man
throwing a net into the water, a North American tourist buying shells from an older
and darker-skinned Cuban man, and a young girl pulling an inflatable raft into the
water. The U.S. visitors pictured were all white and outnumber the Cubans ten to one.
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The caption for one photo read “a girl from Alabama braves the Varadero surf in
February, an unthinkable season for most Cubans. They swim in summer only, when
the water improves to an average of 70 degrees.” Cuban beaches were apparently
vacant accept for U.S. tourists, who also just happen to be attractive, apparently
single, blondes from Alabama. [See Figure 1.7] This image also conveyed a
racialized subtext that it was safe for white women to travel to Cuba because of the
absence of Afro -Cubans on the beach. According to the caption, Cubans would not
be at the beach until the summer rendering the space clear for U.S. visitors to enjoy.
The appeal of the familiar within the exotic and the image of a “safe” environment for
U.S. tourists facilitated increased travel between the Cuba and the United States and
furthered the intimate connections between the two neighbors. 34
Although many of the advertisements and images promoted this idea that the
island was safe and familiar, advertisers also marketed Cuba as an escape from the
normal bounds of morality in the United States. Guidebooks, magazine articles, and
advertisements all pointed to how Cuba permitted U.S. citizens to behave outside the
codes of U.S. normal behavior.35 The majority of these images revolved around the
perception that Cuba as providing the backdrop for a love affair or anonymous sex.
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These images of Cuba as a North American playground were mirrored in Hollywood
films from the time period. The films Week-End in Havana (1941), Cuban Pete
(1946), Holiday in Havana (1949), Affair in Havana (1957), and A Night in Havana
(1957), portrayed the island as a romantic getaway for U.S. visitors.
Week-End in Havana was one of the most popular films using Cuba as the
location for a romantic musical. In the film, the McCracken Steamship Company’s
Ship Cuban Queen, while in route to Havana, ran into a reef off the coast of Florida.
The vice-president of the company, Jay Williams (John Payne), arrived in Florida to
secure waivers from the passengers to protect the company from a lawsuit. Jay
needed every passenger to sign the waiver before he could return to New York and
get married. Jay was able to collect all of the signatures he needed except for one,
Nan Spencer (Alice Faye), a shop girl from Macy’s. Nan refused to sign the waiver
until the company delivered on its travel-brochure promises of a good time in
Havana. Desperate for the signature, Jay agreed to travel with Ms. Spencer to Havana
to guarantee her good time, going so far as to hire Monte Blanca (Cesar Romero) to
be her lover. Doe-eyed Nan looked at everything in Havana and swooned, “I just
knew it would be romantic.” The films’ musical numbers sung by Carmen Miranda,
Cesar Romero, as well as Payne and Faye, contained these themes of romance as
well. “Tropical Magic,” “Romance and Rhumba,” and “When I Love, I Love”
reinforced this idea of romance for the North American tourist in Cuba. Eventually
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Jay himself was also overtaken by the allure of Cuba. He fell for Nan, broke off his
engagement, and lived happily ever after. 36
Like Nan Spenser, Lucy in the I Love Lucy show traveled to Cuba for a
weekend with the hope of meeting a man. Lucy’s romantic efforts aboard ship were
foiled but once in Havana she met Ricky Ricardo, a taxi driver with show business
ambitions. Lucy learned that her new love wanted to come to the United States and
start a musical career. After more hilarity involving Lucy’s inebriation and
incarceration, she landed Ricky a job in Rudy Vallee’s orchestra while at the same
time securing a husband for her.37 For U.S. women, popular depictions of Cuba
concentrated on the possibility of romance and marriage, while for U.S. men they also
focused on Cuba as a place that offered the possibility for anonymous sex.
The tourist advertisements and promotional literature echoed these romantic
images from films and titillated consumers with the possibility of sex. One
advertisement touted Cuba as being a place “where even business is a pleasure and
your pleasure is our business.”38 The advertisements for opening of the new Varadero
International Hotel, took on a sensual tone:
Your room has a big picture window and a balcony. You can reach out and
touch the rustling palms. By day it’s a beautifully appointed modern
apartment, by night it becomes a luxurious bedroom with the moon and stars
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just inches away. Here at the Varadero International there are so many
enticing charms, you'll want to stay forever…39
The sexual subtext of travel to the island was even present even in airline
advertisements. [See Figure 1.8] Delta’s “velvet ride” to Havana pictured a blackgloved female hand caressing the phallus of a jet plane. This not-so-subtle sexual
subtext was marketed along with the traditional emphasizes on speed and connection
to the island. The advertisers seemed to suggest that if one flew Delta to Cuba,
pleasure was sure to be fast at hand.
Cuba was also sexualized for U.S. tourists through images of Cuban dancers.
[See Figure 1.9-1.11] Tourism advertisements and magazine articles contained
images of scantily clad Cuban women in alluring poses who were seemingly available
to the U.S. male tourist. Images of dancing, especially the rumba, were equated with
sex, and guidebooks encouraged North American tourists to visit Cuba to “improve
your rumba where the rumba was born.” Tourist magazines described the rumba as
“torrid,” “a burlesque of barnyard courtship.”40 Dancing was tied into the idea that
Cubans were sexual available to their North American guests. The sexualized dancers
also played to racial stereotypes that would not challenge the U.S. tourist market. The
women were often light skinned Cubans who may have been considered more
appealing to a male U.S. audience. If there was a Cuban male dance partner, he was
often pictured as a light skinned Afro-Cuban man in effeminate costumes. The race
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and costumes made male Cubans potentially less threatening to U.S. men. Tourism
advertisements played to the 1950s racial hierarchy that assumed white U.S. male
superiority to Afro -Cubans. Additionally, the male Cubans’ frilly dance costumes
worn in the photographs suggest homosexuality again removing them as a potential
threat to women tourists or to the desires of U.S. tourists for Cuban women. The
images of sexuality in tourism advertisements favored a U.S. tourism audience over
their Cuban hosts.
With the large amounts of advertising, ease of transportation, and lax entry
requirements for U.S. citizens, tourism to Cuba continued to expand and flourish,
enhancing for Americans the perception of the bond between the two nations.
However, for most Cubans, tourism became one of the most glaring examples of the
inequality that existed on the island. While North American guests could enjoy the
lavish casinos of Havana and white sands of Varadero, the majority of Cubans
languished behind in severe poverty that kept them confined to subsistence
agriculture and illiteracy. As more hotels and public works projects kept money and
investment limited to the capital and its environs, the further reaches of the island
became notoriously neglected. Batista’s loyalists profited from the corruption and
graft but a majority of Cubans came to resent the dishonest and illegitimate
government.41
The ease of travel between the two countries did not apply in the same way to
Cubans traveling to the United States. Most Cubans could not afford to travel to the
United States. Those that did had to meet requirements that were almost the exact
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opposite of what U.S. citizens faced in Cuba. To enter the United States, Cuban
tourists were required to have a valid passport and were only permitted to stay for a
total of thirty days.42 Cuban pesos needed to be exchanged for U.S. dollars in order
for Cuban tourists to spend money even in Miami. Spanish was certainly spoken and
understood in many places that Cubans would visit but travel advertisements did not
include the promise of language accessibility. This inequality in tourism practices was
consistent with the relationship between the two countries, in that the connection
ultimately favored the U.S. citizens over their Cuban counterparts.

Conclusion
Throughout the twentieth century the United States increased its economic,
military, and cultural dominance throughout Latin America. Because of geographic
proximity, Cuba and the United States had always had close relations. Following
World War II, the strength of their northern neighbor forced Cuba to operate in an
economic, political, and cultural space that was largely controlled by the United
States. During this period, the cultural connections between the two countries became
even more intimate. Cubans, especially the middle and upper class in Havana,
embraced a myriad of cultural forms including baseball, Hollywood films, and a wide
range of consumer products. Not only were the products themselves North American
but so were the ways they were advertised on the island. Advertisements for U.S.
products found in popular Cuban periodicals became a primary means that idealized
visions of U.S. culture were spread on the island.
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North Americans came into contact with Cuba through images contained in
advertisements, television shows, and tourism. Tourism provided the most personal
connection between the two countries both in images and in practice. The Cuban
government encouraged the development the tourist industry on the island through
the creation of laws, accommodations, and promotions designed to ease travel for
U.S. visitors. Tourists from the United States frequently made the short trip an island
that by all appearances had been set up primarily for North American visitors. These
tourist locations in Havana and Varadero Beach, included music, food, and lodging
designed to be familiar to U.S. consumers. Cuban and U.S. tourism promoters
produced images of the island as a foreign destination where North Americans could
feel at home but also if they chose to escape from the normal morality of U.S. society.
The tourism industry and its visions of the island became another way that the two
countries connected in a relationship that ultimately favored the United States over
Cuba.
The images contained in popular culture that flowed back and forth across the
Florida Straits held more than just the record of the products or places that they were
meant to advertise. These images also contained the visual cues through which the
general public in each country came to know one another. Because North American
cultural forms and consumer products dominated Cuban society, images in the
advertising of U.S. products included dominant U.S. constructions of family, race,
class, and gender. Through these images Cubans came to know their northern
neighbors and came to judge their own progress and success based on oftenunobtainable U.S. standards. In the United States, the popular television show, I Love
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Lucy, allowed U.S. viewers to see their Cuban neighbors as metaphorically married to
the United States and sharing cultural values. At the same time tourism images
promoted a vision of Cuba as subservient to U.S. interests and as a product to be
consumed. Both of these dominant U.S. views of Cuba—intimately connected yet
subservient—would add to the U.S. public’s shock when Cubans eventually broke
from these images to create an alternative reality.
While Cubans had been encouraged through consumer images to participate in
a version of the “American Dream,” the reality was that the relationship privileged
North Americans over their Cuban neighbors. Although some Cubans enjoyed a
standard of living superior to other Latin Americans, poverty was still widespread on
the island. The reality of Cuban “Lucky Guy” Ricky Ricardos who could travel
between Cuba and the United States was almost non-existent for most Cubans in the
1950s. Instead the connections to their northern neighbors had brought to the island
increased prosperity for the few and the corrupting influence of “Lucky” Lucianos.
The increasing cultural and financial inequality, when coupled with the corruption of
Batista’s government, brought Cuba into a crisis situation in early 1950s that would
eventually explode into the Cuban revolution.
Ultimately, the cultural connections forged between Cuba and the United
States were unequal, favoring “Lucky Guy” wealthy Cubans and U.S. tourists to the
detriment of the majority of middle and lower class Cubans. Fidel Castro would use
this cultural and financial inequality to his advantage and directly challenge the
connections to the United States in the name of Cuban nationalism. Castro was at first
able to use the connections to the United States in order to support his revolution with
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funds, arms, and a U.S. media frenzy that assisted in the victory of the revolution and
in his rise to power. He would later go on to use the same popular cultural images that
had promoted U.S. dominance on the island against the U.S. in order to support his
revolution at home and abroad. Indeed the connections promoted by popular culture
that had favored the U.S. markets and tourists would be overturned and replaced with
a popular culture of Cuban independence that directly responded to what the
revolution would label the “tyranny of capitalism imposed from without.” The
rallying cry of Cuban nationalism and identity would subvert the siren’s call of the
“American Dream,” as the “Holiday Island of the Tropics” and the unequal
connections to the United States became a rallying cry for sustained rebellion.

51

Figure 1.1 U.S. Keds advertisement Bohemia March 3, 1957 p. 129

52

Figure 1.2 Pan American Airlines Bohemia January 27, 1957, p. 103
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Figure 1.3 Cuban Frigidaire advertisement. Bohemia 10 February 1957, 34.
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Figure 1.4 U.S. Frigidaire advertisement. Life Magazine 18 February, 1957.
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Figure 1.5 The map was printed in English, Spanish, and French and was designed
for the traveler who was bringing their own vehicle. Cuba and the U.S. are shown as
connected by enumerable transportation lines. Each of the countries had drawings of
the major exports, historical and geographical points of interest, and entertainment
possibilities for the tourist. Esso Standard Oil Touring Map The Caribbean with the
Bahamas and Bermuda (New York: General Drafting Company, 1951)
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Figure 1.6 In an Omni Bus timetable from the early forties the emphasis on
transportation the airplane, ship, and bus all making Cuba easily reached. Cuban
Tourist Commission, Guia Nacional Del Viajero/Travelers Guide to Cuba, 19411942 (Havana: Cuban Tourist Commission, 1941), 30-31.
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Figure 1.7 A.J. Liebling, “The Greater Antilles of the West Indies,” Holiday 5:2
(February, 1949), 38-39.
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Figure 1.8 Delta Airlines, “The Velvet Ride,” Advertisement, ASTA Convention
Program, October, 1959.
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Figure 1.9 A.J. Liebling, “The Greater Antilles of the West Indies,” Holiday 5:2
(February, 1949), 37.
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Figure 1.10 Cuba: Holiday Island of the Tropics (Miami: Cuban Tourist
Commission, 1949)
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Figure 1.11 Holiday 10:6 December, 1951, 184.
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CHAPTER TWO
Robin Hood, Reporters, and Real Men: Fidel Castro’s
Honeymoon with the U.S. Media, 1955-1959

I can tell you with complete confidence that in 1956
we will either be free men or we will be martyrs.
That means that in 1956 we will be fighting in
Cuba.
—Fidel Castro, New York, (1955)
This was quite a man—a powerful six-footer, oliveskinned, full-faced, with a straggly beard…It was
easy to see that his men adored him…Here was an
educated, dedicated, fanatic, a man of ideals, of
courage, and of remarkable qualities of leadership.
—Herbert Matthews, New York Times, (1957)
And there is one particular man I want to tell you
about who stood before them all called Fidel
Castro…It doesn’t take more than a minute to
realize that here was a man a real man.
—Errol Flynn, Cuban Story, (1959)
The people of the United States, they have great
admiration for you and your men because you are in
the real American tradition of a George
Washington.
—Ed Sullivan, Interviewing Fidel Castro, (1959)

On the rainy night of November 25, 1956, eighty-two men boarded a
dilapidated American yacht named the Granma and set out from exile in Mexico to
begin a revolution in Cuba. The rebels drifted for six miles down the Tuxpán River
and into the turbulent waters of the Gulf of Mexico. As the Granma entered the Gulf,
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the men began to sing La Bayamesa, the Cuban national anthem. But their
exhilaration was short lived. The journey from the Mexican harbor to the East Coast
of Cuba was, by all accounts, a nightmare. Heavy seas, mechanical problems, and
sickness plagued the revolutionaries on the over-crowded sixty-foot vessel. Their
food and water ran out and they became lost. One of the rebels, Roberto Roque, fell
overboard and the Granma had to circle for over an hour to find him in the darkness.
The voyage left the men exhausted and disoriented. What was supposed to have taken
four days lasted seven. On December 2, 1956, unbeknownst to U.S. tourists enjoying
the beginnings of another winter season in Cuba, the Granma ran aground just off the
coast of the island’s Oriente Province at Los Cayuelos. As the 26 of July captain Juan
Manuel Márquez described it, “It wasn’t a landing, it was a shipwreck.”1
The boat came to rest more than a hundred yards offshore in thick mud. The
revolutionary band had to abandon all but the lightest equipment and could barely get
themselves to shore through the waist-deep mud. Instead of a beach, Castro and his
men encountered a dense mangrove swamp, which further impeded their progress. As
they struggled through the swamp, Cuban air force planes bombed and strafed the
1
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beleaguered band. The men of the 26 of July Movement finally made it to land,
exhausted and half-starved. Local peasants assisted them with food and water and led
them farther inland into the hills of the Sierra Maestra. On the fifth night after the
landing, a well-armed company of a hundred of Batista’s soldiers set upon the rebel
group. The firefight that ensued was disastrous for the rebel column. Although a
majority of the eighty-two revolutionaries were killed, a small band of twelve men
(the numbers vary) including the top leaders— Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, Camilo
Cienfuegos, and Argentine doctor Ernesto “Che” Guevara—escaped further into the
Sierra Maestra.
Increased activity by 26 of July Movement’s supporters in the United States,
the student movement in Havana, and the urban underground arm of the 26 of July
Movement had put Cuban armed forces on high alert and allowed them to be ready
for the Granma’s arrival. Castro himself had all but notified Fulgencio Batista’s
government of the exact time and place of his planned landing. In 1955, during his
seven-week tour of the United States to raise money to support the revolution, Castro
pledged to invade Cuba before the end of 1956. In typical style he boasted to a New
York audience of Cuban-Americans, “I can tell you with complete confidence that in
1956 we will either be free men or we will be martyrs.”2 Most of the 26 of July
landing force became the latter, but the landing in itself was a powerful image of
defiance against the Batista government.
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On December 3, 1956, the day following the landing, the front page headline
of the New York Times proclaimed, “Cuba wipes out invaders; Leader among forty
dead.” According to the wire service report, the revolutionaries had been caught out
in the open and killed by Cuban air and ground troops. The article featured an
Associated Press photo of a young, clean-shaven Castro with the caption, “Reported
Killed: Fidel Castro, leader of so-called revolutionary force.” The Cuban army
reported that they had identified the Castro brothers and other 26 of July Movement
leaders by documents found in their clothes.3 The Batista government erroneously
declared the Cuban revolution to be over before it began. These unconfirmed media
reports set the stage for the dramatic resurrection of Fidel Castro and the 26 of July
rebels from their fabricated deaths and served to further discredit the Batista regime
in the eyes of the U.S. and Cuban public.
The New York Times would soon overturn its own story about the demise of
the rebel leaders with a sensational account of Fidel Castro’s survival, his army’s
growing strength, and their heroic actions. What followed was a brief but intense love
affair between the U.S. media, Fidel Castro, and the U.S. public. Beginning in
February 1957, with New York Times reporter Herbert Matthews, and continuing over
the next two years, multitudes of U.S. journalists traveled to Cuba and brought back
stories of the bearded rebels of the Sierra Maestra. Like heroes in popular adventure
dramas, U.S. journalists presented the 26 of July fighters as renegades, Robin Hoodlike figures on the fringe of society struggling for justice against a harsh and
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dangerous world. The journalists who traveled to Cuba at this time also envisioned
themselves as actors on the revolutionary stage celebrating their own rebel spirit as
much as that of the Cuban fighters. These journalists would produce a wide array of
newspaper stories, magazine articles, and television programs that created an image
of the Cuban rebels as “real men” who were not afraid to put their beliefs into action.
These popular accounts not only portrayed the revolution as a fight against Batista but
also connected the Cuban struggle to the values idealized in the U.S.’s own
mythologized past of the U.S. founding fathers, western frontier myths, and the U.S.
wartime self-sacrifice to promote “freedom and democracy.” The stories about
Cuba’s “jungle fighters” inspired U.S. citizens to protest the Eisenhower
administration’s military aid to Batista’s government, to send money and arms to the
rebels, and in some cases to even join the fight alongside the revolutionaries in Cuba.
The U.S. visions of the bravery and fortitude of the 26 of July rebels were
similar to the images contained in popular Western films, jungle adventure stories,
and action comics of the 1940s and 1950s that formed the basis for what much of the
U.S. public imagined “real men” to be like. Like the heroes from Westerns, the U.S.
media presented Castro and his men as possessing exemplary masculine virtues—
brave and decisive, willing to risk everything for what they believed. As in these U.S.
popular myths, U.S. journalists depicted 26 of July rebels as capable of violence and
bloodshed but also possessing fatherly love for their families and the Cuban nation.
As the U.S. media equated the Cuban revolutionaries with popular visions of “true
manhood,” Fidel Castro became the ultimate vision of the romanticized masculine
ideal—a courageous, idealistic, father figure. Even though the United States official
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sided with the Batista government, the intimate popular connections between the
United States and Cuba produced an alternative relationship between the two
countries. This separate relationship allowed the rebels to cultivate and construct a
favorable vision of themselves for the U.S. and Cuban public and for the U.S. public
to feel personally connected to Fidel Castro and the 26 of July Movement before they
entered into Havana.4

A Revolution Resurrected: Herbert Matthews and the Reporter/Rebel Hero
According to 1950s statistics, Cuba had one of the highest standards of living
in Latin America. These numbers did not reflect the reality for the majority of Cubans
because the wealth of the country was concentrated in the capital and in the hands of
the very few. The island had in essence two economies, one centered in Havana that
was connected to the U.S. consumer economy and the other in the countryside
comprised mainly of poor subsistence farmers who were disenfranchised and looked
down upon by their fellow citizens in the capital. These class lines reflected Cuban
racial lines as well: the wealthiest Cubans were white, the poorest black. Afro-Cubans
were denied access not only to bastions of white privilege such as Havana’s private
4
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social clubs and beaches, but also to basic education and health care. These economic
and racial inequalities on the island combined with an almost constant state of
political turmoil punctuated by military coups and violence. This climate of political
instability was further exacerbated by Fulgencio Batista’s coup in 1952 and the
corruption and the brutality of his dictatorship. It was this combination of political
corruption, class and racial inequality, and increasing economic polarization that set
the stage for Fidel Castro and the Cuban revolution. 5
Throughout his dictatorship, Batista tried to control the negative reporting that
tarnished his image at home and abroad. The Cuban leadership was also disturbed by
the rising tide of pro-revolutionary propaganda from inside Cuba and the favorable
reporting in the U.S. press. By the late 1950s, Batista had implemented a censorship
campaign on the island in an attempt to ward off negative stories about his
government. When the New York Times arrived on the island, Cuban government
censors would literally cut out articles and editorials that were critical of the Batista
government.6 After the false reports of his death, Castro knew that Batista’s
censorship would prohibit the anti-Batista Cuban exile community from finding out

5

For accounts of Cuba’s economics, racial and class inequalities, and
Batista’s take over see Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation For All: Race, Inequality,
and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2001), 210-316; Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2004), 141-150; Herbert Matthews, The Cuban Story, (New
York: George Braziller, 1961), 54-60; Louis Pérez Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity,
Nationality, and Culture. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press,
1999), 446-505; Marifeli Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and
Legacy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 52-60.
6

United Press International, “Censors Use Scissors: Cuba Applies Old Means
of Handling U.S. Publications,” New York Times, February 17, 1957, p. 19.

69

that he was still alive and fighting. Many Cubans, including the deposed Cuban
president Carlos Prío Socarrás, had fled for the United States following Batista’s
coup. The ex-president would contribute large sums of money to the revolution,
including the 20,000 dollars used to purchase the Granma. Castro needed the
continued support of the Cuban exile community to aid the revolution financially.7 In
order to publicize their continuing struggle, Castro and the 26 of July Movement
revolutionaries prioritized getting a member of the U.S. press into the mountains.
Castro realized that support from the U.S. media would give the revolution increased
international legitimacy by publicly recognizing it as a threat and possible alternative
to the Batista government. The New York Times provided Castro and the 26 of July
Movement with exactly the type of publicity they needed.8
When Herbert Matthews reached his desk on December 3, 1956, the front
page of the New York Times contained the wire service report of Castro’s death.9

7

Carlos Prío Socarrás at one point claimed to have contributed over $250,000
to the revolution. For an account of Castro’s fundraising with the Cuban exile
community in the United States see Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United
States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), 15-33; Robert Quirk, Fidel Castro, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1993), 101-118; Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait, (New York: William Morrow
and Company, 1986), 325-371.
8

For discussions of Batista’s censorship and the 26 of July Movement’s desire for
publicity see United Press “Censors Use Scissors: Cuba Applies Old Means of Handling
U.S. Publications,” New York Times, February 17, 1957, 19; Paterson, Contesting Castro,
69-80.
9

Herbert Matthews was born in New York City in 1900. He enlisted in the
Army in 1918 and was sent to France with the United State’s Tank Corps but never
saw battle. He returned to the U.S. and graduated from Columbia University in 1922
and immediately went to work for the New York Times. He covered the Italian
invasion of Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil War, and World War II as a war
correspondent for the Times. After 1949 his ailing health forced a move back to New
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Matthews was skeptical of the story and knew that the Times correspondent in
Havana, Ruby Hart Philips, had plead unsuccessfully with her editors to hold the
story until she could independently confirm United Press International’s sources.
After the story of Castro’s death, the Times began reporting more on Cuba and the
growing rancor with the Batista regime both in Cuba and the United States. When 26
of July supporters approached Philips in Havana, seeking a U.S. reporter to publicize
the fact that Castro was alive, she immediately thought of Matthews. Philips cabled
her colleague to let him know about the potential story. Matthews wasted no time and
immediately made plans to travel to Cuba to interview the rebel leader.10
Matthews and his wife Nancie flew to Havana on February 9, 1957. From the
beginning, the trip to interview the rebel leader was colored with an air of adventure
and intrigue. Matthews met with Philips, who had arranged with 26 of July
Movement leaders to transport the couple from Havana to eastern side of the island.
On the fifteenth of February Javier Pazos, a student leader in Havana, Liliam Mesa, a
Havana socialite and Castro supporter, and Fastino Pérez, the 26 of July Movement
leader in Havana, picked up the journalist at the Sevilla Biltmore hotel. Together they
drove throughout the night, avoiding detection at army checkpoints to the city of
Manzanillo. Nancie Matthews stayed in Manzanillo while Herbert hiked with his
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guides up into the foothills of the Sierra Maestra.11
The rebel guides took Matthews to a camp that had been set up for the
purpose of the interview. Celia Sánchez Manduley, a revolutionary leader and one of
Castro’s most trusted confidants, instructed the eighteen rebels who were in the camp
to repeatedly march pass the reporter in order to create the impression of a larger
number of troops. Castro also played to these theatrics and implied that he was
commanding more men then were actually in the 26 of July Movement at the time.12
The interview lasted for more than three hours. Matthews had Castro sign and date
his notes to prove their authenticity. He also took several photos of the rebel leader
before returning to Havana. Nancie Matthews smuggled the notes and film out of the
country in her girdle. On the plane ride home, Matthews had already begun
formulating the story that would become the most important of his career.13
When he arrived in New York, Matthews immediately began writing. The
first of three articles appeared on the front page of the New York Times on February
24, 1957. The historic headline read “Cuban Rebel Is Visited In Hideout: Castro Is
Alive And Still Fighting In Mountains,” accompanied by a photo of a defiant Castro
holding a rifle. [See Figure 2.1] In many ways this was one of the most important
images of the revolution. It confirmed that Castro had survived and introduced the
world to the romanticized vision of the leader that would help bring him the necessary
11
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strength and support to win the revolution, while, casting even more doubt onto
Batista’s legitimacy and his hold over the island. Although the shade makes Castro’s
image dark and somewhat obscured, the photo conveys the idea of Castro standing
tall with his rifle hidden by an “impenetrable” landscape but very much a presence,
unafraid, and ready to fight. To prove the authenticity of the photo, the Times editors
included Castro’s dated signature under the photo.14
In the first article, Matthews detailed his own odyssey into the Sierra Maestra
to meet with Castro as if it were an adventure drama—hours of driving muddy back
roads, eluding army patrols, wading through icy streams, and clawing his way up
mountains—all to get the story. Matthews boasted that he had broken “the tightest
censorship in the history of Cuba,” and that no one outside of Cuba had seen Castro
or knew about the rebel leader’s survival before he reported it. He gave the
impression that he and Castro had both traveled great distances in order to meet. In
his article, Matthews celebrated his own bravery in getting the interview linking the
courage of his own journalistic enterprise to Castro and the revolution. In an internal
Times memo, Matthews boasted, “The articles on Fidel Castro and the Cuban
situation which I did in February have literally altered the course of Cuban history,
and the job I have done has also had a sensational impact on Cuban affairs.”15
Descriptions of this type of journalistic valor would be repeated by the multitudes of
U.S. reporters who followed in Matthews’ footsteps, trekking into the Sierra Maestra
14
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in order “to get the story,” seeing themselves as participants in the revolution not just
observers.16
In addition to glorifying his own journalistic triumph, Matthews extolled on
Castro’s charisma and masculine attributes. “The personality of the man is
overpowering,” Matthews observed, “It was easy to see that his men adored him and
also to see why he has caught the imagination of the youth all over the island. Here
was an educated, dedicated, fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage and of remarkable
qualities of leadership.” 17 Matthews also admired Castro’s physicality. He described
Castro as “quite a man—a powerful six-footer, olive-skinned, full-faced, with a
straggly beard.”18 Matthews and the other U.S. reporters’ depictions of Castro’s
physical prowess, intellect, and beard would play a dominant role in creating the
image of the idealized masculine rebel leader. Castro’s beard in particular would
become a lasting visual symbol of the revolution and the rebel leader. Castro’s beard
held so much attention because it differentiated him from the white, clean-shaven,
Ricky Ricardo-type Cubans that the U.S. public was used to. Because Batista had
vowed to summarily execute anyone his forces captured with a beard, the rebel beards
became symbols of commitment to the revolution and of personal bravery.
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Besides the description and photo of Castro, the first story also contained a
map entitled “Rebel Territory.” [See Figure 2.2] The map showed a large section of
Cuba, falsely implying that Castro and his forces dominated the entire eastern half of
the island. At the time of Matthews’s visit to Cuba, the Sierra Maestra provided the
rebels with good cover but they hardly controlled the eighty miles of mountains that
the map portrayed or any other large portion of Cuba. The map gave spatial
legitimacy to Castro and the 26 of July movement and implied that the group
possessed more strength than it actually did. Matthews went so far as to comment that
“…one got the feeling that he (Castro) is now invincible.”19 This assertion of the
inevitability of victory for Castro and the rebels would be repeated by many U.S.
reporters continually giving strength to the 26 of July Movement while undermining
Batista.
Matthews’ next two articles continued the same basic themes: Batista had the
upper hand for now, but was sure to be defeated; Castro was leading the youth of
Cuba, and symbolized hope for the nation; Castro’s fight was heroic, while Batista’s
continued dictatorship was barbaric and corrupt. In his third article, Matthews
reported on his meeting with José Antonio Escheverría, the leader of the
revolutionary University Student Directorate (DEU) in Havana. Matthews described
Escheverría as young and handsome, but was obviously not as enamored with the
student leader and the urban underground as he was of Castro and the mountain
fighters. U.S. reporters who followed Matthews also concentrated their efforts on
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interviewing the 26 of July Movement leaders, ignoring the other organizations
fighting the Cuban revolution. The image of the 26 of July rebels in the mountains
captivated the imaginations of U.S. readers more than that of the urban fighters.
Moreover, by June 1957, Batista’s forces had killed the most-important leaders of the
urban underground, José Antonio Escheverría in Havana and Frank País in Santiago
de Cuba. Batista’s troops and police had inadvertently helped solidify Castro and the
26 of July Movement place as the dominant revolutionary group in both image and
reality. Leaders of the 26 of July Movement would reinforce the historical myth of a
revolution centered primarily in the Sierra Maestra as part of its effort to consolidate
power after January 1959.20
Recognizing the potential impact of Matthews’ article, Batista’s government
responded with its own spin control. Batista’s Minister of Defense, Dr. Santiago
Verdeja, claimed that the stories were “a chapter in a fantastic novel.” He challenged
the New York Times to prove that the interview with Castro had actually taken place.
“Mr. Matthews has not interviewed the pro-Communist insurgent, Fidel Castro,” he
wrote: “and the information obtained came from certain oppositional sources. It is
noted that Matthews published a photograph saying that it was of Fidel Castro. It
seems strange that, having had an opportunity to penetrate the mountains and having
had such an interview, Matthews did not have a photograph taken of himself with the
pro-Communist insurgent in order to provide proof of what he wrote.” 21 In response,
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the Times published the minister’s statement along with a photo of Herbert Matthews
and Fidel Castro smoking cigars together in the Sierra Maestra, proving that Castro
was indeed alive and in command of the situation.22 [See Figure 2.3]
The New York Times and Herbert Matthews’ stories gave Castro the first
propaganda victory that he needed to ensure international interest in the insurgency.
Castro knew that his image and of the revolution were crucial in order to receive
funding and arms support from the Cuban exile community in the United States. The
articles established Castro in the minds of the U.S. audiences as the true leader of the
revolution. Matthews and the U.S. reporters who followed created a vision of the
invincibility of Castro’s revolutionary momentum and the inevitability of victory over
Batista. Throughout 1957 and 1958 the U.S. press perpetuated this romanticized
image of Castro as a “real man,” to be embraced by the U.S. public.

Mountains of Media Madness
Herbert Matthews not only raised Fidel Castro and the 26 of July Movement
from a prematurely reported death, he also created an instant celebrity and began a
U.S. media feeding frenzy. Immediately after the Matthews articles were published,
scores of journalists swarmed the island in the hopes of grabbing the next big scoop
on the rebels of the Sierra Maestra and the real life adventure happening only ninety
miles away. Throughout 1957 and 1958, the 26 of July Movement actively courted
and received continued support from the U.S. press. Time magazine alone ran over
thirty stories during 1957 and 1958, on the revolutionaries, and Batista’s inability to
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stop the rebellion. Among the most famous journalists to travel to the island during
this period were Jules Dubois (Chicago Tribune), Andrew St. George (Life and Look
Magazine), Robert Taber (CBS), and celebrity-turned-newsman Errol Flynn. With
each reporter the image of Castro and the 26 of July Movement was continuously
constructed as an adventurous, young, well-educated, and heroic fighting machine
pitted against the cruel and brutal dictatorship of Batista.23
The increasingly powerful medium of television also joined the ranks of the
image-making process during the Cuban revolution. In early March 1957, two NBC
television journalists, George Prentice and Anthony Falletti, traveled to the Oriente
Province interviewing and filming anti-Batista critics. The Cuban Military
Intelligence Service (SIM) detained the journalists and confiscated their film before
releasing them at the behest of the U.S. consulate. This suppressive act only created
more demand from eager rebels to have a U.S. television crew film them in the Sierra
Maestra.24 Castro and the 26 of July leadership realized the undeniable evidence that
television coverage could offer the rebels, since Batista still denied that Castro was a
real force. This opportunity came in late April 1957 when CBS sent journalist Robert
Taber and cameraman Wendell Hoffman to Cuba. Mario Llerena, who headed the 26
of July Movement Committee in New York, helped arrange for Taber and Hoffman to
be escorted into the Sierra Maestra where they met up with the 26 of July forces. The
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reporters were able to penetrate Batista’s barriers by posing as Presbyterian
missionaries on assignment to photograph their church’s schools on the island. The
duo spent close to two weeks with the revolutionaries filming and interviewing the
insurgents in the mountains. The result was the CBS documentary Rebels of the
Sierra Maestra: Cuba’s Jungle Fighters, which aired in May 1957. This film
provided U.S. audiences with the first televised accounts of the 26 of July rebels and
Fidel Castro, which left no doubt that the rebellion continued and was increasing in
strength.25
Utilizing the language of Hollywood action/adventure films, Rebels of the
Sierra Maestra: Cuba’s Jungle Fighters began with the narrator describing how
Robert Taber and Wendell Hoffman walked one hundred and fifty miles into the
mountains. Taber then took over the voice-over and described how difficult it was to
get into the eastern mountains. He portrayed the journey like something out of a spy
novel—sneaking through army roadblocks, avoiding detection and danger at every
turn in order to reach their goal. Taber boasted that they were lucky to avoid capture
and presented the viewer with the idea that Batista’s troops were actively pursuing the
film crew, although there is no evidence that this actually occurred. Like Matthews’
description of his heroic efforts to reach Castro, Taber boasted about the hardships
that they endured. While showing the blisters on their feet to the camera, Taber
reported that they toted seventy-five pounds of equipment one hundred and fifty miles
mostly uphill to “get the story.” Taber described their “mission,”
25
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Ours was a challenging but simple assignment. Not to explore the maze of
Cuban politics but instead to penetrate the maze of jungle mountains in
eastern Cuba and to find a rebel leader named Fidel Castro. The man the
Cuban government says isn’t there. However surrounding these mountains
some of the governments best troops. This then is the story of how we evaded
3,000 of these Cuban soldiers to join the rebels, to climb the remote Sierra
Maestra Mountains, and to interview Castro atop the highest mountain in
Cuba.26
Taber’s description made it sound as if the real story was that of his and Hoffman’s
getting into the Sierra Maestra to do the interview rather than the substance of the
interview itself.
“Two months and two tries, we finally got our news cameras into Castro’s
headquarters.” Taber recounted, “These are the guerilla fighters, our first real look at
them. This is the hardcore.” The viewer, through the footage and the voice-over,
understood that it was not just the rebels who were considered “hardcore” but the
reporters as well. Taber described the news assignment as a “mission,” further
depicting himself as not just a reporter but also an important actor in the revolution
itself. The importance of the U.S. reporters to the rebel cause was legitimate. Celia
Sánchez and Haydée Santamaría led the CBS team into the Sierra Maestra into the
mountains where two other 26 of July leaders, Camilo Cienfuegos and Raul Castro,
met them. The fact that four of the top commanders from the 26 of July Movement
personally escorted the reporters to their camp demonstrates the importance that the
rebel leadership placed on U.S. television crew’s presence.
After the footage of the journalists hiking into the mountains, Taber further
utilized Hollywood filmmaking techniques by having Castro and other 26 of July
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Movement troops hide in bushes and brandish their rifles while voice-over narration
introduced the “Jungle Fighters” to the sounds of flamenco guitar.
These are the guerilla fighters…Many of these men exiled to Mexico fought
their way back into Cuba last December. Spending five days at sea. Assaulted
by waves and Batista’s bombs in a sixty-foot PT Boat. Inside the mountains
they are untouchable. Outside the mountains they are out numbered 100 to
1…With Fidel Castro here are former clerks, technicians, students,
townspeople, and the simple campesinos, natives of these hills. All are
members of the movement of the 26 of July…27
Like Matthews’s articles, the program does not explore any of the other organizations
that were actively opposing Batista. Also like the New York Times articles, Taber
exaggerates the 26 of July Movement’s geographical reach. He reports: “The military
stronghold of the opposition lies to the east of the high sierra, which stretches for 200
miles along Cuba’s southern coast.” The film’s claim that the rebels were in control
of a large area “200 miles” of Cuba was false. At the time Taber interviewed Castro,
the 26 of July Movement was only safe in the farthest reaches of the Sierra Maestra
mountains. Statements about the Castro’s forces controlling a larger area suggested
that the rebels were more powerful and gave them added legitimacy. Taber could
have made a more accurate case for the broad reach of the insurrection had he
included the various factions who were fighting in Cuban cities but like Matthews
articles the focus of the show was limited as its title suggested, to the “Jungle
Fighters.”
In addition to the error on how much territory the rebels held, Taber’s use of
the word “jungle” to describe the Sierra Maestra was a misnomer. However, the
image of Castro fighting in the “jungle” enhanced the story of adventure that Taber
27
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wanted to tell about the revolution, and by association, himself. By referring to the
Sierra Maestra as a jungle, Taber also connected his story to other male-centered
adventure stories that the U.S. public of the 1950s would have been familiar with,
especially Tarzan. Like Westerns , Tarzan and jungle adventure stories would have
been a common point of reference for a U.S. audience from the multitudes of films,
serials, and comics of the 1940s and 1950s.28
After the initial introduction of Castro and the rebels, the film focused on
three American teens who had snuck off the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay to
join the rebel fighters. The U.S. Consulate in Santiago de Cuba, acting on behalf of
the boys’ parents, had requested that Taber and Hoffman try to convince the boys to
come out of the mountains and return to their families. The boys were seventeenyear-old Victor Buehlman, fifteen-year-old Michael Garvey, and twenty-year-old
Charles Ryan. [See Figure 2.4] In the film, the boys tested their courage and became
men in the Sierra Maestra. Like Tarzan’s enhanced masculinity from facing the
challenges of the jungle or men’s trials by violence in Westerns, Taber presented the
U.S. teens as learning to be men through the ordeals they were facing with the rebels.
Taber described the boys duties in the 26 of July army. “Mike is assigned to a light
machine gun with Castro’s rear guard.” Taber reported, “Chuck is rifle guard for the
machine gun.” Taber interviewed the boys and Charles Ryan spoke for all three. Ryan
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told Taber that they had come to the mountains out of a sense of duty. Ryan
proclaimed,
We came to do our part for the freedom of the world…We just felt moved to
come here and do our part. So we made contact with Cuban friends and asked
them if there was anything we could do to help their revolution to help them
to get freedom. So here we are in the Sierra Maestra.29
Journalists like Taber and Matthews echoed this sentiment and equated the Cuban
struggle against Batista with the ideals of what the United States stood for: freedom,
liberty, democracy. Castro praised the young Americans’ efforts but also gave them
permission to leave with the reporters and return to their families in Guantánamo.
Buehlman and Garvey chose to honor their parents’ wishes and leave with the CBS
team; Ryan elected to stay, and ended up fighting along side the rebels. He later went
on to do fundraising tours for the 26 of July Movement in the United States.
Taber’s portrayal of the U.S. teens and a subsequent Life magazine headline,
“In a Man’s War, U.S. Boys Quit,” summed up the tone of the episode involving the
young Americans. 30 Taber and the article implied that the “boys” from the United
States had been given an opportunity to prove themselves in the Cuban “jungle” but
had quit and failed to become men. Like Matthews’ portrayal, Taber presented the
revolutionaries as idealized masculine examples; the U.S. boys by comparison, were
not able to meet the challenges that would have put them on equal footing with the
equally young Cuban rebels. Only Charles Ryan, who was the oldest at twenty, was
able to take on the challenge. The revolutionaries saw the propaganda benefits of
29

Taber, Rebels of the Sierra Maestra, 1957.

30

“In Man’s War U.S. Boys Quit,” Life Magazine May 27, 1957 p. 43 and
Patterson, Contesting Castro, 85.

83

having U.S. boys in the Sierra but in reality were much more interested in funding
and weapons from the United States than recruits. Castro emphasized this to Taber
and explained that volunteers came into camp daily and were turned away because of
lack of equipment and appealed to U.S. viewers for arms and money but not boys
from Guantánamo.
At the end of the film, Taber hiked to the top of Pico Turquino to interview
Castro. Castro talked about how Batista could not force them out of the mountains.
Castro remarked that what Taber had seen was “just the beginning” and that “the last
battle will be fought in the capital, you can be sure.”31 The film ended with the rebels
singing the Cuban national anthem and holding up their weapons while crying out
“Viva!”32 Taber then concluded his narration by putting the emphasis back on
himself. Taber boasted, “Assignment completed. We have found Castro and our job is
done but the future chapters yet to be written in these green mountains of the Sierra
Maestra.” Like the Matthews articles, Rebels of the Sierra Maestra was a huge public
relations victory for Fidel Castro and the 26 of July Movement. After its broadcast
there could be no doubt in the United States that Castro was indeed alive and thriving
in the mountains. Taber had perpetuated the heroic myth of the rebels and U.S.
journalists who went to interview them, and set the stage for more stories about
Castro and his jungle fighters.
As the reports came out of Cuba about the rebellion, more and more
journalists traveled to the island to join in the adventure. The oddest and most
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unlikely of these “journalists” to fall under the spell of the 26 of July Movement fever
was actor Errol Flynn. Flynn was forty-nine when he went to Cuba in 1958 and by all
accounts spent most of his time in Havana drinking and gambling with his friend
Victor Pahlen. Somewhere between daiquiris, the aging adventure star became
enamored of Fidel Castro and the growing romance surrounding the revolution. As a
result, Flynn co-produced and appeared in two films about the Cuban revolution,
Cuban Story: The Truth About Fidel Castro’s Revolution and Cuban Rebel Girls.
Cuban Story was a documentary shot by Victor Pahlen and narrated by Flynn.
The film was essentially a series of clips of Cuba before, during, and immediately
following the revolution, with Flynn appearing occasionally to narrate the
cacophonous montage. In an interview conducted years later, Pahlen’s daughter stated
that her father and Flynn thought that because of Castro’s wide popularity, the film
would do well in the United States. However, the political climate between Cuba and
the United States deteriorated so quickly that by the time the film was completed in
late 1959 Castro had gone out of favor with much of the U.S. public. 33 The only
contemporary public exhibition of the film was a screening at the Moscow film
festival in 1963 before it was shelved and forgotten for more than three decades.
Cuban Story began with Errol Flynn striding onto camera to the Cuban
national anthem while smoking a cigarette. The set looked like an office set up in a
hotel room with a map of Cuba on the wall and a globe. After addressing the camera,
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Flynn picked up the globe and pointed to Cuba, asserting that the country, “may be
small but recently it has grown very big in the hearts of men who love liberty and
humanity the world over.” Flynn mused that although he usually came to Cuba for a
few daiquiris and “pastimes,” he began to think that there was something wrong on
the island. He recalled that,
The name of this man Castro kept popping up all the time. Sometimes it was
with hatred, sometimes just with mere scorn and disdain, especially if you
happen to read the Batista controlled dictatorship press. Mostly when Castro’s
name was mentioned it was with love and hope. But that was all secret, very
secret, you were not allowed to say that. Well, as I said, the man began to
intrigue me more and more. Who is this man? Is he some kind of Giuliano, the
man they used to call the Robin Hood of Sicily? What flourishes here? What
goes on in the hills of Cuba in the high sierra, in the Sierra Maestra?34
Flynn then proceeded to narrate over footage of himself gambling at the Hotel Capri
casino. He described the gambling and nightlife of the early 1950s while juxtaposing
his own experiences with the economic inequality on the island. As he learned more
about the revolution, he explained that wanted to meet Castro and set off for the
Sierra Maestra. Like the other reporters before him, Flynn described his own
adventure and hardships while eluding Batista’s troops en route towards Castro’s
“mountain hideout.” Flynn eventually met Castro, not in the Sierra Maestra, but late
in 1958 just before the 26 of July army entered Santiago. The film star was duly
impressed with the rebel leader and echoed Taber and Matthews describing Castro’s
masculine charisma. Flynn proclaimed, “It doesn’t take more than half a minute for
anyone to realize that here was a man, a real man.” Like the other reporters, he was
also enamored with Castro’s beard and the pledge the 26 of July members had given
not to shave until the end of the revolution. Flynn explained any man who had been
34
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caught in the Sierra Maestra with a beard would have been executed by Batista’s
troops for participating in the rebellion. Flynn and the other U.S. journalists, helped
make the rebel beards emblematic of the revolution and a visible sign of courage.
After describing his meeting with Castro, Flynn showed the camera a scarf
given to him after his meeting with Castro. On the one side was the Cuban coat of
arms and on the other the Cuban flag combined with the flag of the 26 of July
Movement. “It was woven and embroidered,” Flynn explained, “by one of the girls of
the rebellion.” Like Matthews and Taber, Flynn mentioned the women in the rebel
ranks but failed to identify the vital role that women played in the revolution as
soldiers, preferring to devalue them to ”girls” who sewed him a souvenir. Flynn, like
other U.S. journalists, chose to report on the impressive qualities of the men of the
mountains alone, evoking the idea that Castro and the “real men” of the revolution
were living testament to the masculine virtues of freedom and democracy. After
describing the scarf, Flynn ended his film sanctimoniously expressing his hope for
Cuba and his own commitment to the revolution. “I’m personally staying on.” Flynn
proclaimed, “Because I want to see that all those sacrifices made by those gallant
people you just watched aren’t in vain.” He then read a telegram allegedly from
Castro inviting U.S. citizens to come visit the island. “I invite you all to come the
beautiful island of Cuba, a beautiful land.” Flynn apologized for his Spanish as he
translated the message, “Where freedom and democracy and all the things that men
live by are a reality.” Flynn, enamored until the end asserted, “I believe that. You
believe it too.”
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Flynn’s second film centered in title only the “girls of the rebellion.” Cuban
Rebel Girls starred Flynn and his fifteen-year-old girlfriend Beverly Aadland.35 [See
Figure 2.5] The film was to be Flynn’s last; he died shortly after its completion in
October 1959. Cuban Rebel Girls contains actual footage from the revolution
combined with poorly acted fictional scenes. Although the title implied that the film
would be about the female revolutionaries, in actuality the film’s plot, like its poster,
centered on Flynn. In the film, Flynn played a journalist, who like Herbert Matthews,
traveled to the mountains to interview the rebels. This fictional role was one that
Flynn would actually attempt to fill in Havana after the revolution by writing columns
for Hearst’s New York Journal-American.36 The film consisted mainly of a series of
melodramatic skirmishes and escapes with a few pauses to allow for Aadland to be
filmed bathing in a river or kissing the rebels. Like Cuban Story most of Cuban Rebel
Girls was shot without sound, with Flynn providing the necessary voice-over
narration. The film was very low-budget; however, the revolutionary government did
help the production value by allowing the crew to shoot scenes on a sugar train, a
tank, and in a sugar mill. The 26 of July leadership’s cooperation spoke to their
continued desire to cultivate any and all positive publicity in the United States
following the revolution. The aging adventure star, like the aging journalist
Matthews, appeared to relish the opportunity to have one last adventure and to be part
of the heroic effort that the Cuban revolution represented.
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Revolution Triumphant and a New Media Blitz
Throughout 1957 and 1958, U.S. magazines, newspapers, televisions, and
movie theaters were filled with images of the “heroic rebels”. Popular support for
Castro and the 26 of July Movement was at an all-time high by the time Batista fled
on New Years Eve 1959. This support had been made possible in part through the
popular intimate ties between the two countries that were well established before the
rebellion began. For two years the images and stories publicized in the U.S. press
portrayed the rebels as pillars of masculine virtue fighting a moral and just war
connected metaphorically to the U.S. own mythologized past. In an interview for Life
Magazine, Guantánamo runaway Charles Ryan summed up the idea of the Cuban
revolution for many people in the United States when he stated, “I figure the fight in
Cuba is for the kind of ideals on which the U.S. was set up on.”37 Despite the
widespread popular support for the rebels in the United States, the U.S. government
remained unmoved by the favorable publicity and continued to openly support the
Batista regime until March 1958. The Eisenhower government hoped that an
alternative third option to either Castro or Batista would emerge to lead Cuba. The
U.S. government in Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Havana recognized the
growing popularity of Fidel Castro but believed the chances of the rebellion
succeeding against the U.S.-backed Cuban military were slim at best.38
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Batista’s government had been receiving enormous amounts of military aid
under the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) since 1953. MAP was a Cold War
program designed to help bolster “hemispheric defense” against the Soviets. The
weapons and elite army units trained by the United States in this program were never
intended to be used internally but had been continuously deployed against the 26 of
July Movement since 1957. Ambassador Earl T. Smith had urged the Eisenhower
administration to continue to supply arms to Batista’s government in order to stabilize
the country and kept encouraging Batista to hold elections and relinquish power.
Eventually it was Batista himself and his failure to deliver on his promise to the U.S.
government to hold free elections that turned him into a political liability that the U.S.
government could no longer support. When Batista continued to use U.S. arms
internally, and no election appeared, the Eisenhower administration suspended Cuban
arms shipments in March 1958.39
Batista was furious at the action of the U.S. government and increased his
efforts to end the insurrection once and for all. He re-imposed the restrictions on
constitutional rights, banned travel to the Oriente province, and recruited an
additional seven thousand troops to combat Castro.40 On June 28, 1958, the Cuban
Army began Operation Verano, which was designed as an all-out offensive to crush
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Castro and the 26 of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra. Batista committed 12,000
troops to the operation but over half were new recruits with little or no experience.
Although Castro’s army had only three hundred people under arms at the time, they
were able to defeat the forces and capture vast amounts of weapons. These victories
emboldened the 26 of July Movement, and more Cubans from around the island
joined the rebellion. Castro and his followers went on the offensive and over the next
four months delivered key defeats to Batista’s armies on the eastern side of the island.
The decisive battle for Santa Clara was lead by Camilo Cienfuegos and Che Guevara
in late December 1958.41 Early in the morning of January 1, 1959, Castro and the 26
of July Movement entered Santiago de Cuba while a plane carrying Fulegncio
Batista, his family, and his top advisors departed Cuba and flew to the Dominican
Republic. The island was now in the hands of the rebels. And all eyes looked to Fidel
Castro, who, as Hearst newsreels reported, was “thirty-two and the man of the
hour.”42
The Eisenhower government instantaneously recognized the new Cuban
government following Batista’s departure.43 In addition, U.S. and Cuban corporations
rushed to praise the rebel victory and publicly acknowledge the new Cuban
leadership. Business interests on the island took out full-page advertisements in the
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Bohemia magazine congratulating the new Cuban leaders and celebrating the success
and their hopes for more profitable times ahead. Coca Cola was the first company to
run a full-page advertisement in Bohemia. The advertisement was just the blank page
with a statement that read, “The Coca Cola Bottling Company rejoices with the
people of Cuba for the resurgence of democratic liberties in our country.”44 Over the
next three months all types of companies—automakers, agricultural suppliers, banks,
breweries, oil companies, motorcycle makers, and manufacturing companies—
followed suit, publicly declaring their gratitude and hopes for the new Cuban
leadership.45
The victory of the Cuban revolution sparked off a new journalistic feeding
frenzy from the United States. Newspapers and television networks rushed to be the
first to interview Castro and to capture the 26 of July Movement’s victorious
procession towards Havana. This new media blitz would continue to reinforce the
masculine rebel identity of the new Cuban leader, while also serving to transform him
in the minds of the U.S. public into the legitimate leader of the country. Castro, for
his part, attempted to assure the U.S. public and U.S. government of the good
intentions of the revolution in the hopes of being able to carry out his promised
reforms. Jules Dubois of the Chicago Tribune was the first U.S. journalist to
interview Castro after Batista’s departure. Dubois interviewed Castro in Holguín on
44
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January 3, 1959. When asked about Cuba’s future relations with the United States,
Castro revealed his awareness for the need to present a more moderate image. “ If I
have had to be very cautious about my statements in the past,” Castro stated, “from
now on I am going to have to be even more careful.”46 Because of his publicly stated
aims of social and economic reform, Castro realized that his leadership and the
revolution as a whole were in a tenuous position with the U.S. government.
Television crews also raced to Cuba hoping to be the first to interview Castro
and report on the victorious revolutionaries. The winner of this race was none other
than Ed Sullivan. Sullivan was by many accounts one of the most successful and
influential people in the entertainment industry with his variety show Toast of the
Town, but what Sullivan really wanted was to be considered a serious journalist. To
impress Edward R. Murrow and the rest of the CBS news team, Sullivan flew to Cuba
and met up with Castro on January 8, 1959, just before Castro entered into Havana.
Sullivan actually scooped another CBS program, Face the Nation, with his
interview.47 Sullivan asked how Castro would stop another dictatorship from
happening in Cuba. Castro stated in English that this would be “Very Easy. Not
permitting that any dictatorship to come again to rule our country. You can be sure
that Batista will be the last dictator of Cuba. Because now we are going to improve
our democratic institutions.” Sullivan then echoed other journalists who connected
46
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the Cuban revolution and Castro to the ideals of the United States. Sullivan openly
praised Castro saying, “ The people of the United States have great admiration for
you and your men because you are in the real American tradition of a George
Washington...We want you to like us and we to like you, you and Cuba. Fidel it has
been a great honor to meet you and your men.” Sullivan presented Castro not as a
leader to be feared but as a friend who held the same values and should be admired in
the United States.48
At the same time that Sullivan was interviewing Castro, the team of
journalists from Face the Nation flew to Cuba to film the rebel leader. The CBS team
met with Castro in Havana on January 8, 1959. Ted Ayers, the producer of Face the
Nation, had received permission form the 26 of July Movement to interview Castro.
The tone of the Face the Nation interview was more confrontational than the other
interviews that Castro did upon his arrival in Havana. The program consisted of a
round-table discussion with several prominent U.S. journalists who directly
questioned Castro regarding communism, the executions, and when free elections
would be held. CBS news correspondent Stuart Novins moderated the twenty-eight
minute discussion. He was joined by Richard Bates from CBS, William L. Ryan of
the Associated Press, and Jay Mallin from Time/Life.49
The journalists began by asking Castro if he had any communist ties, to which
he repeatedly said no. To counter this allegation, Castro pledged to hold elections and
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assured his interviewers that there would be a democratically-elected government
within eighteen months. He promised to return the Cuban government to how it was
before Batista took over in March 1952. When asked about the trials and executions
of Batista’s followers, Castro went on the defensive and said that the people executed
were known criminals and that the people demanded action. Castro explained,
“Justice is the first thing necessary for the happiness of the country. We never
punished anybody without trial, the proof is easy, we respect human rights.”
Throughout the interview, Castro seemed more guarded about his answers and
continuously made the journalists explain their questions. Castro’s answers were
framed to alleviate U.S. fears and to present himself as a leader forced to make
difficult decisions no different then U.S. leaders in similar situations.50 Castro
realized that U.S. public opinion was as crucial for him to keep power as it was for
him to gain it in the first place.
Another facet of this media blitz presented not just Castro’s rugged
masculinity but also his gentle “human side.” Invoking another common image of
“true manhood,” Castro was presented as a gentle father figure, the soldier who could
also be nurturing and kind.51 Hearst Metronome’s Rebel in the Mountains: The Fidel
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Castro Story portrayed Castro as “quick and decisive, without fear or flaw, a doctor
of philosophy, and a god to his woman—Celia Sanchez.” Castro’s men, the narrator
explained, “pledged their allegiance to live or die for the rebel of the mountains.”
However, the narrator also stated that Castro was “gentle with children” and was a
man “who gives and receives affection easily.” This caring side of the revolution
manifested itself in scenes of the rebels making bread with the peasants of the Sierra
Maestra set to romantic music. The film closed with scenes of Castro as a “prophet of
plenty,” a father figure and breadwinner for his “family,” the Cuban nation.52
The U.S. media’s emphasis on Castro as a father figure whom the U.S. public
should not fear of was prevalent in the post-victory depictions of the rebel leader.
Nowhere was this more evident then Edward R. Murrow’s interview with Castro for
his show Person to Person. Murrow was one of the most respected names in 1950s
television journalism and rose to fame when he challenged Senator Joseph McCarthy
on his show See It Now. His show Person to Person was considered to be “softer
journalism” and was a highly popular CBS program. The show’s premise was to take
extraordinary people and talk to them in their most normal setting, their own homes.53
Murrow, like many other U.S. journalists, introduced Castro to his audience as
a hero. Murrow reported, “Just thirty days ago Fidel Castro entered Havana to be
greeted by cheering mobs as one of the greatest heroes in Cuba’s history. A week
before that General Batista and his top aids had fled the country. Leaving it to Castro,
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his rebel army, and their supporters.” Murrow interviewed Castro in his suite at the
Havana Hilton, as in the other early interviews by U.S. television reporters, the
conversation was in English. Castro appeared in pajamas seated on a sofa. Castro
could have been dressed in fatigues or normal clothes but chose the most disarming of
apparel, pajamas. This choice of clothing, along with the rest of the interview, was
designed to present the gentle side of the Cuban leader to a U.S. audience. His
mannerisms and speech were not of the fiery orator that inspired the awe of Cuban
masses, but were instead downplayed, meekly appealing to U.S. viewers, his head
cocked with puppy dog eyes. [See Figure 2.6]
Murrow began the interview with a personal question asking Castro about his
reunion with his mother. Castro responded emotionally that when his mother saw him
“she began to cry.” To emphasize this softer side of Castro even more, Castro’s son
Fidelito was sent out in front of the cameras bearing a puppy, “a gift to his father.”
Fidelito was often put in the spotlight with his father in the early days of the 26 of
July takeover in order to emphasize Castro’s gentle fatherly nature.54 [See Figure 2.7]
The emphasis on Castro’s affectionate side was seemingly meant to round out his
image as a leader—strong but also compassionate to his people. Just as U.S.
presidents often pose with their children and pets, Castro appeared to want to present
himself as a caring family man.
Like other reporters, Murrow asked Castro if he worried about communist
influence in Cuba. Castro cooed, “Oh I am not worried because really there is not a
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threat of Communism here in Cuba.” Murrow also asked whether or not Castro
thought U.S. tourists would return to Cuba. “Well if you help us.” Castro honestly
answered, “We ask that people from the United States come and visit our wonderful
friendship country.” Murrow continued by asking when Castro would come to the
United States to visit and if he would be coming “with the beard or without it?” “It’s
possible if I go soon to the United States with the beard.” Castro responded, “Because
I am not thinking now to cut my beard. Because I am accustomed to my beard. And
my beard means many things to my country. When we have fulfilled our promise of
good government I will cut my beard.” In what could have been a superficial part of
the interview, Castro endeavored to transform the symbolic meaning of his beard
from one of rebel strength and defiance to a promise of good government and hope
for the future. In so doing, Castro attempted to demystify a part of the physical
appearance that was potentially threatening to a cleaned shaved U.S. male public and
instead mark his beard as a symbol of solidarity with U.S. aspirations and values of
honesty and democracy. Murrow concluded the interview on a personal note by
asking the pajama-clad Castro what books he had been reading and by saying
goodnight to Fidelito.55
This humanization of Castro as a “real man” who could command troops and
fight but who also had feelings was important to the 26 of July Movement’s public
relations efforts in the early months after Castro’s rise to power. Castro was trying to
assure a nervous Cuban and U.S. public and an even more nervous U.S. government
that he was not a threat and was thoroughly situated on the correct side of the Cold
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War. Through these portrayals, the image-makers and Castro himself were attempting
to present a more well-rounded vision of a leader who was not only a “jungle fighter”
but also compassionate and kind. It is within this balanced presentation that Castro
became even more acceptable to both the Cuban and U.S. public as the new “father”
to the Cuban nation. Castro was tapping into the same kinds of family metaphors that
had made Ricky Ricardo a beloved Cuban in the United States— strong, steady,
caring, and in control. It was this gentle Castro that traveled to the United States in
the spring of 1959 with the hopes of shoring up relations with his neighbors.

A Revolution of Public Relations: Castro’s Victory Tour of the United States
In April 1959, the U.S. media, the biggest advocate for the Cuban revolution,
staged a massive public relations campaign. At the urging of Chicago Tribune
reporter Jules Dubois, the American Society of Newspaper Editors invited Fidel
Castro to the United States on an unofficial eleven-day tour of the United States.56
The U.S. State Department criticized the visit because it had not been arranged
through official diplomatic channels. President Eisenhower chose not to meet with the
new Cuban leader, preferring instead to play golf in Augusta, Georgia. Castro was
allowed to meet “informally” with Vice President Nixon and Acting Secretary of
State Christian A. Herter.57 Although the expectation was that Castro would be
seeking economic aid and a higher sugar quota, Castro kept his visit devoted to what
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he called a “truth operation” to educate the American public about the revolution. 58
The sites chosen for his visit were all centers of the U.S. establishment with whom
Castro was seeking acceptance. Castro toured and spoke in Washington DC, New
York City, Princeton, and Harvard University before flying back to Havana. During
the trip enthusiastic fans greeted the bearded rebel wherever he landed and his visit
was headline news for the duration of his stay.
Castro’s visit was a testament to the power of his media image in the United
States. Although “unofficial,” his well-publicized visit drew large crowds everywhere
he went. In Washington, DC, a crowd of fifteen hundred supporters met the Cuban
leader’s plane. [See Figure 2.8] Castro reaffirmed the unofficial nature of his trip
when throngs of supporters greeted him and he announced, “I have come here to
speak to the people of the United States. I hope the people of the United States will
understand better the people of Cuba, and I hope to understand better the people of
the United States.”59 In Washington and New York he breezed past his own security
to shake hands with the adoring masses.60 He laid wreathes at the tomb of the
Unknown Soldier and recited the Gettysburg Address aloud while being
photographed in front of the Lincoln Memorial.61
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While in the United States, Castro met with the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
and U.S. House Foreign Affairs committees, as well as with the U.S. press at both the
Newspaper Editor’s meeting and on television with Meet the Press. As with the early
U.S. interviews, Castro spoke in English, appealing directly to the American public
and leadership in their own language. Castro gave medals to those reporters who had
interviewed him during the revolution and had helped the 26 of July Movement to
gain support in the United States. Herbert Matthews, Sam Halper, Robert Taber,
Georgette Chapelle, Ray Brennan, Andrew St. George, Morton Silverstein, Jules
DuBois, Robert Branson, Homer Bigart, Wendell Hoffman, Charles Shaw, and Karl
Meyer each received a hand-struck medal of appreciation from the new Cuban
government. Castro insisted that Cuba would have a free press and that “the free press
is the first enemy of dictatorship.” At these meetings and throughout the trip, Castro
repeatedly asserted that the Cuban revolution was not communistic but humanistic.
Castro also assured U.S. officials that the revolution was “not for export,” but that
Cuba might serve as an example for other struggles against dictatorships in Latin
America. 62
During Castro’s tour of the United States special attention was given to the
continued efforts to reassure the U.S. public that they had nothing to fear from the
new Cuban leader. Like the first interviews of Castro in Havana, the U.S. press
emphasized the “softer” side of Castro’s masculinity while he was in the United
April 21, 1959, 5. For the photo of Castro in front of the Lincoln Memorial see
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States. Just as the Cuban press had paraded Fidelito out during the first days after the
triumph of the revolution to emphasize Castro’s fatherly and gentle side, so, too, in
the United States, Castro had his photo taken with children everywhere. Toy
manufacturer Jack Noahson made over a hundred thousand 26 of July Movement
outfits for boys to play revolution. Photos of these outfits also appeared in Life
magazine with New Jersey kids dressed in fake beards and toy guns playing
revolution in the New Jersey woods with the headline “Castro-bearded Babes in the
Woods.”63 [Figure 2.9 and 2.10] The beards of the rebels were made out of dog hair
and were the most obvious visual symbol of who the boys were playing. Like playing
cowboys and Indians or cops and robbers, Castro and the 26 of July rebels were for a
brief moment seen as an appropriate form of masculine play for U.S. boys.
Sociologists and psychologists view the playing of masculine role models as a means
to socialize boys into male society. The images of U.S. boys “playing Castro” in Life
magazine again demonstrated the widespread acceptance of the Cuban leader as an
acceptable masculine role model. The image that the U.S. journalists had created of
the valiant rebel heroes had filtered into the common view of the U.S. public. For a
brief moment, it was acceptable for U.S. boys to pretend to be Cuban revolutionaries
in the same way that they played U.S. myths such as Cowboys and Indians, Daniel
Boone, or World War II. In many ways the photo of the New Jersey boys in dog-hair
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beards represented the height of Castro’s popularity and acceptance in the United
States.64
Another example of how the U.S. press’s positive depiction of Castro had
transferred to other forms of popular media can be seen in the 1959 U.S. comic book
Battle. 65 The title of the story was “The Man with the Beard!” with a drawing of a
triumphant Castro greeting the Cuban masses. [See Figure 2.11] This comic
portrayed the history of Castro and the Cuban revolution in twenty panels. The
description of the first panel read,
This is Fidel Castro, the man with the beard, the leader of “Los Barbudos” the
bearded rebel army that has taken Cuba in a much-publicized war! This is the
man Cuba hail as hero and liberator! This the man…and this was his
war…and both are inseparable!
The description throughout the comic accentuated the image of Castro as the ultimate
“man.” The drawings of Castro portray him as a determined warrior and politician
fighting for the good of his country and as the legitimate leader of the revolution. The
comic book depiction echoes the image created by U.S. journalists and even explicitly
mentions U.S. newspapermen coming to interview the rebels in the mountains.
Besides the story of the Cuban revolution, the rest of the comic was filled with stories
of U.S. soldiers in World War II, U.S. submarines, U.S. troops in Korea, and work-
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out advertisements including a weight-training program from Charles Atlas “the
world’s most perfectly developed man.” The inclusion of Castro in this company
again implied his acceptance as a viable role male model for U.S. boys in the same
way as United States’ own mythical heroes.66
Throughout his trip Castro played to his friendly image and tried to connect to
his U.S. audience in various ways. While in New York, Castro “spontaneously”
decided to go to the Bronx Zoo. While at the zoo, he fed the elephants, crossed a
barrier to pet a Bengal tiger, and ate ice cream and a hotdog. In the photos throughout
the trip Castro looks as if he is having a legitimately good time. [See Figure 2.12]
The image of him jumping the barrier to touch the tiger again played to the images of
Castro’s unequalled daring. The U.S. public must have appreciated the image of the
“jungle fighter” petting the jungle cat. Throughout his trip, Castro seized every
opportunity to demonstrate to his American audiences that he was very much like
them. Like Cuba’s promotion of tourism during the 1950s, Castro’s appeal to the U.S.
public was one of the exotic mixed with the familiar. In this guise there was much to
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be interested in Cuba’s rebel leader but little to fear from the change in Cuban
leadership.67
Castro charmed his way through the two-week tour of the United States. He
spoke English to U.S. officials and reporters, he engaged energetically with the
crowds waiting to see him, he smiled and waved enthusiastically wherever he went.
Many of the leaders in the United States misread these actions and the photos of the
Cuban leader’s gentler side. Some in the U.S. government thought of Castro and the
rebel leadership as children “playing” at revolution and now “playing” at running a
country. Both Vice President Richard Nixon and Acting Secretary of State Christian
Herter commented that Castro seemed quite “child-like” and “innocent.” And that
like a child he was capable of doing “almost anything” and therefore needed to be
“led.”68
These comments from the U.S. leadership harkened back to older metaphors
of the Cuban people as children. Images of Cubans as children had been a constant
metaphor in the U.S. press since the United States stepped in against the Spanish in
1898. Cubans were depicted as children who needed U.S. care and direction to govern
their own island. Members of the U.S. government and the U.S. media had long held
that Cubans including the new Castro regime were incapable of governing
themselves. These images also supported the traditional U.S. stance of “no transfer”
on the island, whereas no other power including the Cubans themselves would be
67
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allowed to govern the island. By portraying Cubans as children, the U.S. popular
press justified continued U.S. dominance over the island.69 This continued
misconception of the capacity and will of the Cuban leadership and people would
lead to many miscalculations on the part of the U.S. government in the years to come.

Conclusion
Although it is often forgotten or purposely omitted from history, from January
1957 until May 1959, a broad segment of the American public embraced Fidel Castro
the Cuban revolutionaries as heroes. Beginning with Herbert Matthews’ trek into the
mountains, throngs of U.S. journalists traveled to Cuba to report on the bearded
“jungle fighters” of the Sierra Maestra. The U.S. popular press celebrated the rebels
as a vision of “true manhood.” Within the popular accounts of the Cuban rebellion,
U.S. journalists portrayed Fidel Castro as the ultimate vision of the romanticized
masculine ideal—brave and decisive, willing to risk everything for what he believed,
while at the same time fatherly and caring for the Cuban nation. These same
journalists used their stories of trekking into Cuba’s eastern mountains as a means to
celebrate their own masculine identity and saw themselves as participating, not just
reporting, in the revolution.
The U.S. media’s depictions of the 26 of July Movement rebels were similar
to the images of heroes in popular U.S. Western films, jungle adventure stories, and
action comics of the 1940s and 1950s. These popular cultural stories and images
contained the basis for what the U.S. public imagined “real men” to be like. The U.S.
69

For a discussion of the popular U.S. metaphor of Cuba as a child see Peréz,
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public in turn saw the Cuban revolution as reflecting their own values mythologized
in the U.S.’s own heroic past—fighting for freedom and liberty in the face of
seemingly overwhelming odds. Ironically, the U.S. government had been heavily
responsible for creating the conditions that Castro and the revolution fought against,
namely Batista’s repressive government and the economic disparity that plagued the
island. But the media’s celebration of the revolution as reflecting U.S. values, allowed
the U.S. public to ignore these contradictions. Even though the United States official
sided with the Batista government, the popular culture connections with Castro and
the 26 of July Movement produced an alternative relationship between the two
countries. This separate relationship allowed the rebels to construct a favorable vision
of themselves for the U.S. and Cuban public before they entered into Havana.
For others, especially in the U.S. government and some members of the U.S.
press, the revolution was viewed with measured skepticism. John Gunther in his
television series High Road summed up this attitude early in 1959. Gunther
cautioned,
No matter how the new Cuban revolution works out. We ought to recognize
that it isn’t superficial. A profound national upheaval is taking place. Fidel
Castro showed us how a revolution can be won. The question that remains is
can he consolidate his victory and bring peace and freedom to the Cuban
people? Can he deliver? Will the Cuban people get what they have been
waiting for since 1898? And what effect is this fluid revolutionary situation in
Cuba going to have on other countries in the Caribbean and Latin America so
important to the United States? These are urgent questions we don’t yet know
the final answers yet.”70
Questions over the real meaning of the revolution started the moment that Batista fled
and would continue to loom over Cuba and the United States for the next year.
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John Gunther, Director, John Gunther’s High Road, “Cuba” No 104, 1959.
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During Castro’s triumphal visit to the United States, the U.S. press continued to
express concerns over the influence of Communism on the new government, the trials
and executions of Batista’s henchmen, increasing trade with the Soviet Union, the
security of property owned by U.S. citizens, freedom to criticize the new government,
and when elections would be held. Castro’s manipulation and exploitation of his
media image kept these fears at bay temporarily and allowed time for the new
government to enact many of the economic and social reforms that he had promised
while in the Sierra Maestra.
The media love affair and the myth of the heroic revolutionary ended when
the actual Cuban revolution began, when the “real men” of the Sierra Maestra came
down from the mountains and began the real work of reform. When the military
rebellion turned into actual social revolution with all of its components—executions,
agrarian reform, commitment to fervent nationalism, and anti-Americanism—the U.S.
government, press, and public abandoned Castro and “his” revolution. The longpromised reforms placed Castro and the revolutionary government in direct
confrontation with the dominant commercial interests of the United States, and, by
extension, with the Eisenhower administration. The U.S. reaction to the Cuba’s
revolutionary reforms would eventually push the island away from its intimate
neighbor and into the Soviet sphere of influence. The myth of “The man with the
beard” Fidel Castro, and the “real men” of the 26 of July Movement created by the
U.S. press, eventually exploded into enemy images of a communist threat ninety
miles away. The image of the Cuban revolutionary fighter who was linked in spirit to
the United States own heroic myths would be replaced by an aesthetic of the enemy
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that would dominate the visual discourse between the two nations for the next fifty
years.
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Figure 2.1 Front Page New York Times February 24, 1957. Matthews’ articles
brought the 26 of July Movement back to life.
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Figure 2.2 Map from the February 24, 1957 New York Times. The map
gave a false impression of the size of territory being occupied by the 26 of
July rebels.
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Figure 2.3 Fidel Castro and Herbert Matthews smoking cigars together in the
Sierra Maestra. This photo was published in the New York Times as a response to
the Batista government’s claim that Matthews had not actually seen Castro.
New York Times February 28, 1957
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Figure 2.4 Robert Taber (seated) interviewing the three American boys who came
from the U.S. Navy Base at Guantánamo Bay to fight with the 26 of July forces.
(From left to right are fifteen-years-old Michael Garvey, twenty-year-old Charles
Ryan, and seventeen-year-old Victor Buehlman.) Photo from the film Rebels of the
Sierra Maestra: Cuba’s Jungle Fighters, Robert Taber, Director, Produced by CBS
News/Prudential Insurance, 1957.

113

Figure 2.5 Errol Flynn’s Cuban Rebel Girls Directed by Barry Mahon
Produced by Errol Flynn and Exploit Films. (1959)
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Figure 2.6 Castro seated with Fidelito and his puppy as he appeals to the U.S.
public on the Edward R. Murrow Fidel Castro Person to Person on CBS Television
February 6, 1959.
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Figure 2.7 Life Magazine “Liberator’s Triumphal March through an Ecstatic Island,”
Life Magazine January 19, 1959, p. 31.
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Figure 2.8 Fidel Castro arrives in Washington, DC April 16, 1959 to jubilant
crowds. New York Times April 16, 1959, Page 6.
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Figure 2.9 New Jersey boys playing at being 26 of July Movement rebels
in the New Jersey woods. “Castro’s Babes in the Woods” Life Magazine
April 13, 1959 Page 17
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Figure 2.10 New Jersey boys playing at being 26 of July Movement rebels in the
New Jersey woods. “Castro’s Babes in the Woods” Life Magazine April 13, 1959
Page 16
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Figure 2.11 Two Panels from the comic book Battle, New York: Male Publishing
Corporation, October 1959.
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Figure 2.12 Fidel Castro visited the Bronx Zoo on his trip to the United States. In this
photo he is seen after jumping over a fence to pet the Bengal Tiger. Again asserting
his fearlessness to a enraptured public. New York Times April 25, 1959, Page 1.

121

CHAPTER THREE
From Smiling Face to Most Dangerous Place:
The Destruction of U.S.-Cuban Relations
and the Nature of the Enemy, 1959-1963
When I saw the missiles that they dropped
on Mario’s home, I swore that the
Americans would pay dearly for what they
were doing. When this war is finished, a
longer and bigger war will start for me: the
war that I am going to unleash against them.
This will be my true destiny.
—Fidel Castro to Celia Sanchez, (1958)
I want to talk with you tonight about the
most glaring failure of American foreign
policy today— about a Communist menace
that has been permitted to arise under our
very noses, only 90 miles from our shores. I
am talking about the once friendly island
that our own shortsighted policies helped
make communism's first Caribbean base: the
island of Cuba.
—John Kennedy, Campaigning NY, (1960)
Ramos Clemente, a would-be god in
dungarees, strangled by an illusion, that
will-o-'the-wisp mirage that dangles from
the sky in front of the eyes of all ambitious
men, all tyrants—and any resemblance to
tyrants living or dead is hardly coincidental,
whether it be here or in the Twilight Zone.
—Rod Serling, The Twilight Zone, (1961)

On January 1, 1959, Cubans poured into the streets of Havana to celebrate the
news of Castro’s victory and Batista’s departure. The revelry soon turned to revenge
as seven years of repression was released in a tidal wave of rage and violence against
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the symbols of the Batista’s corruption. The crowd decapitated parking meters and
paraded them through the capital streets, sacked and burned the homes and businesses
of former Batista captains, and then turned their anger on what many Cubans
considered to be the most glaring symbols of the corruption and repression that had
dominated the island, Havana’s casinos. The mob vandalized almost every casino in
Havana, throwing gaming tables and slot machines into the street and setting them on
fire.1
After the revolutionary forces entered the city and suppressed the remaining
pockets of resistance and violence, the new Cuban leadership quickly attempted to
revitalize the tourism industry in order to provide a much needed revenue stream for
the country. After sugar, tourism had often been referred to as Cuba’s “second
harvest” but tourism revenues had declined precipitously during the more than two
years of fighting on the island.2 The 26 of July Movement leaders hoped to tap this
second harvest and to renew the industry without the corruption and vice associated
with Batista. In many of his initial interviews, Castro encouraged tourists “from the
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United States to come and visit our wonderful friendly country.”3 The Cuban
leadership’s efforts to court U.S. tourists continued throughout 1959 and into early
1960.
In an ambitious attempt to revive tourism to the island, the new government
hosted the American Society for Travel Agents (ASTA) conference in Havana on
October 18, 1959. The conference, originally planned by the Batista regime, now
featured a program with a photo of the smiling new Cuban “hosts”—Fidel and Raúl
Castro.4 Fidel attended many of the events in the hope of assuring travel professionals
of the new government’s commitment to reviving the tourist industry. The conference
participants were treated to seven days of fun and frivolity as the revolutionary
government tried to showcase the island as a still-ideal Caribbean tourist destination.
The convention was just one of new government’s efforts to persuade tourists to
return to the island.5
In addition to the conference, the Cuban government continued to run fullpage advertisements in U.S. newspapers encouraging tourists to “Get on the
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Edward R. Murrow, Director, Person to Person, CBS, February 6, 1959.
Castro’s telegram to Errol Flynn in Cuba Story also makes an appeal to U.S. citizens
to come to the island. Victor Pahlen, Director, Cuban Story: The Truth About Fidel
Castro’s Revolution, Fenix Producciones S.A., Havana, Cuba, 1959.
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Cuban Tourist Commission, Cuba: Land of Opportunity, Playland of the
Americas (October, 1959), 7.
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The convention reportedly cost the new government over a million dollars,
which was considered a lot in the face of growing financial uncertainties. For
discussions on the conference see: Mark M. Miller and Tony L. Henthorne,
Investment in the New Cuban Tourist Industry: A Guide to Entrepreneurial
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Friendship Airlift to Cuba.”6 The Cuban government’s Tourism Commission
advertisements also played to earlier visions of connection and friendship. These
advertisements featured the smiling face of an unassuming white Cuban hotel worker
ready to serve U.S. tourists. [See Figure 3.1] The caption read:
The face of Cuba is a friendly face and the heart of Cuba is warm with
hospitality! From the clerks who greet you at the airport, the driver who takes
you to your hotel, the bootblacks, guides, chambermaids, flower venders,
waiters and bus drivers…to the señoras and señores you pass on the street –
the faces you meet in Cuba are sincerely friendly. They are the smiling faces
of a people who have always liked and welcomed visitors from North
America, and nothing has changed today! All Cuba offers its friendship, and
opens its lovely green island to your pleasure. You’ll enjoy weather as sunny
and beautiful as the Cuban countryside…nightlife as cosmopolitan as in any
European capital…historic sights; superb swimming, fishing, hunting, and
boating; and memorable shopping! Come soon. You’ll be greeted by smiling
faces wherever you go – in Cuba, one of the Caribbean’s most inviting
islands. Ask your Travel Agent now. Send for brochures and schedule of
events! 7
The Cuban government wanted to reassure the U.S. public with familiar images of
friendship and connectivity that hearkened back to pre-revolutionary images of a
Cuba created for North American visitors. This image of “Cuba’s friendly face” was a
white, clean-shaven, Ricky Ricardo-type persona, chosen to be purposely different
from the visions of the bearded-rebels that were increasingly falling out of favor in
the United States.
Even though the revolutionary government went to great efforts in an attempt
to save its U.S. tourism market, deteriorating political relations between Cuba and the

6

“Get on the Friendship Airlift,” (Advertisement), New York Times, January
10, 1960: 4E.
7

“The Face of Cuba is a Friendly Face” (Advertisement), New York Times,
January 10, 1960: 36X.
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United States made these attempts futile. By January 1960 when the advertisements
promoting Cuba’s “friendly face” appeared, the revolutionary Cuban government had
already enacted several reforms that adversely effected U.S. commercial interests:
land reform, reduced utility rates, lower rent prices, and the nationalization of some
U.S. owned industries. These reforms had brought increasing criticism from the U.S.
government as had the revolutions military tribunals, increasing anti-American
rhetoric, and closer economic relations with the Soviet Union. U.S. popular images of
Cuba as a tourist paradise and the 26 of July Movement rebels as heroes were quickly
replaced with visions of firing squads, Soviet ships docked at Havana harbors, and
anti-American rallies. The porous border that had once been viewed as a natural boon
for tourism and other commercial interests was re-imagined as a source of “maximum
danger.” The U.S. media transformed Cuba’s “friendly face” into a non-human
communist menace lurking only ninety miles from U.S. shores. Meanwhile,
Cubans—confronted by an increasingly aggressive U.S. government—came to see
their northern neighbor not as a source of tourist dollars and consumer goods, but
rather as a threat to be deterred only with the help of Soviet nuclear weapons.
This new hostile environment between Cuba and the United States spawned
a multitude of hostile images aimed at degrading the other. These images were similar
to well-known depictions of enemies in past hot war conflicts, including World War I
and. During World War II, the Japanese and U.S. government created images that
dehumanized and demonized each others’ entire population in order to ready their
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armies to kill one another.8 Cuban and U.S. image-makers used similar visuals to
represent the others’ governments as enemies and tapped into the collective memories
of hot-war conflicts in both societies. The proliferation of these familiar forms of
enemy-making increased the hostility between the two countries. These images
included animals, insects, diseases, devils, monsters, and madmen. As with earlier
popular images that had created popular connections between the two nations, these
new images helped define and shape the antagonistic relationship for the masses
beyond official diplomacy. During the initial break in relations between Cuba and the
United States from 1959 to 1963, images in popular media that had linked the two
nations were replaced with an aesthetic of enemy making that has remained crucial to
the visual war between the two nations until this day.
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Neighbors, Ninety miles, and the Break in U.S.-Cuban Relations
Throughout the first few months of 1959, Fidel Castro and the new Cuban
leadership received widespread support from the U.S. public. However, this
honeymoon period with the U.S. press and public was ultimately short-lived. Indeed,
some members of the Eisenhower administration, including Vice President Richard
Nixon and Secretary of State Christian Herter, had immediate concerns about
Castro’s political direction. After the revolutionary government began to execute
Batista’s henchmen and enact the social and economic reforms it had promised during
the revolution, increasing numbers in the U.S. government and the U.S. public began
to voice their concerns over the political leanings of the revolutionary leadership.9
Throughout the revolution, the 26 of July Movement leadership promised a
series of economic and social reforms to be enacted after the defeat of Batista. True to
their word, in the early months of 1959, the revolutionary government reduced rents,
cut the price of electricity by thirty percent, and nationalized the U.S.-owned Cuban
Telephone Company. In addition, the new Cuban government made good on one of
the main promises made during the revolution by enacting broad-reaching agrarian
reform. Similar land reform measures had previously placed Guatemalan President
Jacobo Arbenz in direct confrontation with U.S. corporate interests and eventually led
to his removal from office and exile through a CIA directed coup in 1954. The new
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Cuban government knew that any attempt at real agrarian reform in Latin America
was almost sure to elicit a negative response from the U.S. government.10
Although well aware of the risks, the new Cuban government passed the first
agrarian reform law in May 1959. The law limited private land ownership to one
thousand acres with a three thousand acres exception for those growing sugar, rice, or
cattle. Any acreage over the limit was expropriated. The owners, in lieu of cash, were
paid with a twenty-year government bond with a fixed interest rate of four and a half
percent for the declared tax value of the land. In many cases large landholders,
including many U.S. corporations, had not adjusted their tax assessments for twenty
to thirty years, which had allowed them to pay a pittance on their taxes. This made the
amounts that the revolutionary government compensated the owners less than the
actual land value. As expected, agrarian reform prompted concern from U.S.
agricultural interests and members of the U.S. government.11
Early economic reforms angered many U.S. business leaders and further
worried the U.S. government about the new Cuban government’s political leanings.
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These fears were compounded in February 1960 when Cuba and the Soviet Union
brokered an agreement whereby the Soviets would supply Cuba with crude oil,
petroleum products, wheat, fertilizer, and machinery in exchange for sugar. Tensions
between the two countries rose significantly when the first shipments of Soviet crude
arrived in Cuba in July 1960. With Soviet tankers sitting in Havana harbor, U.S. and
British refineries—in compliance with the wishes of their governments—refused to
refine the oil. In response, the Cuban government nationalized the Esso, Shell, and
Texaco refineries.12 Reacting to the nationalization of the refineries, the U.S.
Congress passed a resolution to terminate the Cuban sugar quota for the rest of 1960,
prompting President Eisenhower to publicly declare that this action amounted to
direct economic sanctions against Cuba. Meanwhile, the Cuban government
continued efforts to free the island of U.S. control by nationalizing additional U.S.
properties and businesses. The Eisenhower administration responded by canceling the
Cuban sugar quota indefinitely and the Cuban government, in turn, nationalized all
remaining U.S. agricultural, business, commercial, and industrial property in Cuba.13
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Angered by Cuba’s economic reforms and takeovers and frightened by the
strengthening relationship between the revolutionary government and the Soviet
Union, the U.S. government began planning to overthrow Castro. The Eisenhower
administration began covert operations against the Castro government in late 1959
with small sabotage missions against the island, and by mid-March 1960 had
approved a plan to train a group of Cuban exiles for a full-scale invasion of the island.
Throughout 1960, the diplomatic gamesmanship and U.S. covert efforts to topple the
revolutionary government eventually motivated Castro to denounce the U.S. embassy
in Havana as a “den of spies.” On January 2, 1961, he demanded that the United
States reduce its diplomatic staff in Cuba from eighty-seven to eleven people in fortyeight hours. Although this number was equal to the number of Cuban diplomats in
Washington DC, the Eisenhower administration, claimed that it was impossible to
maintain the U.S. embassy in Cuba with so few staff and broke diplomatic relations
with Cuba on January 3, 1961.14
Geographies of Maximum Danger: Pigs, Mongooses, and Missiles
The increasingly intense diplomatic tennis match between Cuba and the
United States became the backdrop for the 1960 presidential race between Senator
John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard Nixon. During the campaign, the image
of Cuba as a looming threat to the United States gained momentum. Cuba’s increased
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dealings with the Soviet Union and the economic reforms implemented by the Castro
government became a main topic of debate amongst U.S. politicians and the media.
After capturing the Democratic Party’s nomination for president, Kennedy wanted to
make sure that Richard Nixon was unable to label him as “soft” on communism.
Kennedy took the offensive and began to use Castro’s takeover in Cuba as a central
example of the Republican failure to effectively confront Soviet aggression in the
Western Hemisphere.15
Throughout the campaign, Kennedy portrayed Castro and Cuba’s proximity as
a “source of maximum danger” to U.S. national security. 16 In several speeches and
television appearances, Kennedy commented on the “loss” of Cuba to the communists
and made direct comparisons between China in 1949 and Cuba a decade later.
Kennedy emphasized that Cuba was an even larger loss, presenting a more immediate
danger to the United States because it was in “our own backyard.” 17 The metaphors
of “backyard,” “doorstep,” and “under our noses” were used repeatedly to describe
the nearness of the threat of communism in Cuba. These images also evoked the idea
of an intimate threat to one’s home, family, and person. Kennedy labeled Cuba as “a
hostile and militant Communist satellite—a base from which to carry Communist
15
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infiltration and subversion throughout the Americas”—and prophetically warned that
the United States needed to be ready to confront “a potential enemy missile or
submarine base only ninety miles from our shores.”18
Many U.S. editorial cartoonists expressed increased apprehension about
Cuba’s proximity and the growing danger of communism through various
cartographic renderings of the Caribbean. Jack Knox of the Nashville Banner echoed
Kennedy’s rhetoric that Cuba’s revolution was turning into a noxious situation “under
our very noses.” In Knox’s cartoon, the map of the United States was portrayed as
Uncle Sam with Florida as his nose, smelling a rotten fish lying on the island while a
silhouette of a rebel held up a rifle in a celebratory pose. [See Figure 3.2] The fish,
labeled “The mess in Cuba,” reflected the growing suspicions that the revolution’s
political course had turned into a unappetizing situation for the United States. The
cartoon’s title, “Clean it up!,” signified that Uncle Sam needed to deal with the
increasingly dangerous situation created by the revolution. Jeff Yohn’s cartoon in the
San Bernardino Sun Telegram also addressed the growing anxiety over Cuba’s
closeness as an inherent danger to the United States. [See Figure 3.3] Yohn’s cartoon
of Cuba as a shark cruising with its fin in the form of a Soviet hammer and sickle just
breaking the surface of the water illustrated the threat of communism lurking below
the surface in Cuba, just off U.S. shores. As the caption suggested, Cuba was turning
into a “New Habitat” for Soviet communism and represented an intolerable risk for
the United States.
18
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Like the U.S. presidential candidates, Castro found that denouncing his
neighbor as a threat only ninety miles from Cuban shores gained him popular support.
Castro countered Kennedy’s campaign rhetoric with his own statements about Cuba’s
vulnerability to U.S. aggression. Castro protested to Herbert Matthews: “You
Americans keep complaining that Cuba is only ninety miles from your shore. I say
that the United States is ninety miles from Cuba and for us that is worse.”19 The new
Cuban government began to fear that the United States might intervene directly on
the island, and by the middle of 1960 had begun to receive intelligence reports about
Cuban exiles training specifically for that purpose.
Cuban intelligence proved correct and the exile force that became known as
the 2506 Brigade began training in March 1960.20 CIA chief, Allan Dulles, briefed
Kennedy about the plans for an invasion of Cuba during the presidential campaign.21
After his inauguration, Kennedy began reviewing plans for the invasion. His
administration had been given assurances that it would be successful, but as always
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Kennedy was concerned first and foremost about his public image and wanted
assurances of “plausible deniability” should the invasion not go as planned. It was
this preoccupation with trying to officially distance the United States from the
invasion as well as the lack of the promised popular support on the island that would
lead to its failure.22
On April 15, 1961, eight B-26 Bombers, painted by the CIA with Cuban air
force markings, took off from Nicaragua for Cuba and began bombing three airfields
with the intention of crippling the Cuban Air Force. Although the pilots claimed to
have inflicted catastrophic damage, in reality the bombing had failed to destroy
Cuban air power, a misstep that would cost the invasion force dearly. The day after
the bombing, Fidel Castro went on national television to appeal to the Cuban people
to be ready for the invaders. In the same speech, Castro for the first time publicly
declared that the revolution was socialist. Castro mockingly used the same metaphors
of geographical closeness that had been used as a warning by Kennedy when he
trumpeted, “We have made a revolution, a socialist revolution, right here under the
very nose of the United States.”23
The invasion took place the day after on April 17, 1961, at Playa Girón on the
Bahía de Cochinos—the Bay of Pigs. The landing force was made up of
approximately fifteen hundred Cuban exiles, many of whom had been large
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landowners and Batista loyalists before the revolution. The poorly-equipped Brigade
landed in a mangrove swamp, making it difficult to advance or retreat, and were
eventually surrounded and captured. Most importantly the uprising that had been
predicted failed to materialize and the invasion instead strengthened Castro’s
popularity on the island. Out of the thirteen hundred troops that landed, one hundred
were killed during the attack and twelve hundred were captured. Those captured were
publicly tried and sentenced to thirty years in prison. The U.S. State Department, after
extensive negotiations, eventually secured their release in December 1962 for a
ransom of fifty-three million dollars in food and medical supplies.24
The failure of the 2506 Brigade publicly embarrassed Kennedy’s but served to
strengthen the new president’s quasi-religious devotion to ridding the world of
communism and drove his resolve to oust Castro to the point of obsession. This
increased mandate to overthrow Castro took the form of a voracious clandestine effort
known collectively as The Cuba Project, and most notoriously as Operation
Mongoose.25 This operation headed by Brigadier General Edward Lansdale and
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Robert Kennedy became the largest covert action ever taken by the United States
against another nation and was intended to incite internal rebellion in Cuba leading to
the overthrow of Fidel Castro. The operation called for widespread economic
sabotage, propaganda, and the build-up of counter-revolutionary movements on the
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misinformation plan that would have provided “fake photographic material” to be
distributed throughout the island. The plan called for images depicting “an obese
Castro with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room in the
Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table brimming over with the most
delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as ‘My
ration is different.’”27 The photos would have portrayed the Cuban leader as a
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to burning cane fields, cutting power lines, and destroying factories, to lacing
Castro’s cigars with LSD or drugging him so that his beard would fall out.28 Both the
U.S. government and U.S. media now looked at Castro’s beard, which had been a
source of curiosity and a positive masculine attribute, as an easily recognizable
symbol of the enemy.
Operation Mongoose also included a contingency plan to incite direct U.S.
military intervention on the island. In a March 13, 1962, memo to General Edward
Lansdale titled, “Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba,” Lyman L.
Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs outlined specific actions that could be taken
in order to create a pretext for a U.S. invasion of the island. This top-secret memo,
known as Operation Northwoods, included calls for staging an attack on Guantánamo
Naval Base, sinking a boat carrying Cuban refugees (real or simulated), creating a
“remember the Maine incident” by blowing up a U.S. ship, or simulating a Cuban
invasion of another Caribbean island. All of these incidents were under consideration
in order “to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible
grievances from a rash and irresponsible Cuba and to develop an international image
of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.”29 It was the image of Cuba
posing a threat to the United States more than any real evidence that was considered
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necessary to justify action against the Castro government.30 The U.S. military had
also scheduled amphibious exercises off the coast of Puerto Rico on the island of
Vieques in the fall of 1962 designed to practice landing on a Caribbean island as well
as increase pressure on the Castro government. The operation, code-named Operation
Ortsac (Castro, spelled backwards), was cancelled due to the real crisis between the
Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the United States that took the world to the brink of
nuclear war in October 1962.
On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy requested network airtime to address
the entire country on a matter of the national urgency. Kennedy announced that U.S.
surveillance had produced conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union had secretly
placed tactical nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba.31 For the Cuban government,
the instillation of the missiles was viewed as a deterrent to continued U.S. aggression
against the island, whereas the Soviets saw the instillation of the weapons as a way to
even out the missile deficit with the United States.32 The missile range maps of the
Western Hemisphere produced during the crisis resembled the concentric rings
produced when a stone hits a still body of water. [See Figure 3.4] The maps
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explicitly illustrated that all of the continental United States, Mexico, Central
America, the Caribbean, and as far south as Peru were in range of attack from Soviet
missiles in Cuba. The maps were a powerful image that confirmed what Kennedy had
predicted in his campaign about Cuba’s conversion to communism and its proximity
to the United States: a Soviet missile base only ninety miles away.
During the Missile Crisis, the hostility between Cuba and the United States
became the focus of global attention as the eyes of the world watched developments
on the island with bated breath. A drawing by Washington Star cartoonist Gib
Crockett summarized the public sentiment from the time period. On October 26,
1962, at the apex of the crisis, Crockett published a cartoon in the Washington Star
portraying Cuba as a gigantic missile base with the entire globe on the front of a
missile. [See Figure 3.5] The caption was a countdown “8-7-6-5-!!!” Crockett’s
drawing reflected what many people who lived through the crisis believed: that
nuclear war and the end of the world was eminent. The regional crisis between Cuba
and the United States had turned into central conflict of the Global Cold War between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
Fortunately President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
negotiated a settlement to stop the countdown. In the agreement, Khrushchev agreed
to remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for Kennedy’s assurance that the
United States would not invade the island.33 The United States also secretly removed
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missiles from Turkey as part of the agreement. Castro and the Cuban government
were furious to not be included in the negotiations and felt betrayed by the Soviets.
Cuban diplomatic demands such as a U.S. withdrawal from its naval base at
Guantánamo Bay, were never on the table. Castro was frustrated that Khrushchev had
squandered an opportunity for Cuba to gain more concessions from the United
States.34
Because Khrushchev and Kennedy negotiated the end to the crisis without
Cuba’s input, U.S. editorial cartoonists propagated view in several images that Castro
was powerless in his relationship with the Soviets. In a famous cartoon entitled, “This
is going to hurt me more than it hurts you,” Edmund Valtman of the Hartford Times
portrayed Nikita Khrushchev as a dentist pulling missile fangs out of Castro’s mouth.
[See Figure 3.6] Valtman portrayed Khrushchev as a dentist grudgingly de-fanging
the missile faced monster he had created. In the drawing, Castro the unwilling patient
submitted to Soviet control and manipulation. This image reinforced the popular
perception, official action, and ultimate reality during the Missile Crisis that the heart
of the conflict was ultimately beyond Castro’s control and remained between the two
main Cold War players.
In another comic, syndicated cartoonist Bill Crawford further echoed the idea
that Castro had little or no control over the political situation surrounding the
missiles, drawing the Cuban president as a child throwing a tantrum as Khrushchev
walked away with his missile “toys.” [See Figure 3.7] The caption read “Trouble in
the nursery.” Crawford relied on classic metaphor of Cuban (now specifically
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Castro) as a child incapable of governing the island. Castro was not regarded
politically “grown up” enough to engage in the decisions made in the “adult” conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The visual metaphor of Cubans as
children unequipped to govern themselves was thus preserved beyond the revolution
with Castro, the child, now under the tutelage of the Soviets.35
With Kennedy’s assurance to the Soviets that the U.S. would not invade the
island, “rescuing” Cuba from the grip of communism was now more out of reach than
ever before. The island became continuously portrayed as held captive by Castro and
communism. During the Missile Crisis, Kennedy repeatedly referred to Cuba as an
“imprisoned island.”36 The transformation of Cuba’s image from an island paradise
into a Communist prison has remained constant ever since. Maps of the island were
often drawn with skulls and bars around it. [See Figure 3.8] Cuba was represented as
a woman or a peasant with a ball and chain around her or his ankle appealing to the
United States for salvation. [See Figure 3.9] Illustrations of Cubans in shackles or
incarcerated dominated the early exile press with Castro drawn as the ultimate jail
keeper. The image of Cuba as a prison would later become part of the rhetoric of the
Cuban exile in their efforts to escape from the island to the United States and
freedom.

35

For a fantastic discussion of the metaphor of children applied to Cuba and
Cubans see John J. Johnson, Latin America in Caricature. (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1980), 116-155 and Louis Pérez Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination:
Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2008), 105-174 and 241-244.
36

John F. Kennedy, Address on the Cuban Crisis October 22, 1962. Available
at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1962kennedy-cuba.html. (Accessed January
30, 2009).
142

The Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis were the most direct confrontations
between Cuba and the United States in what became primarily a war of rhetoric and
images. The early confrontations between Cuba and the United States permanently
altered the view of the symbolic geographical relationship between the border
nations. Both countries now had to contend with their proximity not as a natural
blessing but as a natural hazard. Images of the Florida Straits changed from an easily
traversed channel of cultural and economic exchange to a fortified moat of
ideological demarcation between two enemy camps that now separated and defined
the two nations more than ever before. U.S. public perception and the Cuban
projection of the island as home to the “Smiling Face” of Cuban tourism was
transformed as each country waged an ideological war of images against the other.
A Menacing Menagerie: The Dehumanization of U.S.-Cuban Relations
As the splintering of the ties between Cuba and the United States took place,
images emerged that served to increase the hostility between the two neighbors.
These images dehumanized each nation’s leadership and demonized their social and
economic systems. Cuban and U.S. image-makers produced a virtual menagerie of
animal metaphors designed to dehumanize the governments on both sides of the
Florida Straits. These images included alligators, bats, bears, cats, chickens, cows,
crows, dogs, donkeys, eagles, fish, goats, horses, mice, monkeys, mules, octopi,
parrots, pigeons, pigs, rats, sharks, snakes, and vultures as well as fictional beasts
such as dragons, sea serpents, sirens, and various fanged monsters. These images
helped solidify and give a form to the new enemy relationship between the now rival
nations.
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One of the more common animals used to depict the political leaders in each
country were birds. Both Cuban and U.S. image-makers used numerous renditions of
birds to depict the other nation. U.S. artists often employed images of vultures to
depict Castro or Cuba as a starving or dying island. In a post-Missile-Crisis comic
entitled “Breaking one egg doesn’t clear the nest,” Jack Knox drew Castro’s face on
the body of a vulture sitting in a tree smoking a cigar. [See Figure 3.10] The eggs in
the nest were labeled “Communist Espionage Agents,” “Fishing Ports,” and “Possible
Bomber Bases,” all with the Soviet hammer and sickle. Broken on the ground below
the nest was an egg labeled “Red Missile Bases.” Knox pointed out that only one of
the possible threats incubated by Castro had been destroyed and that the many of risks
associated with a communist Cuba remained to be hatched. Edmund Valtman also
drew Castro’s head on a vulture perched on the arm of Soviet leader Leonid
Brezhnev. Valtman presented Castro, not as a bird of prey, but as a scavenger,
tethered and dependent on the Soviet Union.37 Images of vultures also accentuated the
idea that Castro presided over an island of death and decay.
Another bird commonly drawn by Cuban and U.S. artists was the bald eagle.
The eagle has been the national symbol of the United States from the country’s
beginnings and is widely known as the “American Eagle.” One of the first U.S. artists
to use an eagle to depict the increasing tensions between the United States and Cuba
was St. Louis Dispatch cartoonist Bill Mauldin. In early 1960, Mauldin drew a
political cartoon entitled “He loves me not…” Mauldin featured a smiling Fidel
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Castro yanking the tail feathers out of an eagle like a little girl would from a daisy.
[See Figure 3.11] The eagle looked to be barely tolerating having his feathers
plucked just as the U.S. government was barely tolerating the Cuban government
reforms that were plucking away at U.S. hegemony on the island. During the Missile
Crisis, Mauldin again depicted the eagle but this time attacking a rat made to look like
Castro forcing him to drop a nuclear missile he was holding in his claws. [See Figure
3.12] Mauldin’s fierce eagle was more in keeping with the traditional usage of the
bird as a symbol of U.S. courage and strength, whereas for the Cuban image creators
the eagle was transformed into a negative image.
Cuban artists often portrayed the United States by using its own national bird,
the bald eagle. Because the eagle was emblematic of the United States, Cuban
illustrators transformed the bird from a symbol of U.S. pride into a symbol of U.S.
aggression and imperialism, a monstrous presence to be feared and repulsed.38 An
early symbolic use of the eagle by the Cubans occurred two weeks after the U.S.
defeat at the Bay of Pigs. In front of a large and jubilant May Day crowd, the Cuban
government had the statue of the bald eagle ripped down from the top of the
monument to the U.S.S. Maine in Havana. The destruction of eagle statue was
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emblematic of the end of U.S. domination over the island.39 In an undated poster the
Latin American and Caribbean Students’ Association (OCLAE) produced an image
of the eagle composed of different U.S. company names. This eagle was drawn
landing in a nest that was actually a Nazi helmet, conveying the message that U.S.
capitalism was another form of fascism. Echoing the Cuban leadership’s message that
the United States was the enemy of the developing world, Cuban artists often
portrayed the eagle swooping in on the maps of various countries or threatening
groups of people gathered to protest the United States. These eagles were sometimes
drawn with U.S. fighter jet markings further associating the bird with the U.S.
military presence in Latin America. Like the destruction of the eagle statue, Cuban
artists often depicted the virtual killing of these eagles in order to signify the
destruction of U.S. imperialism. The image of the eagle became so recognizable as
part of Cuba’s anti-American images that some posters did not show the entire bird
and instead only depicted the bird’s talons reaching out to attack crowds of people.
[Figure 3.13]
In addition to animal images, Cuban and U.S. artists employed depictions of
insects to debase one another’s countries. These included ants, bees, butterflies,
cockroaches, flies, mosquitoes, spiders, termites, wasps, and most importantly worms.
Worms were one of the main insects used to humiliate the other in the Cuba-U.S.
conflict. The use of the term “gusanos” (worms) had its origins in War of the
Escambray known by the Cubans as the Lucha Contra Bandidos (War Against the
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Bandits). This counter-revolutionary rebellion began immediately following the 26 of
July Movement’s takeover of the Cuban government. The rebellion was led by former
revolutionaries and dispossessed landholders who were angered by Fidel Castro and
the revolution’s slide to the far left. 40
The rebellion was centered in the Escambray Mountains in south-central Cuba
and lasted from 1959 to 1965. U.S. leaders pointed to the existence of the rebellion
before the Bay of Pigs as evidence that an exile invasion might inspire a widespread
popular uprising against Castro. The rebels in the Escambray Mountains conducted
sabotage raids on sugar refineries and even killed a literacy teacher, Conrado Benítez,
for whom the literacy brigades were later named. On January 28, 1961, Fidel Castro
spoke in Santa Clara to honor Benítez and to encourage the continued fight against
the last pockets of counter-revolutionaries on the island. Castro compared the fight in
the Escambray to the fight against Batista. It was in this speech that Castro first used
“gusano” (worm) as a pejorative term to describe counter-revolutionaries. Castro
40
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triumphantly proclaimed: “It took us two years to crush that nest of worms,” meaning
Batista’s forces. Castro urged the citizens of Santa Clara to erradicate these new
gusanos who continued to oppose the revolution.41
In the summer of 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the revolutionary
government began the “Limpia de Escambray” (Cleaning of the Escambray), which
was a search-and-destroy operation designed to wipe out the remaining insurgents in
the region. A Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) poster from
the time included an illustration of a worm about to be decapitated by a machetewielding soldier. [See Figure 3.14] Cuban illustrators drew the “gusano” to resemble
a barbed-tailed venomous caterpillar native to the island. More than an earthworm,
which viewers would have seen as beneficial, this image of a venomous caterpillar
would have been recognizable especially to rural Cubans as dangerous and as an
insect that should be killed to protect themselves or their families from their painful
stings. The insurgents were metaphorically venomous to the revolution and needed to
be eradicated. After the Bay of Pigs, Castro also added Cuban exiles to the category
of gusanos when he denounced the Cuban exile groups in Miami as “a council of
worms.”42 The revolutionary government also made use of images of “lazy gusanos”
on leaflets to motivate workers in the Cuban countryside to cut sugarcane.43 The
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repeated use of the image of “gusanos” became part of the Cuban lexicon to describe
counter-revolutionaries on the island and exile traitors in the United States.
As part of Operation Mongoose the CIA attempted to “turn the worm” on
Castro and use the image of a gusano to promote resistance on the island. In a
memorandum written from CIA operations officer William Harvey to the head of
Operation Mongoose Brigadier General Edward Lansdale, Harvey spelled out the
agency’s hopes for using a worm as a symbol of resistance. Harvey explained:
The term “Gusano” (worm) was first applied by Fidel Castro to counterrevolutionaries…CIA plans a coordinated campaign to popularize, exploit,
and encourage the use of “Gusano Libre” as the symbol of resistance to the
Cuban regime. So as to give the impression that adoption of the symbol is a
spontaneous internal development and not an exile one, CIA controlled outlets
will refer to instances of use of the symbol inside Cuba rather than calling on
Cubans to adopt the symbol. We intend to use the occasion of the next “Voice
of Free Cuba” submarine operation planned for mid-August 1962 to announce
that the “Gusano Libre” has become the symbol of popular resistance against
the Castro regime, calling upon the people of Cuba to show their defiance of
the government by scrawling this symbol in public places.44
Harvey went on to explain an ambitious program for the “Free Worm” and how it
would stand for among other things a return to the Constitution of 1940, democratic
government, better agrarian reform, private property, free trade, and social justice.
In addition to the radio broadcasts from submarines that talked about the free
worm, visual materials such as pins, armbands, pencils, and balloons with the
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“Gusano Libre” symbol were distributed throughout the country.45 Like the
MINFAR version of the gusano, the CIA “Free Worm” looked more like a venomous
caterpillar than an earthworm, implying that counter-revolutionary resistance
represented a venomous threat against Castro. To encourage this resistance, the CIA
created leaflets with drawings of the “Gusano Libre” engaged in acts of sabotage that
were dropped on the island with the hope of encouraging popular revolt. [See Figure
3.15] As the “Gusano Libre” conducted sabotage it had a smile on its face suggesting
the enjoyment that came from fighting against the revolution. The worm was drawn
cutting electric lines, throwing away machine parts, and putting nails on the road in
front of a soldiers’ jeep. In one of the leaflets the worm was drawn winking at the
viewer as it held a pack of matches and gasoline suggesting that anyone seeing the
leaflet would have an idea of what the worm was encouraging them to burn.
The symbol of a fighting and sabotaging worm was also popularized in exile
publications. Exile cartoonists drew the worm haunting the dreams of Castro or
causing him doubts about his future. [See Figure 3.16] Two popular exile cartoonists,
Nino and Anthony, adopted a version of the gusano libre as part of their signatures.
[See Figure 3.17] Another cartoonist N’Ga also drew single panel cartoons featuring
the gusano libre for the exile publication El Avance Criollo. In N’Ga’s comics the
gusano was dressed in an army helmet with a Cuban flag and was often firing a
machine gun, conducting sabotage, or spying on his Cuban foes. [See Figure 3.18]
Like the CIA “Free Worm” the exiles’ gusano libre often were drawn as smiling or
winking at the viewer. This cooptation and mocking of Castro’s pejorative image was
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similar to the Castro government’s attempts to transfer the symbolic meaning of the
bald eagle from a U.S. national symbol to a symbol of imperialism and tyranny. The
CIA attempted to transfer Castro’s original “gusano” pejorative into the “Free
Worm,” a symbol of counter-revolutionary resistance.
Beyond animals and insects, Cuban and U.S. artists also portrayed each other
as mythical creatures—demons, devils, and monsters. Like Edmund Valtman’s
portrayal of Castro as a fanged monster during the Missile Crisis, the U.S. media
transformed the image of Castro as a revolutionary hero whom had been considered
worthy of little U.S. boys to emulate in 1959 into a vision of evil incarnate. These
renderings of Castro included various visions of a bloodthirsty tyrant to images of the
Cuban leader as a devil cliché with red skin, cloven hooves, a sharp tail, horns, and a
pitchfork. [See Figure 3.19] Cuban artists fired back with images of every president
since Kennedy represented as monsters. One of the most famous examples of this was
an Alfrédo Rostgaard poster that the viewer unfolded to reveal a drawing of Richard
Nixon as a vampire. The poster’s image plus the action of unfolding the image
allowed the viewer to reveal Nixon’s inner character as monstrous. [See Figure 3.20]
The images of monsters and devils became a lasting marker of each country’s
inhumanity and served to further solidify the perception of the each nation as a
demonic other to be feared and reviled.

Hygiene, Homosexuality, Hysteria, and Hitler
In addition to the dehumanizing images of animals and insects, U.S. and
Cuban artists drew caricatures of each other’s leaders as a means to question their
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moral character and ability to lead. U.S. artists drew caricatures that further destroyed
the image of the “heroic” Cuban leadership that had been so widely celebrated in the
United States. Newspaper artists depicted all of the 26 of July Movementleaders in a
negative light with Castro as the main target. In these images, Castro was often
lampooned as fat and dirty his stomach out of proportion to the rest of his body and
bursting through his shirt. [See Figure 3.21] Illustrators also portrayed the Cuban
leadership as filthy with swarms of flies buzzing around their heads. Ché Guevara
was often depicted as filthy, his face distorted with sullen ape-like features. [See
Figure 3.22] In depictions of adversaries, simian features were a common way to tap
into racist stereotypes in order to construct an enemy other.46 The illustrators made
Ché and the other leaders appear darker in appearance and replaced the images of the
“real men” of the Sierra Maestra with pejorative stereotypes of Latin Americans as
black, childlike, dirty, fat, lazy, and stupid.47
Besides racist images and caricatures that demeaned the Cuban leaders’
physical appearance, U.S. image-makers also attacked the masculine character of the
“real men” of the Sierra Maestra through images that brought into question their
sexual orientation. The drawings of Raúl Castro, in particular, used homosexuality as
a means to demean the Cuban leadership. During the revolution, members of the U.S.
media often commented that Raúl Castro, unlike his “barbudo” comrades, did not
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grow a full beard making him appear “boy-like” or “baby-faced” by comparison. As
the connection between Cuba and the United States crumbled, these depictions of
Raúl’s boyish appearance deteriorated into images of Raúl as a homosexual. Claims
about Raúl’s homosexuality proliferated throughout the U.S. media, even though
Raúl was married to another revolutionary leader, Vilma Espín, with whom he had
four children.
Images of Raúl as effeminate and gay played into long-standing prejudices
against homosexuals in Cuban culture. Homosexuals in Cuba were considered less
than men, second-class, and sinful. Although the revolution promoted social equality
on the island, these changes did not extend to homosexuals. Homosexuality did not fit
into the revolutionary leadership’s ideal of Cuba’s virile and honorable “new man.”48
As early as 1961, the revolutionary government sought to eradicate homosexuality as
a social vice and conducted raids in Havana to round up homosexuals along with
prostitutes and drug addicts whom the new government believed to be all closely
linked. Thus, to accuse one of the revolutionary leaders, and the brother of Fidel
Castro, of homosexuality was to call the legitimacy of the revolution itself into
question.49
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In many political cartoons, Raúl Castro’s features were made to look
feminine— fuller lips, long fingernails, feminine buttocks, fluttering eyelashes,
ponytail, and pinky fingers sticking out. [See Figure 3.23] Artists often drew his
clothes with ruffles or even portrayed him as wearing a dress and high-heeled shoes
while fanning himself. Cartoonists also depicted Raúl with flowers in his hair or
smelling flowers. In some of the cartoons, U.S. illustrators drew Raúl flying or flitting
around, which corresponded to a Cuban slang term for homosexual, mariposa
(butterfly). [See Figure 3.24] In many of the cartoons, Fidel Castro and the other
leaders looked aghast and burdened by Raúl ’s lack of manhood. Insulting Raúl in
this manner was another way to insult Fidel Castro, for to have a homosexual brother
in Cuba was considered a source of shame.
Homosexuality was just one image that the U.S. media propagated that served
to destroy the image of the Cuban revolutionaries as idealized masculine figures.
Beginning in 1959, U.S. image-makers began to portray the brutality and insanity of
the 26 of July Movementleadership. Summary justice against those who had opposed
the revolution began in the Sierra Maestra and had continued with military tribunals
after Batista had fled the island. The result were hundreds of executions that took
place in a relatively short period of time after the revolutionary forces took over in
January 1959.The images of executions in both film and magazines had an immediate
and chilling effect on U.S.-Cuban relations. 50
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One of the most disturbing series of photographs and film footage was of the
execution of Colonel Cornelio Rojas, Batista’s Chief of Police in Santa Clara. In
photos published from the execution, the Colonel was led out of the jail and stood
against a wall. He made proclamations damning the revolution and then stood facing
his executioners as the order of “¡Fuego!” was shouted. The film and photos captured
the moment of the bullets ripping through Rojas’s body, including the one that
shattered the Colonel’s skull and sent his hat flying straight up in the air. The image
of Rojas’s lifeless body lying on the ground with open eyes and half his head torn
away must have been very disturbing to U.S. and Cuban viewers alike. Time, Life,
and Bohemia magazines all published graphic images of this execution but Bohemia’s
was by far the most gruesome. [See Figure 3.25] The publication of these photos in
Cuba served as a warning not to oppose the new government and as a celebration of
revolutionary justice.51
Bill Mauldin poignantly summarized U.S. sentiment damning the brutality of
the executions in a political cartoon published in the St. Louis Dispatch. [See Figure
3.26] The cartoon was captioned “Just think what could happen to you if we weren’t
idealists…” The drawing was originally published in the St. Louis Dispatch and then
reprinted in Time magazine. Mauldin depicted a Cuban soldier shooting a bound
prisoner in the back of the head with a pistol while the other two prisoners awaited
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 61-88; and Keen, Faces of the
Enemy, 89-144. On the trials and executions see: Gott, Cuba: A New History, 168169; Paterson, Contesting Castro, 255-256; Quirk, Fidel Castro, 224-229.
51

“Cámara de Torturas en Santa Clara,” Bohemia, January 18-25, 1959, 2023; “Rebels take an Eye for an Eye,” Life, January 19, 1959, 32; “The Vengeful
Visionary,” Time Magazine, January 26, 1959.

155

their fates while tied to posts. The revolutionaries were drawn not as the heroic
fighters of the Sierra but as dirty and disheveled, brutal and cold in their purpose.
These were not the revolutionaries who loved children and puppies, nor were they the
type of fighters who should be emulated by U.S. boys as ideal masculine figures.
Their brutal actions were portrayed as cowardly and callous. The cartoon highlighted
the idea that the revolutionary rhetoric of change came with a high price and cast
further doubt about the true intentions of the revolutionary leadership.
After coming to power in 1959, the U.S. media repeatedly questioned Castro
about the executions. He defended the new government actions by stating that the
executions were just and demanded by the Cuban people. To prove this, the new
government held rallies where the masses of Cubans gathered to chant in unison “To
the Wall!”52 Castro accused the U.S. media and politicians of hypocrisy considering
how many people had been executed by the Batista regime without drawing any
criticism from the United States and how many people were executed in the United
States.53 In an attempt to assuage the fears of the U.S. public and to prove to the
international community that the trials were indeed just, the Cuban government began
televising the trials of Batista’s people. The effort to thwart criticism only increased
international outcry against the circus-like atmosphere of the “show trials.”54
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After the break in relations between the two countries, the images of the
execution Colonel Rojas were used in the anti-Castro films for years afterwards to
show the viciousness of the Castro regime.55 In his book, A Garlic Testament, Stanley
Crawford recalled being subjected to footage of the revolutionary firing squads while
working as a technical writer for the defense industry for Thompson Ramo
Wooldridge (TRW) at California’s Norton Air Force Base in 1962. The footage of the
executions was used in 16mm commercials projected before team-building events
held on the base to promote the buying of U.S. Government Savings Bonds. The
purchase of the bonds was intended to support U.S. efforts to halt communist
brutality in the hemisphere.56
The brutality of Castro and the executions was also portrayed as symptomatic
of the insanity of the regime. In an October 1961 Twilight Zone episode, “The
Mirror,” executions provided the background for the episode. In the show, Peter Falk
played “Ramos Clemente,” a revolutionary who had just triumphed over the dictator,
“General De Cruz,” in an unnamed Central American republic. Falk was made up to
look like Fidel Castro, dressed in fatigues, with a beard, and smoking a cigar. [See
Figure 3.27] The other actors were also made to look like Cuban revolutionary
leaders—Manuel Urrutia, Ché Guevara, and Camilo Cienfuegos, confirming as
Serling had stated to the viewer, “any resemblance to tyrants living or dead is hardly
coincidental.”
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At the beginning of the episode, Clemente ordered the execution of the
deposed dictator General De Cruz and “all prisoners.” Before his death, De Cruz
laughed at Clemente and warned him that he would start to see enemies everywhere,
even in the mirror on the wall. From that point forward the sounds of shots
continuously fired could be heard in the background as the executions continued day
and night. When his comrades begged Clemente to stop the killings and questioned
him over the course of the revolution, the new ruler became angry and believed he
had been betrayed. As predicted by De Cruz, Clemente began to have visions of his
“enemies” in the mirror in his office. These enemies turned out to be visions of his
comrades trying to kill him. In response to these visions, Clemente began killing off
his officers as he slowly went insane. Clemente asked “Father Tomas” why he had so
many enemies. The priest replied, “This is the story of all tyrants. They have one
enemy. The one they don’t recognize until it is too late.” Clemente then saw his own
image in the mirror and realized that he was his own worst enemy and shot himself.
“The Mirror,” like many other images, portrayed Castro and the 26 of July
Movementleadership’s policies of brutality as insane and as part of what made the
new leadership illegitimate in the minds of many. 57
Cuban image-makers also produced visions of U.S. leadership’s brutality and
insanity from John Kennedy until George W. Bush. One of the best examples was a
poster by Cuban artist, Luis Blaguer. [See Figure 3.28] In this late 1960s poster
protesting U.S. violence in South East Asia, Blaguer portrayed President Richard
57
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Nixon with a maniacal look, his eerie and twisted smile along with the sideways
glance of his eyes suggested the president’s untrustworthiness and instability. The
colors—Nixon was drawn with a blue face on an orange background—added to the
disconcerting quality of the image. The artist sought to allow the viewer to see inside
Nixon’s brain and to ponder the president’s mental state. The message became even
clearer when upon closer examination it was revealed that one was looking not at
Nixon’s grey matter but a pile of decomposing bodies. It was Nixon’s insanity that
lay behind the brutality of Vietnam War and by broader implication was a
condemnation of the United States itself.
Cuban and U.S. illustrators also combined images of brutality and insanity by
comparing each others’ leaders to Adolf Hitler—considered the most brutal and
insane leader in modern history. Hitler and the Nazis were so reviled that any use of
imagery associated with them elicited a negative reaction from the viewer.58 Artists
from both the United States and Cuba used Nazi symbols to make visual comparisons
of their neighbor as an ultimate evil. Castro, in particular, was compared to Hitler as
well as to several other Nazis such as Adolf Eichmann, the “architect of the
Holocaust” and Heinrich Himmler, head of the S.S. Illustrators depicted Castro in a
Nazi uniform or with a Nazi armband and even joined the faces of Castro and Hitler
together. [See Figure 3.29] The caption read, “all dictators think alike and are cut
from the same cloth.”
Cubans also used Nazi imagery and references to Hitler to defame U.S.
leaders. Cuban artists have drawn almost every U.S. presidents with references to the
58
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Nazis. In early revolutionary political cartoons Kennedy was depicted as a dog with
Swastikas for a collar. Cuban image-makers have used the swastika repeatedly to
show a connection between U.S. imperialism and Nazi fascism. A famous Cuban
political poster portrayed Nixon as a king on a playing card that if flipped over had
the same king but the image of Hitler. As late as 2008, billboards in Havana featured
the likeness of President Bush merged with Hitler that declared Bush to be a fascist.
These images of the brutality and insanity of each country’s leaders dominated the
visual dialogue between the two countries and served to further separated the
neighboring nations.

Conclusion
On July 7, 1963, President Kennedy asked his press secretary Pierre Salinger
to purchase a thousand Cuban cigars. Salinger returned to the White House the next
day with twelve hundred of the president’s favorite H. Upmann Petit Coronas. After
Salinger had informed Kennedy of his purchase, the president pulled a document
from his desk and signed the “Trading With the Enemy Act” against Cuba.59 With
this act, Kennedy prohibited all unlicensed commercial transactions with Cuba,
including individual purchases of Cuban products and travel to the island, making it
illegal even for the president to purchase Cuban cigars. This order was designed to
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further isolate the island economically and made it impossible for the vast majority of
U.S. citizens to legally travel to Cuba.
By the time Kennedy invoked the Trading with the Enemy Act, the ties
between Cuba and the United States had been permanently altered. During the early
1960s, the friendly relationship between the two nations devolved into open political
and military conflicts that changed the popular view of each country towards the
other. The popular viewpoint was also influenced by images that helped define the
new relationship between the two nations. Images that had once promoted linkages
were replaced with new enemy images that made past connections seem like a distant
memory. The Cuban government no longer promoted its “Friendly Face” in the hopes
of attracting U.S. tourists, but instead propagated images that continuously vilified its
northern neighbor. In the United States cartoonists, filmmakers, and television
producers denigrated Cuba as a scorned and estranged member of the U.S. family of
allied nations. The proximity and porous nature of the border that had been seen as a
natural advantage to tourism and trade between the two nations was re-imagined as a
source of “maximum danger.” A failed U.S. invasion and a nuclear standoff pushed
the animosity between the two countries further than most Cubans or North
Americans could have imagined in 1959.
The visual dialogue of enemy creation became an important part of the battle
for the hearts and minds in the western hemisphere. The images that were produced in
both countries assisted in creating a new set of myths that constructed the relationship
between Cuba and the United States. For both countries this new relationship would
serve as a catalyst for action in opposition to the other. The U.S. government became
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obsessed with trying to prevent “another Cuba” from happening in the western
hemisphere, fearing that it could not afford to loose another battle against
communism in Latin America and maintain its place on the world stage. For the
Castro government, the antagonistic relationship with the United States bolstered its
position internally and throughout the world by having an adversary to mobilize
against. The Cubans used the animosity towards the United States to promote
revolutionary reforms on the island and to spread visions of their success and of the
malevolent nature of the United States around the world. The contest to win the hearts
and minds in Latin America and the rest of the developing world through images
would perpetuate the intimate relationship between Cuba and the United States but
now as enemies. It is to this contest that we now turn to in chapter four.
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Figure 3.1 “The Face of Cuba is a Friendly Face” (Advertisement), New York
Times, January 10, 1960: 36X.
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Figure 3.2 Jack Knox “Clean It Up!” The Nashville Banner, Tennessee, 1960.
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Figure 3.3 Jeff Yohn “New Habitat?” The Sun Telegram, San Bernardino, California,
1960.
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Figure 3.4 Soviet Missile range map, October, 1962.
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Figure 3.5 Gib Crockett, “-8-7-6-5-!!” Washington Star, Washington, DC, October
26, 1962.
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Figure 3.6 Edmund Valtman, “This Hurts Me More Than It Hurts You,” The
Hartford Times, Connecticut, October 30, 1962.
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Figure 3.7 Bill Crawford, Newspaper Enterprise Association, "Trouble in the
Nursery," 1962.
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Figure 3.8 Silvio, “The Hammer and Sickle are symbols of Peace.” El Avance
Criollo, June 30, 1961, page 24.
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Figure 3.9 Joe, “Now I Know What Communism Is!” El Avance Criollo
August 4, 1961.
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Figure 3.10 Jack Knox, “Breaking one egg doesn’t spoil the nest,” Nashville Banner,
1962.
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Figure 3.11 Bill Mauldin, “He Loves Me…” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Missouri,
1960.
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Figure 3.12 Bill Mauldin, “Drop It!” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Missouri, 1962.
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Figure 3.13 Rafael Enríquez, OSPAAAL, “El Salvador, Against Imperialist
Intervention.”
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Figure 3.14 Calvo, Ministry of the Armed Forces (MINFAR) “Clean the
Escambray!” Fidel Castro’s quote, “We will not be tolerate those who betray the
nation. No counterrevolutionary leader will escape!” 1961.
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Figure 3.15 CIA Leaflets of the “Gusano Libre” Jon Elliston, Psywar on Cuba: The
Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro Propaganda, (Melbourne: Ocean Press,
1999), 207.
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Figure 3.16 Silvio, “The Worms: The Nightmare of the Beast of Birán” El Avance
Criollo, December, 1961, p. 12. The caption reads, Birán is a town in Holguín
Province in Cuba and is where Castro was born.
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Nino El Avance Criollo June 30, 1961 page 34

Nino El Avance Criollo January 26, 1962 page 38

Anthony El Avance Criollo August 18, 1961 page 20

Anthony El Avance Criollo December 1, 1961 page 38
Figure 3.17 Cartoonists who incorporated the worm into their signatures.
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El Gusano Libre by D’Ga PR El Avance Criollo January 12, 1962 page 58

El Gusano Libre by D’Ga PR El Avance Criollo January 26, 1962 page 51

El Gusano Libre by D’Ga PR El Avance Criollo February 9, 1962 page 67

El Gusano Libre by D’Ga PR El Avance Criollo April 6, 1962 page 59
Figure 3.18 D’Ga “El Gusano Libre,” El Avance Criollo, 1962.
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Figure 3.19 Rosenda, Castro as Devil, “Mr. Perverso,” Zig-Zag Libre, July 21, 1962.
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Figure 3.20 Alfrédo Rostgaard, “Nixon as Monster,” OSPAAAL, 1968.
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Figure 3.21 Nino, “No, he’s not dead…he just smells the same.” Castro as Fat and
slovenly, El Avance Criollo, August 4, 1961, 34.
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Figure 3.22 This caricature shows the commonly drawn simian features of Ché, Fidel
Castro’s obesity, and Raúl Castro as a homosexual. Nino “Moscuba” El Avance
Criollo, June 23, 1961, page 20.
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Rafael, “Castronauta” El Avance Criollo, May 1, 1961 page 36.

Nino, “A Man like Raul” El Avance Criollo, August 4, 1961 page 34.
Figure 3.23 Raul as homosexual, El Avance Criollo, 1961.
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Figure 3.24 Charro Nuñez, “Castropoide,” El Avance Criollo January 5, 1962
page 59.
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Figure 3.25 Execution of Colonel Cornelio Rojas, Bohemia, January 12, 1959.
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Figure 3.26 Bill Mauldin “Just think what could happen to you if we weren’t
idealists…” Originally printed in the St. Louis Dispatch and reprinted in Time
Magazine. January 22, 1959.
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Figure 3.27 “Ramos Clemente,” Don Medford, Director, “The Mirror,” The
Twilight Zone, Produced: Bruce Houghton Cayuga Productions, CBS, Season 3,
Episode 71, October 20, 1961, (DVD Volume 17: 1999, CBS).
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Figure 3.28 Luis Balaguer, Latin American and Caribbean Students’ Association
(OCLAE), “Day of Continental Support for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, October,
15-21, 1969
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Charro Nuñez, Castro as Eichman, El Avance Criollo June 23, 1961, 6.

Figure 3.29 Niko, Castro as Hitler, “Hitler and Castro think alike...Dictators cut from the
same cloth.” El Avance Criollo, June 23, 1961, 2.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Sources of Maximum Danger: Cuba, the United States,
and the Struggle for Hearts and Minds, 1959-1989
I think the big task of the next administration is
going to be to contain this revolution in Cuba, itself,
and not have it spread through Latin America.
—John Kennedy, On the Campaign Trail, (1960)
Castro’s voice is heard all over Latin
America…The cry Yanki No! Is a cry for help, a
cry of warning a cry for you, Yanki, to care about
your neighbors.
—Yanki No! Bell and Howell Close Up, (1960)
While imperialism wants to destroy us and our
revolution, we are going to destroy imperialism
with our example, our success.
—Fidel Castro, To the Literacy Brigades, (1961)

In August 1961, President Kennedy’s advisor Richard Goodwin attended a
special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the
Organization of American States (OAS) in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The United
States called this meeting of the OAS member nations to adopt the Alliance for
Progress (Alianza del Progreso). The Alliance for Progress was a U.S. economic aid
program designed to assist the developing Latin America republics but also had at its
very heart the mission of further isolating Cuba from the rest of the hemisphere. At
the end of the conference, Goodwin was invited to a birthday party thrown for a
Brazilian delegate. At the party Goodwin was led into a back room where a meeting
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had been arranged between the U.S. official and Cuban revolutionary leader Ernesto
“Ché” Guevara.
Guevara had attempted to meet with a member of the U.S. delegation earlier
in the week but had been rebuffed until the conference had concluded. It was
Guevara’s desire to talk privately with Goodwin in order to propose opening a back
channel for the U.S. and Cuban governments to discuss their relations. During the
discussion, Ché reiterated to Goodwin that the Cuban government believed that the
Alliance for Progress would ultimately fail and further warned that the program
“might set loose forces…ending in a Cuba style revolution.” Ché insisted that Cuba
would not play a direct role in fomenting these revolutions, but Cuba’s example
would spread throughout Latin America. The 26 of July leader then thanked Goodwin
for the Bay of Pigs invasion saying “that it had been a great political victory for them
[Cuba]—enabled them to consolidate (the revolution)—and transformed them from
an aggrieved little country to an equal.” It was from this “equal” vantage point that
Guevara expressed hope that the two nations might be able to find common ground or
at least a “modus vivendi.” After the meeting, Goodwin left immediately to record
what had been said while Guevara stayed on to enjoy the rest of the party.1
Upon returning to the United States, Goodwin sent a memo to President
Kennedy about his run-in with Guevara. “Cuba is undergoing severe economic
stress,” Goodwin postulated, and “the Soviet Union is not prepared to undertake the
1
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large effort necessary to get them on their feet…and that Cuba desires an
understanding with the U.S.” Instead of looking to use this meeting with Guevara as a
possible opening for dialogue between the two countries, Goodwin recommended that
Kennedy maintain an aggressive stance towards the Castro government. Goodwin
urged the president to publicly downplay U.S. concern about Cuba so as “to not
encourage anti-American and leftist forces in other countries to rally round the Cuban
flag.” Goodwin further recommended that the president quietly intensify pressure on
revolutionary government by continuing covert activities aimed at destabilizing the
Cuban economy as well as stepping up anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda
throughout the hemisphere.2
Although this impromptu encounter between Guevara and Goodwin could be
viewed as little more than a cursory discussion between two rival delegates, the
meeting also revealed the main goals that each country was developing towards the
other. At the most fundamental level, the Cuban and U.S. governments wanted to
convince their own populaces and the rest of the world about the righteousness of
their causes and the dangers posed by the other country, in other words, to win hearts
and minds. To achieve this goal, both nations engaged in domestic and international
efforts to showcase themselves, while at the same time discrediting each other
through a variety of programs and visual mediums.
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In the United States domestic images designed to influence public opinion
about the dangers posed by communist Cuba were created by a variety of editorial
cartoonists, filmmakers, and television producers. These artists generated a multitude
of images that assisted in cementing the idea of Cuba as part of the larger threat posed
by Soviet aggression into the U.S. public’s imagination. U.S. image-makers depicted
Latin America as an unstable breading ground for communist revolution further
threatening U.S. hearth and home if the U.S. public remained apathetic. The U.S.
government also commissioned artists to create images to be used in its external
propaganda efforts. The U.S. government distributed films, posters, and perhaps most
importantly in comic books throughout the hemisphere under the auspices of the
Alliance for Progress (1961-1968). In addition to Alliance’s economic and military
assistance programs, different types of U.S. propaganda envisioned Cuba and Castro
as an enemy and at the same time heralded the United States as the region’s true
friend and brother nation.
Following the defeat of Batista, the Cuban revolution quickly turned from the
military rebellion into a conscious effort to reshape the meaning and purpose of
Cuban society. These changes were done in part, as Guevara had explained to
Goodwin, to create a society that would serve as an example for the rest of Latin
America. After 1959, the new government immediately set out to execute a series of
multiple, mutually reinforcing social and economic reforms as part of its over-arching
ideological goals of class, gender, and racial equality. These projects included
agrarian reform, the literacy campaign, universal health care, housing developments,
and national tourism. These projects greatly improved access for Cuba’s underclasses
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to once forbidden spaces and services. After the Cuban government put these reforms
into motion, Cuban artists continuously celebrated the programs in advertisements,
billboards, films, pamphlets, and posters displayed throughout the country. Through
these images Cuban artists visualized and disseminated the notion of a new national
Cuban family unhindered by past racial or class biases. It was through the images, as
much as the reforms themselves, that the Cuban government was able to deliver its
message of what it meant to be part of the new revolutionary society. In addition,
from the triumph over Batista in 1959 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, the
revolutionary government sought to spread the message of Cuba’s national identity as
a challenge and alternative model to U.S. hegemony to the rest of the world. Over
these forty years, Cuban transmitted images of its revolutionary message to third
world nations on three continents.
Unable to find the modus vivendi that Ché had proposed, the U.S. and Cuban
governments maintained their positions of animosity towards the other. Popular
culture produced in both countries became a primary arena for the expression of
national identity and a key battlefield for popular support of the competing ideologies
in the hemisphere. U.S. and Cuban image-makers produced a dialogue of images that
reflected these animosities and were designed to influence not only their own
populaces but also to win the hearts and minds of the rest of the world.

Yanki No! U.S. Images of Fear of Castro’s Reach
Following Castro’s 1959 victory tour of the United States, the U.S. press’s
image of the Cuban leader changed almost overnight from a venerated heroic figure
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to a pernicious threat. The major change in images occurred after the first set of
agrarian reform laws began to be institutionalized in 1959 and the nationalizations of
U.S. corporations began to take effect on the island in early 1960. The tension
created by these reforms was compounded by sabotage on the island from anti-Castro
forces as well as Castro’s own increasingly harsh rhetoric towards the United States
due to his own preconceived notions of U.S. opposition to social reforms in Latin
America.3 U.S. image-makers, particularly political cartoonists and documentary
filmmakers, echoed the growing concerns of U.S. politicians and businessmen, and
began to portray Castro as a maleficent communist in an effort to raise U.S.
awareness against the once popular rebel. Cuba’s increasing ties with the Soviet
Union and Castro’s anti-American diatribes also played into the image that the
revolutionary leader needed to be stopped from spreading his influence to other Latin
American countries. In a famous illustration, Chicago Sun Times political cartoonist
Bill Mauldin depicted a smirking Castro smoking his signature cigar, his beard now
turned into octopus tentacles grabbing at all of Latin America. [See Figure 4.1] The
use of the octopus’s body was a classic archetype used in past conflicts to represent a
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far-reaching and dangerous influence.4 The U.S. media increasingly employed this
type of visual hybridization of Castro, his head placed on an animal body in an effort
to dehumanize the Cuban leader. The combination of Castro with the octopus’s
tentacles effectively communicated the fear and vilification of Castro’s influence over
Latin America that was emblematic of the early 1960s.
U.S. artists used several types of imagery to communicate their opinions about
the need to confront Castro before his impact spread to all of Latin America.
Nashville Banner cartoonist Jack Knox drew “Cuban mosquitoes” in the shape of
Soviet hammer and sickles flying off the island to spread a “plague” of communism.
[See Figure 4.2] Knox drew Uncle Sam looking at Cuba holding a bottle of “AntiCommunist quick action formula” insecticide. The caption read “Use a strong
insecticide before they spread a plague.” Knox was echoing the calls for “quick
action” on the part of the U.S. government to stamp out the swarming communism in
the Caribbean. Knox also wanted to emphasize to the U.S. public that the dangers of
spreading communism was not limited to Latin American countries. To achieve this
visually, Knox included a sign in his drawing that read “90 Miles” reminding his
audience that the communist mosquitoes did not have far to travel to infest the United
States with their infection as well.
The metaphor of disease would have contained a personal meaning to the U.S.
public for the need to take aggressive action to protect themselves and their families
4
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against illness. Unlike explaining the economic or political differences between
communism and capitalism, the visualizing of disease as a risk for ones own family
was immediately impacting. Curing the “disease” of communism in Cuba became an
obsession of the Kennedy administration and an effective rhetorical device. During
his presidential campaign, Kennedy repeatedly referred to communism in Cuba as a
disease and called for an aggressive cure to stop Castro from spreading the infection.5
Political cartoonists visually presented this call by depicting the map of Cuba as a
communist infection endangering the health of the rest of the world. Echoing these
sentiments, Nashville Banner cartoonist Jack Knox drew Cuba as in the form of an
infected boil on the globe spreading its sickness across the rest of the western
hemisphere. [See Figure 4.3] U.S. political cartoonists also portrayed Cuba as a sick
nation bedridden with a communist contagion. Exile newspaper, El Avance Criollo,
cartoonist Anthony drew Cuba as a woman infected with a communist boil swelling
on her shoulder. [See Figure 4.4] Anthony’s image called on the well-known gender
construction of Cuba as a woman, the damsel in distress, in need of male help from
the United States.6 Editorial cartoonists often portrayed Latin America as a nurse or
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the United States as Uncle Sam ready to administer an injection in the hopes of
“curing” what ailed their diseased Cuban patient. In all of these political cartoons a
common theme was repeated—Castro needed to be recognized by the U.S. public as a
threat and communism in Cuba would spread unless the U.S. government dealt with
the growing danger.
This call to awareness and action by editorial cartoonists was repeated in
several documentary films and television shows produced in the early 1960s. U.S.
filmmakers aimed at convincing the North American public to take a more active role
in thwarting the increasing menace of communism in Latin America. The active role
proposed was for the United States government to economically and militarily aid
Latin American democracies through programs like the Alliance for Progress and to
oppose Castro and Cuba by any means necessary. The filmmakers presented Castro’s
Cuba as the possible precursor to a wider spread communist takeover in the western
hemisphere. In the filmmakers’ opinion, if the U.S. government and to a larger extent
the U.S. public, remained ambivalent to confronting communism, then violent
revolution throughout Latin America was a foregone conclusion. The filmmakers
endeavored to convince the U.S. public that the crisis in between Cuba and the United
States was a life or death struggle for global freedom.
One of the first documentaries to warn that the United States was losing the
battle for the hearts and minds in Latin America was Robert Drew and his team of
cinematographers Richard Leacock, Albert Maysles, and DA Pennybaker’s
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documentary Yanki No!7 All four filmmakers pioneered the “direct cinema”
movement of the 1960s. Direct cinema was a style of observational documentary
making that utilized compact cameras and sound equipment in order to present
subjects as they existed in everyday life. Drew, Leacock, and Pennybaker were
partners in Drew Associates while Albert Maysles and his brother David had their
own company. All four filmmakers were publicly acknowledged as the preeminent
documentarians of the 1960s.8
In Yanki No! Robert Drew’s principal concern in the film was why antiAmerican sentiment was increasing in Latin America. Drew and the other filmmakers
wanted to encourage their U.S. audience see themselves as part of a larger
hemispheric family that was increasingly under attack from communism. Throughout
the documentary, the filmmakers focused their interviews on families in order to
personalize the different situations in Latin America and give the U.S. viewer a way
to empathize with their Latin American neighbors. The film opened with scenes of
poverty in Latin America and emphasized the disparity between rich and poor. The
filmmakers first interviewed the “Manzanita family,” Gabriel, his wife Maria, and
their two kids who lived in a Caracas slum. Scenes of naked babies, kids with no
shoes, a dead baby in coffin, and children looking through trash flashed across the
screen while the narrator described the conditions. The Manzanita family explained
the difficulties of living in the slums and the lack of opportunities that they had for
7

Richard Leacock, Albert Maysles, DA Pennybaker, Directors, “Yanki No!”
Bell and Howell Close Up ABC, Robert Drew/ABC-Time Inc. Producers, ABC,
1960.
8

Dave Saunders, Direct Cinema: Observational Documentary and the
Politics of the Sixties, (London, Wallflower Press 2007).
201

advancement. “Latin America is heading into another kind of revolution,” the narrator
postulated, “an economic revolution with Russia bidding to supply the ideas. Cuba is
the spearhead.”
Drew then turned his attention to Cuba and the changes that had been taking
place on the island since 1959. Amid scenes of Cubans marching, the narrator
announced that Cuba was organizing its population into a huge militia with supplies
from the Soviet Union. The filmmakers portrayed the Cuban masses as a dangerous
mob, hostile to the U.S. government and seemingly to the U.S. public itself. Drew and
his fellow filmmakers focused on the protest of the Declaration of San José in August
1960. This organized demonstration brought together over a million Cubans to the
Civic Plaza in Havana to protest the OAS document that condemned Soviet incursion
into the hemisphere. The document was designed to further isolate Cuba and censure
the Castro government for cultivating economic ties with the Soviet Union.9 The film
captured the million strong protest chanting “Cuba Sí! Yanki No!” During the filming
of the protest, the filmmakers focused much of their attention on Afro-Cuban
protestors as they gathered in the plaza. By emphasizing the anger of the crowd of
Afro-Cubans and the amounts of people gathered in the plaza, the film played to
white North American audiences confronting their own increasing racial tensions in
the 1960s.
In addition to the rally, the filmmakers documented many of the
improvements that had taken place in Cuba following the revolution. They
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highlighted the advancements in education, health, and housing that Cubans were
experiencing as a result of the revolution. Some Cubans considered these reforms to
be a more than fair trade-off for the lack of elections. Drew again chose to interview a
family instead of a government official to report on what was happening on the
island. The family of Jesus Moreno, a fisherman, who had received a new house from
the revolutionary government, told the documentarians his opinions about the
revolution. Moreno explained to the filmmakers that he was very excited about the
revolution and boasted, “What do we need an election for? We are on top.” He then
turned towards the camera and thanked Fidel Castro for receiving his house.
The filmmakers contrasted the economic successes in Cuba to the poverty of
Caracas and left their audience with a dire warning.
Castro’s voice is heard all over Latin America—in the slums of Rio de
Janeiro, in the slums of Buenos Aires, in the slums of Lima, in the slums of
Panama. Vast and rapid changes are inevitable. They’ve already started. With
an anti-American messiah, Soviet help, and Communist infiltration in Latin
America, these changes will sweep the rest of Latin America, either violently
with communist help or peacefully under the present democratic governments.
This is a life and death challenge for the United States. A hostile Latin
America could sabotage the U.S. position in the Western Hemisphere and
weaken it around the world…The cry “Yankee No!” is a cry for help, a cry of
warning, a cry for you, Yankee, to care about your neighbors. You, Yankee,
must be prepared to follow through with understanding, effort, and dollars. To
act quickly and strongly on their behalf, your own behalf, and on the behalf of
freedom in the world.
Like the editorial cartoons about the increasing danger of Cuba’s spreading influence,
Yanki No! appealed to the U.S. public to actively oppose communism in Cuba as a
tangible threat that would increase in Latin America if left unchecked. The
filmmakers’ use of images of families also brought an intimacy to the message that a
straight political analysis of the decaying situation between Latin America and the
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United States would have missed. By using families to explain how they personally
felt about their situation, the documentary had a more personal impact on the viewer
by allowing them to place themselves into the situation of their Latin “neighbors.” It
was this intimate stake in foreign relations that the filmmakers wanted to make clear
to their U.S. audience. Ultimately the filmmakers appealed to the U.S. public to be
less apathetic towards the hemisphere and to recognize that they were connected to a
larger hemispheric family that was greatly in need of their help.
The metaphor of families and the need increasing for U.S. public action
against Cuba’s influence in the region continued in Marshall Diskin’s television
special, 90 Miles to Communism.10 In his program, Diskin argued that ignorance and
misinformation about the rise of communism in Cuba was the ultimate threat to the
United States and the rest of the hemisphere. Like many early films about Castro’s
Cuba, Diskin focused his first scenes on armed Cubans as the narrator gravely
warned, “At America’s back door. More than a quarter of a million under arms.”
Diskin paid special attention to armed women and children marching in unison. The
filmmaker wanted to shock the U.S. audience with more than just the threat of
military action from the island only ninety miles away, but also with who comprised
the army. “The militia drills every day,” the narrator lamented, “Women learn the
lock step instead of the rumba. Children are also being trained…the twig is easier to
bend at an early age.” This image of women and children as soldiers would have
offended common notions of family in the United States. U.S. media depictions of
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communism often linked the political system with the destruction of the nuclear
family, torn apart and forced to live separate lives in the service of the state.
Like the filmmakers in Yanki No, Diskin interviewed a number of Cubans
about what they thought about the changes happening on the island. Most of the
people interviewed cared little about revolutionary ideologies and more about the
immediate economic benefits that they had received from the new government. One
sugarcane cutter put it very succinctly (and perhaps too articulately for a “cane
cutter”) when he said, “I don’t know much about Russia or China, but this
government is the uplift of this country.” Another Cuban peasant put it more bluntly
when he announced to the camera, “We have a new house and if anyone tries to take
it we will cut their throats.” Diskin dismissed what said in these interviews and
criticized the Cubans for not recognizing the truth of what was actually happening in
Cuba, an insidious communist takeover. Diskin presented the Cubans as under the
spell of Castro and unable to see or purposely ignoring the dangers of the communist
leader.
Both Robert Drew and Michael Diskin sought to warn the U.S. public about
the dangers of communism through their films; however, it was Ed Butler, who can
be considered the most zealous and over the top anti-communist filmmaker from this
period. A self-proclaimed expert on communism, Butler, became politically
motivated after the Cuban revolution and began to work against what he saw as the
increasing threat of communism in Latin America. In order to work against this
threat, in May 1961, Butler created the Information Council of the Americas (INCA).
INCA’s goal was to defeat Castro and communism in the Western Hemisphere.
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Butler recognized the power of propaganda in Castro’s rise to power and saw the
communist leader using images as a tool to convince other Latin American countries
to “go communist.” Butler believed that the United States needed to mobilize its own
propaganda efforts in order to combat this threat and that INCA could assist the
government in this cause. Butler wanted to create a new recognized position of
propaganda specialist that he termed “conflict manager.” According to Butler the role
of conflict managers was to “engage in direct confrontation with communism.” From
his New Orleans offices, Butler began to produce numerous radio programs,
pamphlets, flyers, and films in his effort to win what he termed the “brain war”
against communism. 11
Butler aimed at frightening the viewer into opposing Castro and Cuba. One
example of Butler’s scare tactics was INCA’s most notoriously melodramatic film
effort, Hitler in Havana.12 In the film, sponsored by the Schick Safety Razor
Company, Butler used the example of family as a means to frighten his intended U.S.
audience. Butler presented Fidel Castro as the modern day equivalent of Adolph
Hitler. The film’s dramatic soundtrack and over-the-top narration described the
horrors of the Cuban “red menace” with scenes of Castro juxtaposed with images of
Hitler, the Cuban militia along side the Nazi army, swastikas morphing into hammers
and sickles, and Hitler youth montages with scenes of Cuban children engaged in
military drills. The film made several claims against the Castro government was
destroying the lives of Cuban families. These claims included that Cubans citizens
11
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were going hungry, that the secret Cuban police monitored the Cubans every
movement, and that young girls had been stolen from their families and sent to the
Soviet Union for “indoctrination,” with the implied subtext of forced prostitution.
Cuba, according to Butler, was the spearhead of a Soviet led communist takeover in
Latin America equivalent to the Nazi takeover of Europe. INCA, Butler asserted, was
combating this propaganda by disseminating “the truth about Castro’s Cuba” to the
hemisphere. “Castro knows the power of words as a weapons,” Butler proclaimed,
“His propaganda mills work overtime firing mental missiles into the heart of enemy
nations.”13
The revolution, according Butler, had turned Cuba into a gloomy militarized
wasteland. Butler also blamed Castro for many of the concurrent problems in the
United States. Among these problems was the Kennedy assassination, college student
liberalism, and African American riots. Butler based his assertions on a debate he had
led with Lee Harvey Oswald over the Fair Play for Cuba Committee on the radio
three months before he assassinated Kennedy. Butler used this interview as evidence
that Oswald had been incited to kill the president by Castro and communism. To this
effect, Butler claimed Castro was now trying to brainwash liberal U.S. college
students to rise up against democracy by turning them into an “army of Oswalds.” It
was Butler’s contention that if the United States did not contain Castroism in Latin
America and on U.S. college campuses then other U.S. presidents were sure to be
assassinated.
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Like the filmmakers of Yanki No!, Butler also used race to grab his U.S.
viewers attention. Butler sought to frighten his audience with the specter of increased
racial violence in the United States because of communism. “It is communists,”
insisted Butler, “not Negroes who bare the ultimate blame for racial violence in
America.” Butler labeled Castro as the instigator of racial tension; “The Hitler in
Havana has invaded America with vicious ideas not troops. Communist instigated
riots have splattered the United States with blood and flames.” For Butler racial
violence was just another symptom of communism tightening chokehold on U.S.
society. The film ended with Butler’s ominous warning to the U.S. public to take
action against their southern neighbor. “If we do not win the war of words now,”
Butler forewarned, “we will loose our lives in revolutionary riots tomorrow.”14
While Butler’s Hitler in Havana was by far the most bombastic of
documentary of the time period, each of these three film productions echoed U.S.
editorial cartoonists message that the U.S. public needed be conscious of the dangers
that had been created by Castro. According to the cartoonists and filmmakers, Castro,
the revolution, and Soviet involvement in Cuba were all threats to democracy in Latin
America and ultimately to U.S. security. By using metaphors of proximity, family and
race, the cartoonists and filmmakers made the threat of communism seem more
immediate and personal for their intended U.S. middle-class audience. The
filmmakers and cartoonists’ repeatedly warned that the conditions of poverty in the
region made Cuban style revolutions possible if not probable throughout the
hemisphere. And if the United States did not act Castro’s Cuba could convert all of
14
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Latin America to communism. The conviction to defeat Castro in the battle to win
hearts and minds would manifest itself in Kennedy’s Latin American aid program—
the Alliance for Progress.
“Progreso si, tirania no!” The Alliance for Progress
On January 20, 1961, President Kennedy became the thirty-fifth president of
the United States. His inaugural address left no doubt that his intention to confront
Castro and the threat of communism in Cuba. Kennedy intended to strengthen the ties
between the United States and the rest of the Western Hemisphere in order to oppose
the threat of communism. Kennedy stated,
To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge: to
convert our good words into good deeds, in a new Alliance for Progress, to
assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But
this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let
all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or
subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that
this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.15
On March 13, 1961, the newly elected President Kennedy made good on his promise
and announced the creation of the Alliance for Progress. In his plan, Kennedy set
forth a broad and bold initiative, calling on the “free nations” of the hemisphere to
unite in a “revolution” for social change. Kennedy meant the Alliance to be a
“Marshall Plan” for the Americas that would raise the standard of living for all Latin
Americans and thwart communist expansion in the Western Hemisphere. The
Organization of American States (OAS) met in August 1961 and signed the Punta del
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Este Charter to adopt the Alliance for Progress. The U.S. government barred the
Dominican Republic and Cuba from participation in the program. The Alliance was a
central part of Kennedy’s efforts to contain Cuba’s revolution and to showcase U.S.
capitalism and democracy in the hemisphere. To achieve this goal the program called
for broad economic development initiatives, counter-insurgency, and, of course, an
aggressive propaganda campaign.16
While the mainstream U.S. media recognized disparities of extreme poverty
and wealth in Latin America as a fertile breading ground for communism, the
Alliance for Progress was initially met with only tempered enthusiasm. Many people
in the United States saw the Alliance as a program of handouts and as not doing
enough to directly combat the root cause of communism in the Americas, Cuba.
Cuban exiles in particular had mixed opinions on a program and expressed these
sentiments in a number of political cartoons. Some cartoonists presented the program
as a strong method for combating communism in the hemisphere. In one illustration,
exile cartoonists portrayed Kennedy as a hero, triumphantly striding across Latin
America. [See Figure 4.5] Those Cuban exile cartoonists who were enthusiastic
about Kennedy’s program saw the Alliance as literally crushing both the Cuban
revolution and the communist threat in the hemisphere. The Cuban exile artist Joe
drew the Alliance as a huge cement block crushing Che Guevara. [See Figure 4.6] A
second image in the same strip portrayed the “Punta del Este” as a lance impaling
Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and Raul Castro. The exile cartoonist Rafael echoed the
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idea of the Alliance as a force that would crush communism. Rafael depicted a hand
labeled “Latin America” clasped with a hand labeled “J.F.K. Alliance for Progress”
the two hands were shaking and in the process crushing Nikita Khrushchev. [See
Figure 4.7] The caption translates to “strong relations.”
At the same time other Cuban exile cartoonists saw the Alliance as not doing
enough to rid Cuba or Latin America of communism. In one cartoon, exile artist
Silvio drew Kennedy as “Johnny Appleseed” planting the seeds of economic
development in a field of Latin American countries. [See Figure 4.8] Unfortunately,
communist crows ate the seeds that JFK scattered. The largest crow resembled
Castro. The caption on the cartoon read, “ With these ugly birds it is impossible to get
a good harvest…” Silvio, like many other artists in the exile community, took the
view that the economic assistance to Latin America without direct action against
Cuba would have little success. Antonio Prohías echoed Silvio’s claim that the aims
of the Alliance were at best misguided because they did nothing to get rid of
communism. Prohías portrayed Uncle Sam as a bullfighter and communism as the
bull. [See Figure 4.9] Prohías drew a Latin American standing on the side of the
bullring watching as Uncle Sam plunged banderillas into his own neck instead of the
bull’s. The Latin American mocked Uncle Sam saying, “Listen uncle, it’s the bull that
you’re suppose to stick with the banderillas.” Even with concerns about the program,
the U.S. government nevertheless pushed forward with its program to convince Latin
America to adopt the Alliance.
In addition to giving economic aid and military aid to strengthen Latin
American “democracies,” the Kennedy administration also sought to combat Castro’s
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communist influence in Latin America through the use of propaganda. Following the
Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy administration stepped up its efforts to discredit Fidel
Castro and the Cuban revolution to the rest of Latin America. As part of Operation
Mongoose and under the aegis of the Alliance for Progress, the administration began
production of propaganda in “all media” to achieve the administration’s goal for a
politically and economically isolated Cuba that would eventually lead to destabilized
government ripe for internal revolt.17 Donald Wilson, Deputy Director of the United
States Information Agency (USIA), was tapped to lead the production of a massive
propaganda effort. USIA was charged with creating propaganda that “exploited
Castro defectors and children refugees…and (conducted) research on musical and
visual symbols.” This effort was to “utilize all media in mobilizing public opinion in
the other countries of Latin America against the Castro/Communist domination of the
Cuban people…”18 In a July 20, 1962, memo from Donald Wilson to Edward
Lansdale, head of Operation Mongoose, Wilson outlined the results for first phase of
the operation. From March 1962 until July 1962, USIA produced and distributed an
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enormous amount of propaganda including daily radio programs, television shows, an
animated film, books, and perhaps most importantly comic books.19
Illustrating the Alliance: The Comic Book Program of the Alliance for Progress
Comics had been part of the United States Information Agency efforts to
combat communism in Latin America even before Castro’s takeover in Cuba. Richard
Cushing, who worked for the USIS in Cuba during the revolution, had created a
comic book while serving as the Public Affairs Officer for the USIS in Chile from
1950-1951. The comic Juan Verdejo y su Sueño de Utopía - (John Doe and his Dream
of Utopia) told the story of a Chilean worker who became disenchanted with the
promises made by communists. [See Figure 4.10] This comic was reprinted and
distributed throughout Latin America.20 This same plot line of communists making

19

The power of comics as a tool of persuasion has been documented in
several books. For a landmark study on the political impact of commercial U.S. comic
books in Latin America see Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart, How to Read
Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic, (New York: International
General, 1971); See also David Dunn, “Comic Book Political Marketing: An Initial
Overview” Paper presented at the Political Studies Association Conference, Leicester,
April 2003. Available at http://www.psa.ac.uk/ (Accessed March 15, 2009); Anne
Magnussen and Hans-Christian Christiansen, Comics & culture: analytical and
theoretical approaches to comics, (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press,
University of Copenhagen, 2000); Anne Rubenstein, Bad Language, Naked Ladies,
and Other Threats to the Nation: A Political History of Comic Books in Mexico, (
Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); William W. Savage, Comic Books and
America, 1945-1954, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990); Alphons
Silbermann and H.D. Dyroff. Comics and Visual Culture: Research Studies from Ten
Countries, (New York: K.G. Saur, 1986).
20

Richard Cushing’s son, Lincoln Cushing, provided me with a copy and
explained the significance of the Juan Verdejo comic for me in 2006. Also note that
the United Sates Information Agency (USIA) and the United States Information
Service (USIS) were the same agency. USIS was the name used for the agency
abroad but it was called USIA domestically so as to not confuse the agency with the
United States Immigration Service (also USIS).
213

false promises to Latin American workers would be repeated on a much larger scale
to counter the threat of communism spreading from Cuba. The Alliance for Progress
comic book program was important enough to warrant its own director, Earnest
Keller. Keller, who began his career as a journalist and embassy attaché in Manila,
ran the Latin America comic book program in Washington, DC from 1963 until 1967.
Keller’s office at USIA produced detailed reports documenting country by country
the titles and amounts of each comic distributed. The program would eventually
produce a total of thirty-six different comics between 1961 and 1967 and by
September 1967 had distributed over sixty-six million copies throughout Latin
America.21
The U.S. government utilized a variety of local presses in Latin America to
print Alliance comics. In several incidences, USIS printed comics simultaneously in
different cities in the same country, for example Guayaquil and Quito, Ecuador,
Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico, and Caracas and Maracaibo, Venezuela. In
some cases private corporations sponsored the comics’ printing. For example, in
Mexico in March 1962, Pepsi Cola paid for the printing of over three hundred
thousand copies each of three different anti-Castro comics, El Despertar, La Estafa,
and La Traicion. This is ironic considering that Coca Cola was one of the first
countries to congratulate the revolution in Bohemia in 1959. Printing in Mexico also
was listed in the USIA documents as having been paid for by a “private anticommunist group.” Similarly, in Columbia, Ecuador, and Venezuela the private
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“Latin American Information Committee, Inc.” was listed as the financiers and
distributor of the comics.22 These types of “private” companies were exactly the type
of cover organizations that the CIA would use to channel funds to different programs.
After the USIS printed the comics locally, they were then given to newsstands
to sell or distributed free of charge and in a variety of ways in eighteen different Latin
American countries. Keller described in an internal memo dated May 22, 1963, the
“ingenious ways” that USIS distributed the comics. Keller explained,
The Latin American USIS posts distribute the cartoon products in various
ways, some highly ingenious. For instance, in two countries USIS furnishes
the books as ‘text-book’ material to aid in the teaching of reading, In some
places books are offered free of charge to shoppers in stores and in one supermarket are stuffed into customers’ bags by the checkers. Labor unions
distribute them to their members, and in this connection one post reports that a
Communist speaker became incoherently enraged when union members at a
meeting continued reading their USIS cartoon books while he was haranguing
them. In one country the books sell competitively on the newsstands with
other cartoon books of the comic variety. Churches place them in their
parishioners’ hands. USIS mobile units distribute them gratis at movie
showings and USIS-sponsored public events.23
Keller also explained that even more important than the distribution of the comic
books themselves was the utilization of the comics by the Latin American
newspapers. In some cases Latin American newspapers serialized the comics weekly
while others stuffed the comics into their newspapers as supplements. For example, in
Columbia, the weekly newspaper El Campesino printed comics as a weekly strip.24
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The titles and themes of the comics varied from anti-Castro/anti-Communist,
to pro-democratization, and to Alliance for Progress/self-help development programs.
USIS printed comics in both color and black and white and in Spanish and
Portuguese. In total, the Alliance program produced twenty-nine sixteen-page comics,
six four-page comics, and a forty-page photo-novella. The anti-Castro comics fell
under the general series entitled Historieta Dos Mundos (Two Worlds Comics). The
specific titles and themes were, El Despertar (The Awakening) “Castro’s Phony Land
Reform,” Escuela de Traidores (School for Traitors) “Castro’s guerrilla training
camps,” Eso No Puede Pasar Aqui! (This Cannot Happen Here!) “Castro takes over
all private businesses,” La Estafa (The Swindle) “Castro takeover of the
Universities,” Los Expoliadores (The Despoilers) “Communism Breeds Want in
Cuba,” La Mordaza (The Gag) “Castro Throttles Press, Radio and TV,” La Puñalada
(Stab in the Back) “Castro‘s War on the Church,” Los Secuestradores (The
Kidnappers) “Castro Brainwashes the Children,”and La Traicion (The Betrayal)
“Castro’s Takeover of Labor Unions.”25
In the anti-Castro comics, the artists denounced Castro as a ruthless dictator,
discrediting the revolutionary government’s national and socialist agenda, in order to
educate Latin Americans of all ages on what Keller referred to as “the manner in
which Communism by its very nature breeds want and hunger in every country it
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blights.”26 The full-size comics were sixteen pages long and printed using a fourcolor process. U.S. artists drew action-packed covers for the comics with either a
scene of violence unfolding or about to unfold. [See Figures 4.11 and 4.12] The
illustrators depicted bearded communists perpetrating violence against honorable
clean-shaven revolutionaries and their families or shadows creeping up on women
and innocent children. The titles of the comics were emblazoned across the top of the
booklet in large eye-catching red or orange block letters. There was a place for a price
to be assigned to the comic, although, as mentioned before, these comics were most
often given away free of charge. Inside the comic, various size panels contained
multiple characters illustrated with meticulous detail. Traditional dialogue bubbles
above the characters and general descriptions boxes gave voices to the characters, set
the scene, and described the action.
The majority of the anti-Castro comics followed the same storyline—Cubans
rejoiced with the downfall of Batista, Castro then betrayed the revolution by adopting
communist totalitarian policies, and true revolutionaries had no choice but to flee the
country to save their families and to continue the fight against Castro from abroad for
a Cuba that could someday be truly free. The comic creators designed these comics
with action and romance to appeal to a broad audience—men, women, and children.
In the anti-Castro comics, the heroes were all white Cubans representing the middle
and upper class families in both Cuba and the Latin American countries where the
comics were distributed. Many of the USIS writers employed the same plot of
communism threatening Latin American families, especially women and children, in
26
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order to have a maximum impact on their readers. These images of a threat against
ones own family made the larger political battle between two ideologies into a
personal one.
One of the first USIS anti-Castro comics was entitled, El Despertar (The
Awakening) “Castro’s Phony Land Reform.” El Despertar told the story of the Cuban
government threatening the lives and livelihoods of Cuban farmers. The policies of
the Cuban government forced the loving couple, Pepe Cuadros and Blanca Vazquez,
to fight against Cuba’s communism and unfair land reform. [See Figure 4.13] Pepe
Cuadros and Mateo Vazquez (Blanca’s brother) returned home from fighting in the
revolution. The family celebrated the end of Batista’s dictatorship and the promise of
receiving their own farms through the agrarian reform. However, this promise was
corrupted when the Cuban government insisted on controlling what the farmers could
grow and mandated that they could only sell their products to the government to buy
goods in government owned shops. Often in the in the Alliance comics the Castro
government delivered reforms that fell short of the initial promises made during the
revolution. In this way the comic artists sought to persuade their readers not to trust
what they had heard about Castro’s reforms and to look instead to the reforms offered
by the Alliance programs instead.
To counter the false hopes and broken promises of the Castro regime, the
Alliance comics often pointed to alternatives for Latin America. In El Despertar
Pepe’s cousin, Jorge, lived in Puerto Rico and wrote to his family about Puerto Rico’s
“land reform.” Jorge explained how he could plant what he wanted, received wages
for work, and sold his crops to whomever he wanted for actual money. In contrast,
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when one of Pepe’s neighbors died from exhaustion, the revolutionary government
confiscated the farm from his family. This angered Pepe and Mateo, who confronted
Pontones, the head of the local militia. When Pontones refused to help, Mateo and
Pepe realized that they did not actually hold title to their land. In response to what
they then saw as a phony land reform, Mateo and Pepe wrote a letter to Castro in
protest. Pontones intercepted the letter and accused them of counter-revolutionary
activity. He took Mateo to jail and promised to be back for Pepe. A “good member”
of the local militia, Manolo, warned Pepe and Blanca that Pontones was coming back
to arrest Pepe. In response, Pepe and Blanca had to flee Cuba in order to save
themselves and their family. [See Figure 4.14] The last line of the comic read, “The
story is repeated. Once again two Cubans, lovers of liberty are obliged to flee their
own country. Because, like many others, they have come to understand at last that the
regime of Fidel Castro is a totalitarian dictatorship!” All of the Alliance comics ended
with this type of pronouncement—Castro had betrayed the Cuban revolution and
could not to be trusted.
In another anti-Castro comic La Mordaza (The Gag) “Castro Throttles Press,
Radio and TV,” declared on its cover that, “No country is really free without freedom
of expression.” [See Figure 4.15] The comic writers again placed romance and
family at the center of the plot as a way to draw readers of different backgrounds into
the story and to then illustrate how Castro’s treachery put not only their individual
lives at risk but also the life of the entire nation. In this story Andrés Ruíz and Rosita
García worked as television reporters who supported the revolution to the point that
Castro personally thanked them for their help in winning the fight against Batista.
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Although Castro promised to keep freedom of speech at the forefront of the
revolution, the new government ended up going back on its pledges and shut
newspapers down and imposed their will on all forms of speech. Andrés who was a
television reporter at first acquiesced to the communist’s demands and reported their
censored stories. He did this because he was worried for his own and Rosita’s safety.
However, Andrés soon realized that his actions were helping to prop up Castro and
his dictatorship and that was ultimately where the real danger lay. Andrés resolved to
take a stand and had his friend Juan prepare a boat to leave the island. Andrés went on
the air and exposed the truth telling his audience that he had been reading statements
prepared by the government and that the communists now controlled Cuba. Because
of this breach of security, Andrés and Rosita had to flee the island and barely escaped
with Juan out of the country. [See Figure 4.16] Again the comic writers illustrated
that “true revolutionaries” had to become exiles in order to continue the fight against
Castro’s communism from abroad.
In both El Despertar and La Mordaza the heroes supported the revolution but
for the love of their country and each other were left with little choice but to flee
Castro’s Cuba. The comic writers portrayed the protagonists as victims of Castro’s
communist government—idealists betrayed. The central message of the comics was
that if the middle and upper classes in other Latin American countries did not defend
themselves against communist aggression in the hemisphere then the same fates could
befall them. The comics all supported the political agenda that the U.S. government
kept reiterating—the revolution to rid the island of Batista was justified, social
reforms were needed in Cuba but the methods that were used to carry out these
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reforms were incorrect, and the communist government suspension of basic liberties
made it impossible for “freedom loving” Cubans to stay on the island. The heroic
individuals and families in the stories risked certain death if they were true to their
values and tried to remain on the island. The comics presented the Castro government
as extreme and unbending in its quest for totalitarian power.
Besides the Anti-Castro titles, the USIA also produced several comics to
promote the Alliance for Progress and in an attempt to foster unity between the
United States and Latin America. These comics encouraged Latin Americans to
participate in Alliance’s rural development projects, praised the merits of noncommunist labor unions, and campaigned for good citizenship and the benefits of
self-help. The writers of these pro-Alliance for Progress comics often portrayed
nefarious outsiders as trying to defeat good Latin Americans who desired a more
prosperous future for their families and communities. The comic’s plots also
contained benevolent outsiders, usually from an Alliance for Progress program, who
wanted to help the people as well as encouraging the self-determination that was seen
as ultimately needed to build a better future. The comics often used documents from
the OAS meeting at Punta del Este as evidence to support the goals of the heroes.
Like the anti-Castro comics, the story arc in the Alliance comics was also essentially
the same—the hero had the necessary conviction and a dreams for a better future,
communist outsiders attempted to defeat this optimism, but with assistance from the
Alliance for Progress they ultimately triumphed and were able to meet their goals.
The comics acknowledged that change was necessary in Latin America but that the
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only avenue for real change was through programs like the Alliance not through
communism and its false promises.
In one example, Pepe Obrero y Su Sueño (Pepe the Worker and His Dream),
told the story of factory workers and their quest for a better life. This comic had a
very different look than the anti-Castro comics. It was much more cartoon like in its
drawings and action. [See Figure 4.17] This difference could have been because the
comic’s message was far more positive than the dire anti-Castro comics and was not
designed to scare its audience. In this story, Pepe believed that it was possible for his
family and the entire community to have a better life with schools, housing, and a
higher standard of living for his town. These dreams were not achieved through
handouts or communism, but instead through hard work and small businesses. The
stories of the Alliance contrasted with the nationalizations of industries and
businesses taking place in Cuba. The Alliance comics presented private enterprise and
entrepreneurship as the keys to economic development with only limited help from
the outside.
In Pepe Obrero, a furniture factory opened in Pepe’s town and began
producing chairs. Pepe and the other factory workers as well as the owner, Don Félix,
were dissatisfied with the conditions at the factory and the products produced. In
response, the workers formed a union and were able to negotiate with Don Félix for
better conditions and wages. Don Félix in return received better work and products to
sell. However, “opportunists” (read communists) moved into the town and destroyed
the effectiveness of the union. The union demands became untenable and caused the
factories to close and move elsewhere. Pepe and the other workers realized that the
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unions needed to be more democratic and be able to vote on what was best for both
the workers and the owners so that everyone could prosper. After the union
implemented these reforms, the factories reopened in the town. Pepe and his fellow
worker, Juan, realized that the union could not solve all the problems of the town and
that they still needed help to achieve their dreams of development. At the end of the
story, Pepe and Juan read from the charter of the Alliance for Progress. [See Figure
4.18] The two workers realize that the Alliance offered them and all Latin Americans
the hope to achieve all their dreams together.
Another comic entitled, La Hora Decisiva (The Hour of Decision) is an
example of another type of pro- Alliance comic. In this type of story the protagonist
must stand up for what he believes in, risking everything for the ultimate good of his
country and loved ones. The Alliance was portrayed as controversial but those who
understood the aims of the program triumphed, the truth ultimately coming to light. In
La Hora Decisiva th protagonist, Roberto Gomez was committed to helping his
fellow classmates become involved with the Alliance for Progress in their (unnamed
Latin American) country. [See Figure 4.19] Unfortunately for Roberto, the other
students did not believe in the true intentions of the Alliance. One classmate in
particular, Ramón was vocal about his disbeliefs in the Alliance and claimed it was
part of “Yankee imperialism.” Ramón had other evil intentions and sought to
discredit Roberto in an effort to steal Roberto’s girlfriend, María. However, Roberto
remained true to his beliefs even risking the love of María for what he believed was
right for his country. Roberto is eventually able to show his fellow students the work
that the Alliance is doing and the great benefit the projects will bring to the country.
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At an all student rally, Roberto passed out the preamble of the Alliance for Progress.
(The preamble was reprinted in the comic.) [See Figure 4.20] He was careful to
emphasize that unlike the communists the Alliance did not promise “a paradise
tomorrow” and that the projects would take time to complete but that with hard work
together with the Alliance the university students could create a brighter future for
their countrymen. Roberto convinced his fellow students, even Ramón, and in doing
so won back the love of María.
The use of comics was an effective and relatively inexpensive medium to
distribute the U.S. message against Castro and communism. Because all age groups
read comics they could have a far-reaching impact. The U.S. government knew that
the power of visually linking political messages with entertainment and appealing to
the masses through an already popular and easily digestible genre should not be
underestimated. The Alliance comics fulfilled the desire for the U.S. government to
assert its “storyline” about Castro’s Cuba and what the Alliance hoped to accomplish
into the hands of millions of Latin Americans. Ultimately military power and the
support of dictatorships friendly to U.S. interests more than images kept the western
hemisphere from converting to communism. However, the comic book effort alone
shows that the U.S. government believed that images were an integral part of the
battle against Castro’s Cuba and for hearts and minds of Latin America.
Cuba Nueva: Promises Kept and the Winning of Cuban Hearts and Minds
The Cuban government was well aware of the U.S. government’s direct and
indirect efforts to politically and economically isolate the island. Although Cuba had
been barred from receiving aid from the Alliance for Progress, it was still a member
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of the OAS. Ché Guevara was Cuba’s representative at the meeting and was given the
opportunity to speak at the conference. During his lengthy speech, Guevara asserted
that, “this conference and the special treatment given to all of the delegations…all
bear the name of Cuba, whether the beneficiaries like it or not…” Guevara went on to
criticize the Alliance as a U.S. smokescreen that would do little to alleviate any real
suffering in Latin America and instead would serve to prop up U.S. imperialism.
Cuba on the other hand, Guevara declared, intended to offer the hemisphere an
alternative model and become a beacon of hope for the world through example.27
Before Cuba could become a beacon for other countries like Guevara
predicted, the new government first needed to convince its own populace of the
righteousness of the revolutionary cause. Central to this mission was keeping the
promises of change and development that the rebels had pledged during the
revolution. Immediately following Castro’s entry into Havana, a majority of Cubans
met the revolution with a mixture of relief and hope. The Cuban political cartoonist
Antonio Prohías summed up the optimism that was widespread in the first months
after the revolution. Prohías was one of the most celebrated political cartoonists in
Cuba and served as the president of the Cuban Cartoonist Association from 1958 to
1959. In March and April 1959, Prohías deviated from his normal Bohemia comic
strip “El Hombre Siniestro” (The Sinister Man), to draw a set of two frame cartoon
comparisons of what Cuban society was like before the revolution and the hopes for
27
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what Cuba could be like after. In these cartoons entitled “Cuba Nueva,” Prohías
illustrated several of the revolutionary promises that were beginning to take place in
Cuban society. [See Figures 4.21 and 4.22] The cartoon’s title had a map of Cuba
hatching from an egg as if the beginning of a new life for the island and summed up
many of the changes that the new government was trying to implement. These
changes included agrarian reform, the literacy campaign, housing, and national
tourism all of which supported the overarching goals of racial, class, and gender
equality. Prohías was able to capture the hopes for several of the main social reforms
that the revolutionary government was attempting to implement.
The revolutionary government’s ability to implement social reforms as proof
that they were keeping their promises was critical to build up their legitimacy. Indeed,
the most important set of hearts and minds that needed to be convinced about the
merits of the revolution were the Cuban people themselves. The leadership realized
that only after the island’s majority was behind the revolution would it be possible to
expand its message outward to Latin America and the wider developing world. With
every reform the Cuban government produced images that served to remind the
populace that the leadership was fulfilling its promises. Because the majority of
people in Cuba were only semi-literate, visual communication was imperative to
reach the largest segments of the population. The Cuban leadership commissioned
images in advertisements, billboards, cartoons, films, pamphlets, and posters that
showcased the new society that was attempting to build.28
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One of the first sets of changes that the revolutionary government
implemented was to grant access to spaces that were once off limits except to the very
wealthy. These reforms allowed the poor and especially Afro-Cubans to participate in
arenas of Cuban life that had at one time been explicitly off-limits. These reforms
enabled the new government to use race and class to now build a stronger base of
support and to redefine the national family. National tourism served The government
wanted to reward the populace for winning the revolution and to promote national
unity through domestic tourism. In several advertisements, gasoline companies
encouraged Cubans to explore their own country. [See Figure 4.23] These
advertisements presented the possibility for all Cubans to explore locations that
previously had been available only to foreign tourists or the very wealthy. The goal,
as shown in the Prohías cartoon (Cuba Nueva), was to change the Cuban mindset
away from traveling to the United States or Europe and to instead have Cubans
embrace their own national patrimony.
One of the first changes the revolutionary government made to encourage
national tourism was to open all Cuban beaches to the public.29 With this change the
government eliminated the racial and class barriers that had existed at private beaches
and clubs before 1959. One of the most symbolically important beaches was
Varadero Beach located a hundred miles east of Havana and had the reputation as one
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of the most exclusive resorts on the island. After the revolution, the Cuban
government explicitly allowed Cubans who had been previously denied access to
vacation at Varadero.30 For Cubans, especially black Cubans, to vacation at Varadero
held great symbolic value for the new Cuban leadership and Cubans in general. In
1961, Castro proclaimed this significance at Varadero stating,
The fatherland today gives every child the opportunity, which was formerly
reserved for a few. You have an example of this here with this beach, where
some 40,000 students with scholarships will vacation. A few years ago only
the sons of multimillionaires could enjoy themselves here. Today this same
beach can be used by the most humble son of a worker or a farmer.31
In keeping with the spirit of this speech, Varadero became known as the “National
Center of Vacation and Recreation for workers, peasants and the young.”32
The new government facilitated the visiting of Varadero by nationalizing
hotels and properties in Varadero that had once belonged to foreign individuals or
corporations. Prices were then drastically reduced—a single room cost as low as 1.00
peso. The Cuban government nationalized and converted the villas of the wealthy into
tourism apartments and charged only thirty-five pesos for a week’s vacation for up to
ten people. The government also extended credit through the National Institute of
Tourism (INIT) to make vacations to Varadero and the rest of Cuba affordable.33 This
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credit was extended in order to encourage Cubans to travel to Varadero and other
places in Cuba as a means for better acquainting themselves with the country as a
means to build sense of national pride and identity. The new government also used
vacations to Varadero as a way to reward the best workers. INIT initiated a reward
program in which the best “workers, students, police, and military would receive
holidays at different tourism centers.34 The Comité de Trabajadores Cubanos (CTC)
also held contests to reward the most productive workers in the country with
holidays.35 Varadero was part of the reward system for workers supporting the
revolution with their best efforts.
To promote the new national tourism and to also showcase the tearing down
of racial and class biases, the Cuban National Institute of Tourism (INIT) advertised
tourist destinations with images of racial harmony. Because tourism had been
extremely segregated in the past, spaces previously off limits to Afro-Cubans, like
Varadero, provided a perfect opportunity to illustrate the differences that the
revolution was making in terms of establishing racial equality. Castro represented the
inclusiveness of Varadero when he stated,
The beaches, now that the Olive Green Revolution has constructed a new
nation—for this reason we say, A.R. and D.R., meaning before and after the
revolution—have been rescued, along with the rest of our national heritage, to
be given over to the legitimate owners. Now the blue of the waters and the
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sunlight of the sky, can be embraced in equality by the tender eyes of the
young, the skeptical eyes of the poor, and the oppressed eyes of blacks…”36
Tourism representations in the early years of the revolution not only encouraged more
people to visit Varadero but also became a propaganda tool of the new government
that continuously reaffirmed ideological goals and confirmed revolutionary success.
In many of the INIT advertisements the government’s underlying message
was that the entire nation now belonged to all Cubans regardless of race and class.
Advertisements featured families arriving in Varadero and groups of Cubans enjoying
the beach underneath large canopies. In other advertisements, INIT depicted groups
of Cubans from different races traveling together.37 In one example INIT presented, a
group of five people—including two mulattos, two white Cubans, and an AfroCuban—playing volleyball together on the beach.38 [See Figure 4.24 and 4.25] The
caption in advertisement read,
Now the country’s workers can enjoy the advantages of our climate of eternal
spring and delight -- twelve months out of the year – in the sun and sea of our
beaches, the revolutionary Government has made dormitories and cabins
available all year, at reasonable prices, there are dances, games and pastimes,
and all the facilities to play sports. Cuban now that you have a socialist
homeland that has given you the right to rest you can enjoy your days off
more than ever before…go and enjoy your beaches where all year long the
people are happy!39
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In the eyes of the revolution, all Cubans were now part of the same national family,
and could enjoy Varadero with the same rights.
In addition to national tourism, another way the new government sought to
create a new cohesive and equal nation was through the literacy campaign. The
Brigadas de Alfebetizadoras or Literacy Brigades like national tourism helped to
unite the Cuban people through the program itself as well as through the many visual
forms that celebrated the program. Before the revolution Cuba’s illiteracy rate stood
at about forty-two percent. Reducing this rate had been one of the stated goals of the
revolution from Castro’s attack on the Moncada.40 The new government wasted little
time and declared 1961 the “Year of Education.” Eventually, over a hundred thousand
teachers went out into the Cuban countryside to teach. Young and old, men and
women, everyone was given the opportunity to learn. In order to amass the number of
teachers necessary, the Cuban government closed all secondary and pre-university
schools on April 15, 1961. Everyone over the age of thirteen who had completed the
sixth grade was encouraged to volunteer for the program. The campaign was so
successful that in the course of a little more than a year the literacy rate in Cuba was
improved to ninety-six percent. The new government achieved their stated goals for
raising the rates of literacy as well as the secondary goal of promoting the
revolutionary government itself. 41
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The campaign itself was presented to the Cuban people with militaristic
language. The program to eradicate illiteracy was “a battle” the teachers “an army.”
The government presented education not just a fight to improve reading and writing
but as the frontline of a war against imperialism. The teachers themselves reflected
this rhetoric dressed in military uniforms with berets, boots, and arm insignia. The
brigadistas marched in parades with giant pencils and lanterns instead of guns.
Posters promoting the campaign carried the idea of brigadistas killing illiteracy. In a
1961 poster the brigadista was pictured stabbing the word illiteracy in the mountains
with a pencil. [See Figure 4.26] The style of the poster was similar to the military
posters that had urged action against “gusano” counter-revolutionaries. The brigadista
was larger than the mountains, an unstoppable force. Visually both efforts, one to
wipe out anti-revolutionary forces on the island and the other wiping out illiteracy
caused by imperialism, were visually joined.
The cover image of Literacy Campaign’s teaching manual further illustrated
these military themes. [See Figure 4.27] The manual’s cover drawing featured a
teacher striving forward with a shield bearing the insignia of the campaign while
holding the lamp of the brigade in the other hand. Behind the teacher, was a group of
Cuban men, women, and children, of all races—the new revolutionary family—
marching forward in unison as they were guided out of the darkness. The instructor’s
shield was emblazoned with the words Ejercito de Alfabetizadores (Army of
“Education,” in Dudley Seers, Cuba; The Economic and Social Revolution, (Chapel
hill: Univiversity of North Carolina Press, 1964), 161-282; and Marvin Leiner “The
1961 National Cuban Literacy Campaign,” in Robert F. Arnove and Harvey J. Graff,
eds, National Literacy Campaigns: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, (New
York: Plenum Press, 1987), 173-196.
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Teachers) protecting the nation as it followed behind him. The cover depicted a
kerosene lamp that served a real purpose in the campaign of providing light to
conduct classes in rural settings that had no electricity at night. The lamp was also
symbolic of the Literacy Campaign and the Cuban revolution bringing of the light of
knowledge to all Cubans.
The Literacy Campaign’s curriculum also contained martial overtones.
Teachers taught math and reading using examples that reinforced the superiority of
the revolution and the evil nature of the United States using the twenty-four “themes
of revolutionary orientation.” These themes included the history of the revolution,
new social programs such as the agrarian reform, revolutionary organizations, and the
general inferiority of the United States.42 Through these lessons students learned not
only to read and write but also that the United States was their enemy. The slogan for
the literacy brigades was “We have won another battle over imperialism!” As a
Cuban report to UNESCO frankly stated, “The aims of education in the new Cuba
include instilling in our children and young people an unbounded love of the
Fatherland…to abhor imperialist wars of plunder… [and] to develop a love of country
and a love for workers and peasants…”43
Images from the program also reinforced the mission of the revolution as a
whole. In 1961, the beach at Varadero was chosen as the national training site for the
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Literacy Brigades further redefining this once exclusive resort. The teachers stayed in
the hotels and villas that had been used by foreign tourists. At full capacity the
training center housed twelve thousand volunteers. Over a one hundred thousand
teachers trained at Varadero then traveled to the far reaches of the country. The
Cuban government chose the beach as a training site as an incentive for those who
had volunteered for the program. The use of Varadero as a staging point for the
literacy campaign further distanced the resort from the symbol of U.S. dominance that
had once been associated with the beach. Advertisements for literacy workers used
images of the beach as an incentive to work for the literacy brigades. [See Figure
4.28] One advertisement from Bohemia in June 18, 1961, showed a young Cuban
volunteer pointing to the beach where his fellow trainees played in the surf. The
caption read, “During training I am enjoying a vacation in Varadero, I will then go to
work planting the flowers of education in our country…” The volunteer was dressed
in a brigade uniform and appeared happy to be going his part to help the revolution.
The brigadista in the advertisement appeared to be very young and white.
The Cuban government utilized the Literacy Campaign as another method to
break down barriers between the races. Images from the campaign contained photos
of white Cubans working with their Afro-Cuban brothers in a common purpose of
eliminating illiteracy and at the same moment visually eliminating racism. During the
Literacy Campaign, companies advertised their products with images of multi-racial
Cubans cooperating and learning together. In a March 5, 1961, Coca Cola
advertisement commemorating the literacy campaign, the photo in the advertisement
depicted the hands of a white upper class woman guiding the darker hand of her
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domestic servant writing the alphabet. [See Figure 4.29] The caption read “In 1961,
the year of education, use your ‘pause that refreshes’ to teach reading and writing to
whomever you have near.” The message was that a “woman of the house” could
teach while having her “Coca Cola” break. Although there was still a power relation
in the image that favored white Cubans over Afro-Cubans, the image still pushed for
cooperation. Like the government’s push for national tourism, the literacy campaign
became a means that the revolutionary leadership united white and Afro-Cubans in a
common revolutionary effort through which each race could come to know and
respect the other. The government pointed to the campaign as eliminating illiteracy
and also contributing to building a new sense of national unity.
The government reminded the Cuban populace about the literacy campaign
through billboards and murals painted throughout the island. Billboards were an
effective means of visual communication that the Cuban leadership employed to
continuously remind the public about the revolution’s goals and successes. The
Castro government took the billboards that had been used before 1959 to promote
U.S. products and transformed them into advertising for the revolutionary message. 44
These billboards like posters could be quickly changed to suit the revolutionary
government’s needs such as celebrating revolutionary heroes, instilling motivation, or
highlighting revolutionary achievements such as the literacy campaign. 45
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The Cuban Film Institute, ICAIC, also visually promoted the “fight” against
illiteracy. In March 1959, the revolutionary government founded the first cultural
institution of the revolution, the Instituto Cubano del Arte y la Industria
Cinematográficos, the Cuban Film Institute, (ICAIC).46 The new government
recognized that one of the most important visual mediums they could utilize to spread
their message was film. Like the documentary films that presented Cuba as a threat to
the United States, ICAIC produced documentaries that denigrated their northern
neighbor and more importantly educated the island’s populace about the revolution’s
activities and goals. These films documented the new social reform programs such as
agrarian reform, housing, health care, and the literacy campaign.
One of the first films on the literacy campaign was Manuel Gómez’s 1962
Historia de una Batalla (Story of a Battle). 47 Gómez used his film to link the fight to
eliminate illiteracy to Cuba’s larger fight against imperialism. The martial theme of
the film, “study to defend,” was anti-American. Gómez shot Historia de una Batalla
during the push by thousands of volunteers into the countryside in 1961. The film’s
scenes of volunteers riding trains and marching through Havana resembled the
deployment of an army. Gómez purposely juxtaposed these images with scenes of
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Cubans defeating the U.S. led invasion at the Bay of Pigs to further emphasize the
militaristic nature of the fight against illiteracy. Gómez also honored the teachers who
had been killed by counterrevolutionary forces while trying to teach in the Escambray
Mountains like they were fallen revolutionary soldiers. The victims of these attacks
were declared martyrs of the revolution and were held up as examples of selfsacrifice equal to those who died fighting Batista. The film echoed the revolutionary
government’s call to participate in the campaign by linking the idea that literacy to
defending the nation against U.S. imperialism and aggression.
ICAIC directors continued to celebrate the literacy campaign and connect it to
military action years after the project was completed. Octavio Cortázar’s 1977
fictional account of the literacy brigade, El Brigadista (The Teacher), followed the
story of Mario, a fifteen-year-old boy who traveled to the Zapata swamp to teach
farmers. 48 Although the villagers did not welcome Mario at first, through his
determination and dedication to the revolution he won the town over. Mario also
gained the villager’s respect when he helped them defeat counter-revolutionaries
hiding in the swamp. Cortázar film reaffirmed the importance of the Literacy
Campaign to the collective memories of the Cubans who had participated as teachers
and those who had been their students. Similar to national tourism, images of the
Literacy Campaign , as much as the government program itself served to unite Cuba
in common purpose and supported a new vision of national identity free of racial and
class prejudice.
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Images of Alliance and Opposition: Cuba’s Quest for Hearts and Minds Abroad
Like Cuba’s domestic programs, the Cuban government produced a variety of
visual sources to document Cuba’s goals in foreign relations. To assert their views
internationally the Cuban government would often commission images to be created
in a variety of visual mediums to address a single issue. For example a Cuban agency
would produce a poster, ICAIC would make a film, and billboards would be erected
all in support or protest of the same foreign policy issue. The multitude of images
thus reinforced Cuba’s message of its place in the world and how Cuba’s new society
fit in globally. Just as the revolutionary leadership supported its domestic program of
change to promote a new sense of Cuban identity with multiple images, the Cuban
government employed multiple visual mediums to publicize its international policies
as it sought to become a voice for change in the rest of the Third World.49
Cuba materially and visually supported multiple social revolutions in the
Americas most notably in Guatemala, Grenada, and Nicaragua.50 Cuba stood against
the racist policies in South Africa and the United States. Indeed the Castro
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government treated the struggle for equality by African-Americans as another
struggle for liberation by a non-aligned nation. Cuba stood in solidarity with the
North Vietnamese communists and opposed the U.S. bombings of Cambodia and
Laos. During the mid-1970s, Cuba began to actively support liberation movements in
Africa. In total, Cuba sent more than sixty-five thousand troops and civilian advisors
to seventeen African nations and actively participated in armed conflicts in Algeria,
Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and most dramatically Angola. The liberation
movements that Cuba supported were opposed across-the-board by its northern
neighbor. Much like a chess game, any move that Cuba made on the international
stage was countered the United States, any movements that the United States made,
Cuba would oppose. The Cuban government would often produce images that
professed its opposition to U.S. foreign policy goals. In this way the struggle for
hearts and minds around the world reinforced the continued struggle of Cuba against
its most formidable enemy, the United States.51
One of the most successful means for the Cuban government to make its
position visually known on a wide array of both foreign and domestic issues was
through the distribution of posters. Between 1959 and 1989 most Cuban
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governmental agencies produced posters. These agencies employed a multitude of
artists who between them created thousands of posters promoting revolutionary ideas
and goals. Best estimates approximate the number of Cuban posters produced
between 1959 and the present at over 12,000 individual posters bringing the total
number of copies distributed to well over sixty million. The agencies that produced
the majority of posters included the Cuban Communist Party, the Latin American and
Caribbean Students Association (OCLAE), the Cuban Film Institute (ICAIC), the
Cuban Tourism Institute (INIT), and the Organization in Solidarity with the Peoples
of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. (OSPAAAL).52
Out of all the Cuban agencies that produced posters, OSPAAAL’s
international efforts were the best known. 53 Poster artists working for OSPAAAL
created a myriad of images that drew attention to Cuba’s stance on international
affairs throughout the world. OSPAAAL was founded as a non-governmental
organization in Cuba after the revolutionary government hosted the Tricontinental
congress in Havana from January 3-15, 1966. Representatives from eighty-two Third
World nations attended the congress. OSPAAAL has maintained its offices in Havana
ever since and receives funding from the Cuban government. The stated aims of
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OSPAAAL from the beginning were to fight against imperialism by promoting
freedom and solidarity within the Third World. OSPAAAL’s leadership claimed that
the posters themselves were a “combative form of cultural expression,” to be use in
the fight against imperialism.54 The most prolific period of OSPAAAL’s poster
production was from 1967 until it lost the majority of its funding with the fall of the
Soviet Union in 1989, but the organization has continued producing posters on a more
limited scale to the present day.55
OSPAAAL distributed its posters worldwide as part of its Tricontinental
magazine. At its height, OSPAAAL distributed over 50,000 copies of the magazine
per month. Each issue of Tricontinental included a poster that was folded inside the
magazine to be pulled out and displayed. From 1967 to 1989 roughly fifteen million
posters were distributed over a twenty-two year period.56 OSPAAAL posters were
published with captions in four languages, Spanish, French, English, and Arabic.
However, OSPAAAL artists knew that their intended audience was largely illiterate
and so relied more on the images themselves to convey their message. The posters
graphics used many recognizable symbols and archetypes that made the
dissemination of the images readily accessible across national boundaries and
cultures. OSPAAAL commissioned posters for the many cold war and anti-colonial
conflicts that were fought around the globe. OSPAAAL posters offer not only a
54
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historical record of the many Third World struggles that took place during the Cold
War but were a weapon of change used during many of those conflicts.
For example, during the Vietnam War, Cuba produced a number of posters to
protest U.S. involvement in South East Asia and celebrated the fortitude of the
Vietnamese people. Many of the poster showed the victims of U.S. aggression,
especially children maimed or killed by U.S. bombs. Again this use of images of
family as victims was used by both the United States and Cuba to make the conflicts
personal to all viewers. Cuban posters from this time period also depicted U.S.
presidents Johnson and Nixon as responsible for the atrocities being committed in
Vietnam. In 1971 René Menderos’ famously portrayed Nixon as a monster in the
shape of an eagle violently tearing the heart out of South East Asia. [See Figure 4.30]
Like Bill Mauldin’s visual hybridization of Castro as an Octopus, Menderos affixed
Nixon’s head to the body of an eagle, his face bearing vampire fangs. By comparison
OSPAAAL artists’ depictions of Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese people were
joyful, peaceful, and serene. [See Figure 4.31] The posters celebrated Vietnamese
victories against the United States and condemned the U.S. escalation of the war into
the neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia. In celebrating Vietnam’s
determination against the United States, the Cubans also celebrated their own
struggles against U.S. aggression.
This comparison between a hostile and insanely aggressive United States and
a peaceful but determined Vietnam was visible in several Cuban Film Institute
(ICAIC) films. One of the most famous films about the Vietnam War was Santiago
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Álvarez’s 79 Primaveras (79 Springtimes).57 Santiago Álvarez was a founding
member of ICAIC and one of Cuba’s most celebrated film directors. He was the in
charge of the Cuban newsreel program and produce over seven hundred short
documentaries for ICAIC. 58 Álvarez was instrumental in transforming film in Cuba
and clearly stated the purpose of filmmaking after the revolution. “Cinema, is not an
extension of revolutionary action, Álvarez asserted, “Cinema is and must be
revolutionary action in itself.”59 In order to advance the cause of the revolution,
ICAIC averaged more than forty documentaries per year from 1959 until the present.
Like Cuban posters and billboards, Álvarez’s documentary style was primarily visual
containing little or no dialogue.
The title of the film, 79 Primaveras, referred to North Vietnamese leader Ho
Chi Minh who died in 1969at the age of seventy-nine. Álvarez used few words in his
films and yet was able to tell a history of Vietnam’s struggle for independence. Like
the OSPAAAL posters, Álvarez’s film contained contrasting images of the beauty of
Vietnam and the brutality of the United States—blooming Vietnamese flowers that
morphed into exploding U.S. bombs, Vietnamese children dancing around Ho Chi
Minh and children burned by U.S. napalm bombs, U.S. soldiers killing Vietnamese
and posing for photos with their bodies. The film also showed the anti-war protests
and violence taking place in the United States because of the war, U.S. imperialism as
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a domestic crisis as well as an international one. Towards the end of the film,
Álvarez presents the violence of the war, as so intense that the film itself seems to
come to pieces as the viewer is watching. Through these images of violence inflicted
by the United States, Cuban image-makers were able to show the differences between
the new Cuban society and the brutality of U.S. imperialism.
Another societal difference that was highlighted in various visual forms by
Cuban artists was race. From the very beginnings of the revolution one of the main
goals was the ending of racist policies on the island. This official achievement was
celebrated by in Cuba in the early 1960s and contrasted with the continuing struggle
of African-Americans in the United States. Castro continuously aligned himself with
the plight of African-Americans. In September 1960, Castro came to the United
States to address the United Nations on his second visit since assuming power. This
visit had a very different tone then Castro’s celebration tour of the United States in
1959. The 1960 visit was punctuated by the Cuban delegation leaving their mid-town
Manhattan hotel in protest over “ill-treatment,” and relocating to the Hotel Teresa in
Harlem. Because Harlem was the epicenter for Black culture in the United States, the
move by the Cuban delegation provided visual shorthand that communicated to the
U.S. Black community and to the world that Castro considered African-Americans
part of Cuba’s global struggle for social justice.60
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One the first attempts to play on the differences in racial policies between
Cuba and the United States was through tourism marketing. In January 1960, the
Cuban government offered to hire U.S. boxer, Joe Louis, to promote Cuban tourism
to African-Americans. Louis was reported as saying “There is no place in the world
except Cuba where a Negro can go in the wintertime with absolutely no
discrimination.”61 Louis was photographed with Castro and was enthusiastic about
the contract. Nothing came of the arrangement in terms of tourism promotion or
income for Louis. Instead, a year and a half later, Louis testified before a U.S.
congressional sub-committee as part of its investigation into Cuban communist
infiltration into the U.S. through the Caribbean. Of particular concern to the
committee was that Cuba was trying to attract African-American tourists who, in their
opinion, could then be turned against the U.S. government. The committee wrote a
special report detailing the perception of possible communist infiltration entitled
“Cuba and the American Negro” that was attached to the hearings proceedings. 62
In a Time Magazine article from June 1960, Castro was quoted as openly
questing “what would happen if the Negroes in the Southern U.S., so often lynched,
were each given a rifle?”63 Various Cuban agencies produced posters in support of
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African-Americans in the United States. Several posters depicted leaders of the U.S.
Black Panther Party like revolutionary heroes such as Angela Davis, George Jackson,
Huey Newton. [See Figure 4.32] The Cuban government repeatedly condemned the
violence against African-Americans in the United States as a human rights abuse.
Several posters echoed these condemnations and contained photos of the Ku Klux
Klan and violence perpetrated on African Americans. In a Heri Escheverria poster
published by Editora Politica, the shape of the statue of liberty was filled with images
of racism and violence in the United States with the caption “What types of fighter
for Liberty are these?”[See Figure 4.33] The images in the poster were from the
Watts riots in 1965, which also became the subject for a celebrated ICAIC
documentary.
In 1965, Santiago Álvarez produced one of his most famous documentaries
focusing on racism in the United States—NOW! Like 79 Springtimes, NOW! was
comprised of “found” footage and photographs from U.S. magazines and newsreels.
From these sources, Álvarez created a collage of the images to depict racism and
brutality in the United States. The entire film is only six minutes long and was set to a
U.S. banned Lena Horne song “Now “that used the Jewish celebration song “Hava
Nagila” as its basis. The scenes in the movie are of the Watts riots in 1965, Martin
Luther King Jr. meeting with president Johnson, and widespread violence against
African-Americans in the southern United States. The film ended with the sound of a
machine gun and animation spelling out the word now in bullet holes. Álvarez’s film
mirrored Castro’s call for African-Americans to rise up in armed struggle against an
internal imperialism propagated by a U.S. government that oppressed their race. As
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with many of the domestic and international issues in the early years of the
revolution, images of solidarity with African-Americans supported the rhetoric of the
Cuban leadership.
In its efforts to support struggles against injustice throughout the world, Cuba
produced a multitude of images in every visual medium to show their solidarity.
However the ultimate image of Cuban of revolutionary struggle came in the form of a
single photo of Ché Guevara. In March 1960 a French freighter, La Coubre, loaded
with Belgium arms exploded in Havana Harbor killing seventy-five and injuring
another two hundred people. During a speech Castro made denouncing the bombings,
photographer Alberto Diaz Gutierrez better known as Korda snapped a photo of Che
Guevara he titled Guerrillero Heroico (Heroic Guerrilla). [See Figure 4.34] Korda
was commissioned by Castro to document the revolution in photographs and became
in essence the official photographer for the Cuban revolution. Guerrillero Heroico
became the most famous and lasting images of the revolution and is widely regarded
as one of the most recognizable photos in the world.64
From the photo, every form of visual media imaginable has been emblazoned
with Ché’s image—advertisements, album covers, banknotes, billboards, bumper
stickers, buttons, coins, flags, key chains, murals, postage stamps, posters, and tshirts, to name but a few.65 In addition, Che and Che’s image have been the subjects
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of numerous books, films, and songs. Korda’s image has been transformed so many
times that it now represents a set of ideas more than the man himself. It is Ché’s
image not necessarily his actions that have survived and continue to inspire other
movements.
The modern use of Ché’s image tends to provoke a response of fraternity or
anger. Most people who wear the t-shirt have no idea who Ché Guevara was or what
he stood for and only see his image as a symbol of youthful rebellion. Ironically the
image has been so mass-produced and sold that it is representative of the very type of
global mass capitalism that Ché would have fought against. Nevertheless, the image
remains a potent symbol of protest and is one of the most enduring legacies of the
Cuban revolution. Although Ché’s forays into Africa and Latin America in an effort
to foment Cuban style revolutions abroad were unsuccessful and led to his death,
Ché’s image as an inspiration for other struggles of liberation can be seen as a global
victory Cuban victory in the struggle for hearts and minds.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, Latin America became a frontline
battleground of the Cold War. Castro’s acceptance of aid and weapons from the
Soviet Union sent a clear signal that the Cold War had expanded beyond a primarily
European front and into a more global conflict. Because of this shift, the United
States could no longer count on Latin America to be a stable and benign region. Even
before taking office, Kennedy began to see Latin America as the “most dangerous
Museum of Cultural History, 1997). For a great documentary on the use of Ché’s
image around the world see Luis Lopez and Trisha Ziff, directors, Chevolution,
Fortissimo Films, 2008.
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area in the world” and worked to destroy the Cuban revolution in both image and
reality. After January 1959, the revolution turned from a military operation against
Batista to a conscious effort to reshape the meaning and purpose of Cuban identity. It
was in this new quest for a re-envisioned national family based on socialist ideals of
racial, class, and gender equality that the Cuban revolution found its most lasting
mission. Castro seized upon the constant specter of U.S. aggression served as a
catalyst to speed revolutionary changes on the island and as an impetus for the Cuban
government to spread their example abroad.
Both Cuba and the United States worked to win the domestic and international
battle for hearts and minds. For the new Cuban government winning the hearts and
minds of the Cuban people was the primary objective of building a new society that
could serve as a beacon to the rest of the developing world. In order to build this
society, Cuban artists endeavored to produce a new worldview of the island as an
independent and equal nation apart from the United States. The new government
encouraged Cubans to get to know their own country and to know one another as
equals. Crucial to this effort to form a new society was an increase in access,
education, and common images and messages that continuously spoke to the Cuban
people as a revolutionary unified society.
In the United States, the battle for hearts and minds centered on the
containment of Cuban communism. U.S. political cartoonists and filmmakers
demanded that the public pay attention to the increasing danger now posed by their
once close ally. The U.S. government considered popular visual culture such as comic
books an important part of the fight against communism spreading to other Latin
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American nations. Arguably U.S. military power, more than images, kept the western
hemisphere from converting to communism. However, the use of images was always
included in plans to contain Cuba’s advance and therefore was considered an
important psychological tool used to spread U.S. ideas and values.
Since 1959 the United States also had another image of Cuba’s failure to
convince a portion of its own population of the merits of the revolution, the
continuous mass exodus of Cuban from the island to the United States. The Cuban
exile community has been a continuous source of image making against the Castro
government and is in many ways the most intimate and personal aspect of the conflict
between the two nations. By their very existence, the exiles have continuously fed
U.S. popular culture with images of the failure of the Cuban revolution and Castro. It
is the changing nature of these images and the Cuban and U.S. response to the exile
community that we next turn.
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Figure 4.1 Bill Mauldin, Castro as Octopus spreading his reach over Latin America,
Chicago Sun Times, 1963.
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Figure 4.2 Jack Knox, “Use a Strong Insecticide Before They Spread a Plague,”
Nashville Banner, 1961.
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Figure 4.3 Jack Knox, “The Real Danger is Spreading Infection,” Nashville Banner,
1960.
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Figure 4.4 Anthony, Communism as infection, El Avance Criollo, August 25, 1961,
35. The caption reads, “God willing the vaccine will save me from this infection.”
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Figure 4.5 Kennedy Strides over South America. El Avance Criollo, January 5, 1962,
Cover
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Figure 4.6 Joe, “Punta del Este,” El Avance Criollo, August 25, 1961, 14.
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Figure 4.7 Rafael, “The Firm Handshake,” El Avance Criollo, January 5, 1962, 10.
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Figure 4.8 Silvio, “With these types of nasty birds, it is impossible to get a good
harvest…” Kennedy as Johnny Appleseed, El Avance Criollo August 25, 1961, 40.
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Figure 4.9 Antonio Prohías, “Listen Uncle, it’s in the bull where you stick the
banderiallas…” El Avance Criollo, December 1, 1961, 4.
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Figure 4.10 Richard Cushing, Juan Verdejo y su Sueño de Utopia (John Doe and his
Dream of Utopia), USIS, Chile, 1950.
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Figure 4.11 Escuela de Traidores (School for Traitors) “Castro’s guerrilla training
camps,” Alliance for Progress, 1966.
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Figure 4.12 La Traicion (The Betrayal) “Castro’s Takeover of Labor Unions,”
Alliance for Progress, 1962.

262

Figure 4.13 El Despertar (The Awakening) “Castro’s Phony Land Reform,” Alliance
for Progress, 1962.
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Figure 4.14 Pepe Cuadros and Blanca Vazquez leaving Cuba to continue their fight
against communism and unfair land reform from abroad. In El Despertar (The
Awakening) “Castro’s Phony Land Reform,” Alliance for Progress, 1962.
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Figure 4.15 La Mordaza (The Gag) “Castro Throttles Press, Radio and TV,” Alliance
for Progress, 1962.
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Figure 4.16 Andrés, Juan, and Rosita “Lovers of Liberty,” flee from Cuba and barely
escape with their lives. In La Mordaza (The Gag) “Castro Throttles Press, Radio and
TV,” Alliance for Progress, 1962.
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Figure 4.17 Pepe Obrero dreams of a better life for his family. In Pepe Obrero and
Su Sueño (Pepe the Worker and his Dream), Alliance for Progress, 1963.
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Figure 4.18 Pepe Obrero reads from the Punta del Este Charter. In Pepe Obrero and
Su Sueño (Pepe the Worker and his Dream), Alliance for Progress, 1963.
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Figure 4.19 La Hora Decisiva (The Hour of Decision), Alliance for Progress, 1963.
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Figure 4.20 Roberto Gomez was committed to helping his fellow students become
involved with the Alliance for Progress. In La Hora Decisiva (The Hour of Decision),
Alliance for Progress, 1963.
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Figure 4.21 Antonio Prohias, “Cuba Nueva,” Bohemia, March 29, 1959, 12.
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Figure 4.22 Antonio Prohias, “Cuba Nueva,” Bohemia, March 29, 1959, 12.
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Figure 4.23 “Go for the gusto in Cuba!” Shell Gasoline Tourism Advertisement,
Bohemia, March 29, 1959, 56.
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Figure 4.24 “Now all year long you can enjoy your beaches.” Instituto del Turismo
Nacional Cubano (INIT), Bohemia, October 15, 1961, 38.
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Figure 4.25 “Now all year long you can enjoy your beaches.” Instituto del Turismo
Nacional Cubano (INIT), Bohemia, October 15, 1961, 39.
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Figure 4.26 Literacy Brigade Poster “Death to Illiteracy!” Asociation de Juventud
Rebelde AJR (Association of Rebel Youth), from Joanne C. Elvy “Photos from a Cuban
Diary: Forty Women on Forty Years Reflections on the 1961 Cuban Literacy Campaign”
Available from www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente/fall_05/Elvy.pdf (Accessed June
5, 2009).
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Figure 4.27 Literacy Brigade Textbook “Let’s work together!” Comisión Naciónal de
Alfabetización, Ministerio de Educación, 1961, from Joanne C. Elvy “Photos from a
Cuban Diary: Forty Women on Forty Years Reflections on the 1961 Cuban Literacy
Campaign” Available from www.ncsu.edu/project/acontracorriente/ fall_05/Elvy.pdf
(Accessed June 5, 2009).
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Figure 4.28 “While I train I can enjoy a vacation at Varadero…” Literacy Brigade
Advertisement, Bohemia, June 18, 1961, Inside Front cover.
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Figure 4.29 “In 1961, the year of education, use your ‘pause that refreshes’ to teach
reading and writing to whomever you have near.” Coca Cola, Bohemia January 8,
1961, backcover.
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Figure 4.30 René Menderos, Nixon tearing the heart out of South East, OSPAAAL,
1971. Reprinted in Richard Frick, The Tricontinental Solidarity Poster, (Bern,
Switzerland: Comedia-Verlag-Bern, 2003), 290.
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Figure 4.31 Alberto Blanco, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese People, OSPAAAL,
Reprinted in Richard Frick, The Tricontinental Solidarity Poster, (Bern, Switzerland:
Comedia-Verlag-Bern, 2003), 292.
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Figure 4.32 Rafael Morante, George Jackson, OSPAAAL, Reprinted in Richard
Frick, The Tricontinental Solidarity Poster, (Bern, Switzerland: Comedia-VerlagBern, 2003), 421.
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Figure 4.33 Heri Escheverria, “What kind of ‘Freedom Fighters’ are these…” Editora
Politica, Undated-Post 1965.
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Figure 4.34 Alberto Díaz Gutiérrez, “Korda,” Guerrillero Heroico (Heroic
Guerrilla), March 5, 1960. Available at Wiki Commons
www.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a1/Heroico1.jpg, (Accessed July 17, 2009).
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CHAPTER FIVE
Martyrs, Murderers, and Miracles:
Images of the Cuban Exile Within and Without, 1959-2000
Some ask can it be that bad in Cuba and I always
think of these people who have faced a hundred
miles of ill highways, the sun, the storms, the terror
of the night in tiny boats to flee red paradise.
—Ed Butler, Hitler in Havana, (1966)
We say to those who do not have the genes of
revolutionaries, or the blood of revolutionaries, or
who do not have the necessary discipline and
heroism for a revolution: We don’t want you! We
don’t need you!
—Fidel Castro, Anti-Mariel Rally, (1980)
I'm Tony Montana, a political prisoner from Cuba.
And I want my fuckin' human rights, now! Just like
the President Jimmy Carter says. Okay?
—Tony Montana (Al Pacino), Scarface, (1983)
No one—not even a father—has the right to enslave
another human being.
—News Max, Free Elián Campaign, (2000)

On Thanksgiving Day, November 25, 1999, a five-year-old boy was
discovered floating in an inner tube off the coast of Florida. The boy was reportedly
found alone, surrounded by dolphins, and miraculously unsunburned despite having
been adrift for days, the only survivor of an escape from Cuba. The discovery of this
child set off an international custody battle that became part of the larger war of
images that began decades before his birth. That war started on another stormy
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November 25 forty-three years earlier when an overcrowded and dilapidated boat set
out for a return voyage to Cuba from Mexico. That voyage was also attributed as full
of heartaches, myths, and miracles. Both of these famous seafarers, Elián González
and Fidel Castro, have been part of one of the constant themes of Cuban history—
exile.
The Cuban exile community in the United States has been a central part of the
conflict between the United States and Cuba. Both governments have used images of
the exiles to support their political own agendas. For the Cuban exiles themselves, the
conflict between the Cuba and the United States has been fought on the most intimate
level—whole families have been uprooted; parents and children split apart; property
expropriated. The majority of Cubans arrived in the United States in four waves, the
first wave of 1959-1962, the “Freedom Flights” of 1965-1973, the Mariel Boatlift of
1980, and the Balsero Crisis of 1994-1995. Each of these groups of exiles became the
subject of a new set of images produced on both sides of the Straits of Florida.
The exiles have been a curse and a blessing for both the Cuban and the U.S.
governments. Allowing or even encouraging a portion of Cuba’s population to leave
the island has been a method for the revolutionary government to constantly
externalize dissent. Because the exiles rejected their place in the new revolutionary
Cuban family, the Cuban government in turn rejected them as the worst traitors of the
revolution. Within the revolutionary framework, those who remained on the island
then had increased legitimacy in Cuban society while those who left were
automatically counter-revolutionaries in league with the enemy. Emigration from the
island also served the Castro government as a social safety valve. Every Cuban that
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left the island was one less person relying on Cuba’s socialist system for economic
support. In addition, Cubans who opposed Castro but left the island no longer posed a
danger for internal rebellion. The Cuban exile community has also become an
economic lifeline to thousands of resident Cubans through the remittances that are
sent every year totaling upwards of a billion and a half dollars. However, the price for
this safety valve and foreign currency has been a constant source of negative images
for the U.S. government to use against the Castro regime.
The U.S. government, for its part, welcomed the exiles into the U.S. national
family because they served as a potent symbol to be used against communism during
the Cold War. For the U.S. government, the massive departures of Cubans from the
island provided a constant image base to point out of the failure of Castro’s system.
However, the exiles have also been a political liability to their U.S. hosts. Their
willingness to confront Castro directly through sabotage and acts of terrorism at times
aided the U.S. government and at other times was at odds with the stated objectives of
the United States. Some members of the exile community viewed any action, legal or
illegal, as justified as long as it worked towards their ultimate goal, eliminating Fidel
Castro. Domestically, the exiles have played a crucial role in reinvigorating South
Florida yet at the same time have been linked to the region’s major crime problems.
The exiles have continuously bound the two nations together through family
ties to the island as well as divided the nations by acting as the most vocal opponents
to any reconciliation between the two estranged neighbors. The visual metaphors of
family that have both connected and separated the two countries are often rooted
within the exile community. These images—from Ricky Ricardo’s family man
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fantasy, to Tony Montana’s anti-hero family tragedy—captivated the U.S. public
imagination and in turn shaped the view not only of the émigré community but also
the relationship between Cuba and the United States more generally. The contested
family connections between the United States and the island, like the custody battle
for Elián González, continued to reinforce the metaphorical battle between Cubans
for the custody of their island.
The exiles are in many senses the embodiment of the intimate relationship
between the two countries, the personal made political and the political made
personal. The U.S. and Cuban governments turned every exile who chose to leave the
island into a political image. For most exiles, the personal reasons why they left the
island were based on the consequences of the strained political relationship between
Cuba and the United States. These reasons including differences in political ideology,
fear of government persecution, economic opportunity, or any combination were
often the result of the conflict between the neighboring nations. Popular images
produced by exiles and about them often reveal this personal/political duality and
served to define it. These popular images have both obscured the truth of the exiles
history as well as revealed details about them and their connection to the U.S.-Cuban
foreign policy that would have otherwise remained hidden from view.
First Waves: Golden Exiles and the Formation of the Community
Since the beginnings of the twentieth century almost every Cuban political
figure—José Martí, Gerardo Machado, Ramón Grau San Martín, Carlos Prío
Socarrás, Fulgencio Batista, and Fidel Castro—has spent time in exile in the United
States. Some of them came to the United States in order to launch their political
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careers in Cuba; others came at the end of their tenure. Thousands of Cubans also
traveled back and forth between Cuba and the United States for professional and
personal reasons. Immigration to the United States, both legal and illegal from Cuba,
has been continuous from the early nineteenth century. Before 1959 the number of
Cubans who remained in the United States as permanent residents was relatively
small, around 30,000. The Cuban revolution of 1959 provided the catalyst for a
substantial and sustained exodus from the island. The second half of the twentieth
century has accounted for the largest numbers of Cuban immigrants with over a
million Cubans arriving in the United States over the last fifty years (1959-2009).
The first large migration of Cubans to the United States took place
immediately following the revolution and lasted from 1959-1962. Because
commercial air travel continued to the island until the Cuban Missile Crisis, most of
these immigrants simply boarded tourist planes from Cuba to the United States and
never went back. These immigrants came from the upper echelons of Cuban society
and had the most to lose from the revolution. The exiles were a relatively
homogenous group—predominantly white, educated, and with significant resources.
Some of the first to arrive in the United States had been connected to the Batista
government and needed to flee the island or risk imprisonment or death. Soon after
the revolution began its social reforms wealthy landowners, large business owners, or
managers in U.S. corporations also left. Although many in the first waves came from
opposing political camps—some backed the revolution, others supported Batista—
once in the United States they joined together to oppose Castro and the development
of Cuba as a socialist state. Before the Bay of Pigs, the first exiles believed that their
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stay in the United States would be temporary. The Cuban Missile Crisis (October
1962) brought a halt to this first wave and the Cuban government stemmed the flow
of exiles for three years. In total close to a quarter of a million Cubans arrived in the
United States in the first three years following the revolution.1
Following the Missile Crisis, the Cuban and U.S. governments suspended
commercial flights between the two countries. Nevertheless, Cubans continued to
immigrate to the United States via third countries. Between October 1962 and
September 1965, over 50,000 Cubans came to the United States mainly through
Mexico and Spain. Another four thousand Cubans left the island in small boats and
rafts. The media in the United States paid much more attention to the small number of
Cubans who crossed the ninety miles of ocean clandestinely, heralding them as
heroes. During the first years of the revolution, the Straits of Florida, which tourism
advertisers had touted for its azure and placid beauty were now portrayed in the
media as an inhospitable shark-infested “corridor of death.”2

1

For an excellent accounts of the different waves of Cuban exiles see Richard
R. Fagen, Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O'Leary. Cubans in Exile: Disaffection
and the Revolution, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968); Miguel A. de la
Torre, La Lucha for Cuba: Religion and Politics on the Streets of Miami, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003); María de Los Angeles Torres, In the Land of
Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United States, (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2001); María Cristina García, Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and
Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959-1994, (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1996), 13-45; Robert M. Levine and Asís, Moisés, Cuban Miami, (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2000); and Silvia Pedraza, “Cuba's
Refugees: Manifold Migrations,” Cuba in Transition, Association for the Study of the
Cuban Economy, 1995. Available from Fifth Annual Meeting of the Association for
the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), www.lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce,
(Accessed January 12, 2006).
2

Cuban waters have been associated with sharks for centuries. One the most
famous early representation of shark attack is John Singleton Copley’s 1778 painting
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Images of sharks and the other natural hazards of crossing the Straits of
Florida made stories of Cubans fleeing the island in homemade rafts even more
harrowing. [See Figure 5.1] Even though from 1960 to 1980 the amount of Cubans
who came to the United States via their own craft was only two percent, the U.S.
government, U.S. press, and the exiles themselves played up the image of Cubans
risking their life to flee Castro’s “red hell.” A multitude of images in the exile press
from the early sixties featured images of Cubans swimming or rowing away from the
island. [See Figure 5.2] For the exiles the Florida Straits became the metaphorical
equivalent of the Berlin Wall—a barrier keeping people prisoners of communism.
Cubans became the Western Hemispheric equivalent of Eastern European “escapees.”
Images of exiles risking life and limb crossing the shark-infested Straits on rafts
supported the United States position that Castro and communism was failing the
people of Cuba. The U.S. government also popular images of this moral triumph of
the exiles fleeing communism to justify granting Cubans easy admission into the
United States and supplying them with substantial aid.3

“Watson and the Shark.” In the painting a sailor reaching for help is attacked by a
giant shark in Havana Harbor. Another popular tale of shark attack and Cuba is
Ernest Hemingway’s Old Man and the Sea. In the story sharks devour the marlin the
Cuban fisherman, Santiago had caught as he is rowing back to shore. For a
description of the exile view of the Florida Straits as dangerous see Patrick Lee
Gallagher, The Cuban Exile: A Socio-Political Analysis, (New York: Arno Press,
1980), 40-42. The images of sharks were also used to illustrate the enemy by both
countries. See for example Figure 3.3 Jeff Yohn’s cartoon of the shark as communism
patrolling the Caribbean. Also in the Robert Cohen film Three Cubans children sing
about Fidel Castro devouring the sharks at the Bay of Pigs. Robert Cohen, Director,
Three Cubans, National Educational Television (NET), 1965.
3

Jack Anderson made the comparison between the Berlin Wall and the
Florida Straits in a 1964 article in Parade Magazine. Jack Anderson, “The Dramatic
Story of How Heroic Men, Women, and Children Brave Terror and Torture to Escape

291

During this first exodus Cubans from every profession came to the United
States including a Cuban political cartoonists who could believed that they could no
longer practice their arts without fear of reprisals from the Cuban government. As the
Cubans who came to the United States supplied stories of the worsening shortfalls on
the island, exile cartoonists illustrated these complaints in cartoons published in
several exile periodicals. The exiles used the food shortfalls on the island as evidence
of Castro’s government failure. Many of the first exile cartoons played up this idea of
the island plagued by famine and hunger. In 1961, exile cartoonist “Joe” portrayed
the island with a cartoon captioned “Cuba Territory of everyman for himself in
America,” the map of Cuba was labeled with one word, “Hunger.” [See Figure 5.3]
In another cartoon, Joe illustrated Cuba with food shortages as so bad on the island
that even the pans were leaving. In the same cartoon, Joe drew the militia eating their
weapons instead of fighting with them. The exile cartoonist Nino also portrayed the
militia chasing a would-be exile but ended jumping on the boat himself. [See Figure
5.4] These images supported the reports that the desperation on the island was
growing and that Castro could not be in power for long.
The second large wave of Cuban immigrants came to the United States
between 1965 and 1973. Frustrated by the continued propaganda victories that the

from Red Cuba,” Parade, August 30, 1964, 9-11; For an analysis of the symbolism of
the “escapee’ during the Cold War see Susan L. Carruthers, “Between Camps:
Eastern Bloc "Escapees" and Cold War Borderlands,” American Quarterly, Volume
57, Number 3, September 2005, 911-942; See also Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at
the gate: the United States and refugees during the Cold War, (Princeton : Princeton
University Press, 2008), 106-132; For a great discussion of the internalization of the
rafter as the mythical but minority exile experience see De la Torre, La Lucha for
Cuba, 61-62.
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unsanctioned outflow of Cubans provided for the United States, the Cuban
government decided to try and turn the exile crisis to their advantage. In September
1965, Castro announced that Cuba was opening the port of Camarioca to anyone who
wanted to leave the country and that Cubans in the United States could come and pick
up their families. The U.S. government was shocked by the immediate response of
Cubans sailing from Miami to pick up their relatives. Not wanting a large unregulated
flood of immigrants coming into the United States, the Johnson administration opted
to negotiate with the Cuban government to stop the free flow of exiles across the
Straits. Following these talks, both governments agreed to allow for daily flights to
transport family members of those already in the United States as well as political
prisoners out of Cuba. This airlift became known as the “Freedom Flights.”
Beginning on December 1, 1965 and lasting until April 6, 1973, two flights per day
between Varadero and Miami transported almost three hundred thousand Cubans to
the United States.4
The U.S. press heralded the first waves of Cuban exiles as “golden exiles” and
“model immigrants.” The U.S. popular media praised the exiles for their financial
success, patriotism, and staunch anti-communism. Images in U.S. magazines
celebrating white Cubans attending university classes, working in high tech fields,
and standing in front of their businesses were widespread during the first two waves
of exiles. Like the U.S. media reports about the revolutionaries in the Sierra Maestra,
4

For descriptions of the Freedom Flights see Bon Tiempo, Americans at the
Gate, 106-112; Richard R. Fagen, Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O'Leary. Cubans
in Exile: Disaffection and the Revolution, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press),
1968; García, Havana USA, 37-45; and Pedraza, “Cuba's Refugees: Manifold
Migrations,” 1995.
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these news stories spoke of the Cubans in very masculine terms. The press heralded
the exiles as “men of action,” the new Horatio Algers of the United States—pulling
themselves up by their own bootstraps. 5 The July 1973 National Geographic, lauded
the Cuban exiles for invigorating the economies of where they settled, especially in
South Florida. National Geographic showcased the Cuban men for having brought
“new life to Miami.” The exiles had “left their indelible mark on Miami,” lauded
National Geographic, “boasted its economy, spiced its culture, and established an
enclave of several hundred blocks…”6 The exile community and the U.S. government
cultivated the image of Cubans as an ideal immigrant group throughout the 1960s and
1970s and as a direct propaganda slap in the face to the Castro government. The fact
that Castro had called this group of Cubans worms and undesirables made their
material successes in the United States a challenge to Castro and the revolution’s
legitimacy.

Exiles Gone MAD: Espionage, Antonio Prohías, and Spy vs. Spy
Besides this challenge to the new Cuban government that the exiles created
through images of their success in the United States, the first waves of Cubans also
engaged in direct confrontation with the Castro government. In addition to
5

For U.S. media accounts of the first wave of exiles see See T. Alexander,
“Those Amazing Cuban Émigrés,” Fortune, October 1966, 144-146; Al Burt,
“Miami: The Cuban Flavor,” U.S. News and World Report, March 1967, 104-106;
“Flight from Cuba; Castro’s Loss is U.S. Gain,” U.S. News and World Report, May
1971, 74-77; See also De Los Angeles, In the Land of Mirrors, 62-83; García,
Havana USA, 1-20.
6

Edward Linehan, “Cuba’s Exiles Bring New Life to Miami,” National
Geographic, July 1973, 68-95.
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businessmen and political exiles, the first wave also contained a violent class of
people as well. Dispossessed Cuban military officers as well as ex-Batista and mafia
henchmen made up a portion of these golden exiles. With the support of their wealthy
fellow exiles and the CIA, the first wave of refugees formed numerous paramilitary
groups with the intention of overthrowing Castro by force. During the first several
years of exile, Cubans in the United States, especially in South Florida, formed
hundreds of different anti-Castro organizations. Some of the groups that emerged
were more violent and direct than others. Among the most active and destructive of
these groups were Alpha 66, Commandos L, Coordinators of Unified Revolutionary
Organizations (CORU), Revolutionary Student Directorate (DRE), Insurrectional
Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MIRR), and Omega 7. Starting in 1959,
these organizations began to conduct sabotage raids in Cuba, planted bombs at Cuban
embassies and on planes, and threatened businesses in the United States deemed as
too friendly to the Castro government. This sabotage and violence was the dangerous
side of the “men of action” now residing in the United States.7
During the first years after the Cuban revolution, the U.S. government
supported the exiles’ sabotage efforts against the Castro government as well as
waging their own extensive clandestine effort to topple the revolution. To direct these
missions the CIA operations station in Miami became the largest in the world outside
of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Known by its code name JMWAVE, the
7

For a concise history of the anti-Castro exile organizations see Hernando
Calvo and Katlijn Declercq, The Cuban Exile Movement : Dissidents or Mercenaries,
(New York : Ocean Press, 2000), 1-13; see also García, Havana USA, 120-145; For a
discussion about the ideas behind “valor and action” in the exile community see Joan
Didion, Miami, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 99-108.
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CIA headquarters at the University of Miami remained open until 1967 and operated
more than three hundred front companies throughout greater Miami. Estimates vary
as to how many CIA agents were working out of Miami during the early 1960s. Most
accounts put the number at three to four hundred case officers. Each case officer
would have had several agents or teams working under them bringing the total on the
CIA payroll into the thousands.8
Exile magazines and newspapers celebrated the sabotage raids and valor of
the counter-revolutionary organizations. [See Figures 5.5 and 5.6] Cuban exile artists
Silvio and Antonio portrayed Castro as shocked at the destruction that took place on
the island. His expression was one of confused anger as the exile planes bombed the
island. These types of images displayed both the reality of exile sabotage and calls to
action. In Silvio’s drawing, he depicted the bombing of the Niagara sugar refinery in
Pinar del Rio, while Antonio depicted the bombing of the Nico Lopez oil refinery in
Havana. The exile cartoonists often expressed their anger and maleficent wishes for
Castro and his government in their illustrations. [See Figure 5.7]
As the Castro government clamped down on the freedom of the press, many
Cuban writers and cartoonists migrated to the United States. These editors and
illustrators recreated many of the same publications that they had published in
Havana including magazines such as El Avance Criollo, Occidente, and Zig-Zag. For
example, El Avance Criollo was founded in Cuba in 1934 and was one of the leading
8

For a description of CIA activities in Miami see Bohning, The Castro
Obsession, 129-149; Joan Didion estimated that the number of people on the CIA’s
Miami payroll could have been anywhere from twelve thousand to one hundred and
twenty thousand. Joan Didion, Miami, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 9091; Ellison, Psywar on Cuba, 151-192.
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politically moderate newspapers. The revolutionary government seized it in January
1960 and it was reestablished in Miami the following year. Zig-Zag was founded in
Havana in 1941 and was a popular satire magazine. In February 1959, Zig-Zag was
the first newspaper to be closed by the revolutionary government for lampooning
Castro and the revolutionary leadership. The magazine was refounded in Miami in
1962 and became one of the most successful exile periodicals due to the high volume
of political cartoons. By 1966 Zig-Zag Libre had thirty thousand subscriptions and
dissident groups airdropped an additional fifty thousand copies into Cuba. [See
Figure 5.8] Political cartoonists such as Anthony, Joe, N’Ga, Silvio (Silvio
Fontanilla), and Antonio Prohías all immigrated to the United States during the first
waves of exiles and contributed to these publications.9
Out of all the exile cartoonists Antonio Prohías became the most famous in
the United States. Prior to the revolution Prohías had been the most celebrated
political cartoonist in Cuba having won the Juan Gualberto Gomez prize, the highest
award for award for cartooning in Cuba, six times. He was a one of the founding
cartoonists of Zig-Zag in Cuba in 1941 and published regularly in the Havana
newspaper El Mundo and Bohemia magazine. In 1958 and 1959, Prohías served as
the president of the Cuban Cartoonist Association. Immediately following the
Castro’s takeover, Prohías praised the social changes being made by the revolution in
a comic entitled “Cuba Nueva.” However, he soon earned the ire of the new
9

For a discussion of Cuba’s comics after the revolution including those who
left for exile see John A. Lent, “Cuba's comic art tradition,” Studies in Latin
American Popular Culture; 1995, 225-245; For a description of Zig-Zag Libre’s
popularity and use as a propaganda tool see Andrew St. George, “The War of Wits,”
Parade, August 7, 1966.
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government when his cartoons became critical of Castro and the revolution’s
increasing drift to the left. As an example of the power of images, after Prohías
published cartoons against the Cuban government, Castro publicly criticized Prohías
at a rally to the point that the incensed mob called for the cartoonist to be shot. Afraid
for his safety during the highly charged beginnings of the revolution, Prohías left for
the United States in May 1960. 10
Upon arrival in the United States, Prohías published hundreds of anti-Castro
political cartoons for El Avance Criollo and Zig-Zag Libre but the cartoons he
became most famous for drawing was MAD Magazine’s “Spy vs. Spy.” Prohías
creation became a mainstay of MAD for thirty years and provides a fantastic
commentary on the Cold War climate of U.S. Cuban relations during the early 1960s.
Prohías said that his inspiration for the comic came from having been accused of
working for the CIA in Cuba and the “with us or against us,” climate of the early
revolution.11 “Spy vs. Spy” encapsulated the continuous espionage between Cuba and
the United States that was centered in Miami. In addition to large amount of CIA
activities, Miami’s anti-Castro exile organizations targeted Cubans themselves within
the exile population for anything that could be deemed as supporting Castro. Adding
to this air of suspicion was the presence of Cuban spies loyal to Castro who lived
amongst the exile community and reported back to the island. All of this espionage
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and counter-espionage created a pervasive sense of paranoia and suspicion in South
Florida.12
In “Spy vs. Spy” Prohías drew two spies, a black spy and a white spy,
completely identical except in color. The spies constantly tried to out wit the other.
Sometimes the white spy would win, other times the black one, but neither was better
than the other. A majority of the “Spy vs. Spy” cartoons were set in suburbs
resembling Miami’s Little Havana or at sea in the same locations where exile spy
organizations and Cuban spies operated. The spies were constantly trying to come up
with ever more elaborate ways of destroying each other. [See Figure 5.9] The spies
used all sorts of devices to attack each other, but the most common were bombs. [See
Figure 5.10] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, bombings were a constant form of
terrorism used by anti-Castro organizations in Cuba, the United States, and against
Cuban targets abroad.13 Futile and useless violence provided the drama for “Spy vs.
Spy,” that often mirrored the real lives of Cuban exiles.
The environment of espionage in Miami became the subject of negative
scrutiny in several documentaries produced in the mid-1970s. Following the
Watergate scandal (1972-1974) and the public outrage with the Vietnam War, the
12
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U.S. congress sought accountability for a variety of actions that had taken place over
the last few decades. A 1975 ABC News Close Up! Special entitled “The CIA”
examined Cuban exile community’s links to the CIA, especially the role Cubans had
played in the Watergate scandal.14 The filmmakers pointed out that the espionage
between Cuba and the United States had spurred increased domestic surveillance
activity in the United States. The program’s director followed the trail of the
Watergate burglars back to the Cuban community in Miami. The television reporters
traveled to Miami to meet with various Cuban exile leaders to discuss Cuban
involvement with the CIA. The exiles told the reporters that they were fearful of
saying too much on camera because they could get in trouble if what they said was
deemed to not be sufficiently anti-Castro.
Like “Spy vs. Spy” the film underscored the environment of distrust that the
high volume of espionage had created in Miami. “Miami’s Cuban exile community,”
the narrator admonished, “has been a man-power pool for the CIA for the past 15
years. With their own hostility towards Castro and their frequent CIA assignments—it
was not always clear, not even to the Cubans, when their operations were official and
when they were not.” According to the filmmakers, it was this atmosphere of
continuous missions and singleness of purpose that made the Watergate break-in
justifiable to some Cubans because they believed that a Nixon victory would help to
rid the island of Castro.15 Four of the five Watergate burglars, Bernard L. Barker,
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Virgilio R. Gonzales, Eugenio R. Martinez, and Frank A. Sturgis were from Miami,
and deeply involved in anti-Castro covert activity. Additionally, E. Howard Hunt,
who was also indicted and pled guilty to conspiracy, was a CIA operative who had
played a prominent in planning the Bay of Pigs invasion. The Cuban exiles
involvement in Watergate was damaging to the Miami Cubans’ public image in the
United States.
The “golden exiles’ patriotic image was further damaged in a 1977 CBS News
special, “The CIA’s Secret Army.” 16 This program continued the theme of fanatical
exiles acting outside of the law in their quest to rid the island of Fidel Castro. Bill
Moyers hosted the show and was critical of the exiles’ involvement with acts of
terrorism. Moyers explained that although there was a limited number of exiles
actually involved with the violence the entire Cuban community shared culpability
because they sheltered them and supported their actions. “Terrorists like fish need a
sea to swim in a community to sustain them,” Moyers chastised, “they find it here in
Miami’s Little Havana.” Moyers continued to use a negative tone while describing
how the anti-Castro groups in Miami had become an uncontrollable political liability
for the U.S. government. As in previous films, Moyers pointed out how four of the
five Watergate burglars had been part of the CIA backed anti-Castro group Operation
40 and the Bay of Pigs invasion. Howard Hunt, the architect of the break-in, had
convinced the exiles that the reason for the break-in at Democratic campaign
January 22, 1973, Available from Time Magazine, http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/ 0,9171,903690-2,00.html, (Accessed March 27, 2009).
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headquarters was that Castro had “funneled money to George McGovern’s
campaign.” Moyers contended that the single-minded hatred of Castro and
communism enabled these groups to agree to anything so long as it was against the
Castro regime. Throughout the program, Moyers presented Cubans in Miami as more
of a threat to U.S. security than Castro himself. Although the espionage and
involvement in Watergate had caused some damage the image of the Cuban exile
community it was Fidel Castro and the next human wave from across the Florida
Straits that would permanently undo the golden exile image.
Say Hello to My Little Friend: Mariel and the Destruction of the Golden Exile
Immediately after taking office in January 1977, the Carter administration
attempted to ease tensions between the United States and Cuba. Carter’s
administration came the closest of any U.S. president to normalizing relations with
the Castro government. In an attempt to start the process towards healing the
relationship with Cuba, the United States made several diplomatic overtures towards
the island. Carter suspended U2 reconnaissance flights that had continued to spy on
Cuba without pause since 1960, lifted the ban on travel to the island by U.S. citizens,
and lifted the ban on U.S. expenditures in Cuba. These first steps led to each country
opening a diplomatic interest sections (one step below an embassy) in Havana and
Washington, DC. Carter hoped that Castro would reciprocate by releasing political
prisoners, toning down his rhetoric for an independent Puerto Rico, and decreasing
Cuban military involvement in Africa.17
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In addition to the increased diplomatic effort by the United States, the Cuban
exile community also began to try and improve relations with the Castro government.
In 1977, Bernardo Benes, a Cuban exile banker, began secret talks with the Castro
government in an effort to improve relations between Havana and Miami. These talks
eventually led to more formal discussions in what became known as “El Diálogo”
(The Dialogue). During these talks, Benes helped to negotiate the reunification of
divided families, the release of three thousand political prisoners, and the right for
Cubans living abroad to visit their families on the island. The Castro government was
at first resistant to allow Cuban exiles to visit the island but eventually agreed, partly
because of the potential to make money off the exile travel. Between 1977-1980 over
100,000 exiles visited Cuba.18
Images from this time period reflected the spirit of these thawing relations and
readied the U.S. public for the possibility of normal relations with their neighbor. An
ABC News Close Up! Special entitled “Cuba the Castro Generation” presented the
island in a more complimentary light.19 The program focused on the positive
attributes of the Cuban people and the benefits that normalized relations with the
Castro government could bring both countries. The program made the point that the
United States was ready to negotiate with the Castro government and offered an
apology for the bad relations in the past. The narrator explained that Cuban “hostility
The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic History of the Castro Years,
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987), 101-127.
18
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is based on our [U.S.] exploitation of Cuba before Castro and attempts to invade Cuba
or assassinate Castro since.” The film reported that the Carter administration wanted
to find middle ground between the two countries, much like Ché Guevara had
expressed hope for when he had met with Richard Goodwin at the Punta del Este
Conference in 1961. The Carter administration hoped, as the filmmakers explained,
that by allowing Cubans and U.S. tourists to visit the island that the people to people
relationship could bring the two countries closer together and eventually lead to a
resumption of normal diplomatic relations. However, these efforts at normalization
were short lived. The Cuban government did not meet U.S. demands and eventually
talks broke down. The political situation between the two countries would become
even more strained by the end of Carter’s presidency.20
The increased contact between resident Cubans and exiles was met with
mixed feelings on both sides of the Straits. Many Cubans were eager to see their
relatives and to visit the island. Resident Cubans benefited from the money their exile
family members brought with them as well as goods that were hard to obtain in Cuba.
On the other hand, some exile organizations objected to this contact and viewed any
aid to Cubans still on the island as propping up the Castro government. Cubans on the
island who had exile relatives were grateful for the financial assistance; those who did
not resented that the Cuban government was now dealing with the declared enemy.
Many Cubans saw how the exiles had prospered in the United States and became
hungry for the better life that exile seemed to promise. In response to these visits and
20
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continued economic problems on the island, more Cubans attempted to immigrate to
the United States. Throughout 1979 and 1980, increasingly desperate Cubans broke
into foreign embassies to request political asylum. Other even more brazen actions by
Cubans desperate to leave the island included hijacking boats to cross the Straits. The
majority of these hijackers were given immunity from prosecution upon reaching
U.S. shores, infuriating the Cuban government.21
On April 1, 1980, a small group of disaffected Cubans (the estimates vary
between four and twelve) crashed a bus through a fence at the Peruvian Embassy.
Although the fleeing Cubans were unarmed, in the melee that followed a ricocheting
bullet killed a Cuban policeman. Castro was furious at the dissenters and even more
upset that the Peruvian Ambassador refused to hand over the asylum-seekers to
Cuban authorities. As a result, on April 4, 1980, Castro ordered that the Cuban police
assigned to guard outside the embassy be removed. The Cuban government stated
that Cuba would not “protect embassies that would not cooperate in their own
protection.”22 To further punish the Peruvians, the Cuban government publicly stated
that any citizen wishing to leave Cuba could do so through the Peruvian Embassy.
The response was immediate, overwhelming, and took the Cuban government
completely by surprise. Within forty-eight hours, over 10,000 Cubans had entered
Peru’s embassy grounds claiming asylum. Images from television and newspaper
21
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reports showed desperate Cubans climbing over fences and literally fighting their way
into the overcrowded embassy compound. President Carter further exacerbated the
situation on April 9, 1980, when he stated that “our hearts go out to the almost ten
thousand freedom-loving Cubans” who were seeking asylum in the Peruvian
Embassy.23
In response to this public display against the revolution, Castro denounced
those in the Peruvian Embassy as “traitors and escoria (scum).” In an effort to
diminish the negative impact of the images broadcast around the world of Cubans
clamoring to get into the embassy, Castro claimed that those wanting to leave Cuba
were parasites feeding off the revolution and that Cuban society would be better off
without them. The Peruvian government, for its part, refused to allow more than a
handful of the Cubans that had taken refuge in their embassy to immigrate to Peru.
This left the Cuban government in a bind over what to do about the people who had
been publicly declared “traitors” but who also had been given permission to leave yet
had no means to do so. The Costa Rican government stepped in offered to fly the
Cubans trapped in the embassy to the Costa Rica and allow them to complete their
immigration process in San José. The Cubans agreed and several flights did take
hundreds of Cubans out of the country; however, when most of these Cubans
continued on to the United States and reported on the stark living conditions in Cuba,
the Castro government put an end to the flights. On April 18, 1980, the Cuban
government announced that anyone wanting to leave Cuba needed to proceed directly
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to their ultimate destination and not through a third country. Two days later, Castro
declared that anyone wanting to leave for the United States would be allowed to do so
through the port of Mariel on the outskirts of Havana. President Carter reiterated that
the United States would welcome anyone wishing to flee communism with open
arms, and with that, a massive flotilla of boats began to leave from Florida for Cuba.24
In order to leave the country through Mariel, Cubans had to apply for exit
visas. The Cuban government ordered the Committees for the Defense of the
Revolution (CDR) to organize attacks on those who applied for exit visas. CDR units
publicly humiliated their fellow citizens and in some instances beat them in the
streets. To further disgrace those Cubans wishing to leave and mark the anniversary
of the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban government held mass rallies of over a million people
to denounce those wishing to leave as traitors. The Cuban government televised these
rallies and broadcast to the entire island in a strong show Cuban solidarity against the
United States. Protestors illustrated banners with worms of every kind—worms
carrying suitcases, worms being flushed down toilets, gangster worms, and
homosexual worms. The crowd carried posters with debris, cockroaches, rats, and
worms filling up a trashcan with the colors of the U.S. flag and the expletive that was
yelled repeatedly by the crowd, “Que se vayan!” (Let them go!)25 [See Figure 5.11]
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On April 21, 1980, the first boats began to arrive in Mariel harbor from
Florida to pick up their families. Hundreds of boats made the ninety-mile crossing to
assist those wanting to leave. Most of the boats from Florida came with the intention
of picking up friends and loved ones; however, the Cuban government insisted that
the captains take aboard whomever they were given. Smaller boats that were
supposed to carry less than ten passengers were forced to take over thirty. Within
thirty days over 90,000 Cubans had arrived in the United States. By the time that the
boatlift had finished in October 1980, almost 125,000 Cubans had come to the United
States.26
To downplay the newspaper and television photos of so many Cubans wanting
to leave the island, Castro argued that the United States had done Cuba a favor by
taking the worthless parts of Cuban society to Florida. To give credence to this
rhetoric, Castro forced captains to take scores of criminals, homosexuals, mentally ill,
and prostitutes on boats headed for Miami and then trumpeted that what he had done
to the international press. This well-publicized purge of Cuba’s “undesirables” made
the reception for many Marielitos very different from earlier exile groups. “Marelito”
became a pejorative not only in Cuba but also in the exile community itself.
U.S. immigration authorities were caught completely off guard and were
overwhelmed by the human tidal wave. Because of refugee overcrowding in South
Florida, the U.S. government opened exile processing centers at four military bases—
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Camp Santiago, Puerto Rico; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Fort Indiantown Gap,
Pennsylvania; and Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. To be released from these facilities the
Marielitos had to be claimed by their family or receive sponsorship from a U.S.
family. The U.S. government printed brochures encouraging private citizens to take in
Cuban refugees. [See Figure 5.12] These publications contained primarily
photographs of children and families even though the vast majority of refugees were
single Afro-Cuban men.
Besides the “undesirables” in the boatlift one of the main differences between
the Mariel exiles and the first waves of exiles was their racial composition. Before
Mariel the majority of Cuban arrivals in the United States were white families,
whereas more than half of all Marielitos were single Afro-Cuban males. Although
Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits denied racism existed within their
societies, in Miami racial divisions were still very much part of exile Cuban society.
Many of the Golden Exiles came from the most elite classes in Cuba and looked upon
Afro-Cubans as inherently inferior. The racial background of the Marielitos also
played into U.S. racial biases against blacks that further challenged the image of the
exiles as ideal immigrants in the United States.27
Cuban image-makers seized on the negative descriptions of the Marielitos.
During the middle of the exodus, Cuban artist René de la Nuez Robaina, better known
by his single name Nuez, summed up the negative attitudes towards the boatlift in a
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book of political cartoons published in July 1980 entitled Humor del Pueblo
Combatiente (Humor for the Fighting People). [See Figure 5.13] Nuez’s book was a
series of one hundred and twenty-four cartoons illustrating the history of the first
three months of the Mariel Boatlift. [See Figure 5.14] The majority of cartoons were
of a Cuban guajiro (Cuban from the countryside/farmer) shouting insults at across the
Florida Straits at President Carter. The guajiro was emblematic of the Cuban nation,
long celebrated as the heart of the revolution. Throughout Nuez’s book, the boatlift
was illustrated as continuing while the guajiro and Carter spared with each other from
opposite sides of the Florida Straits. Nuez’s use of the guajiro instead of a cartoon of
Castro was also indictive of the view that it was the Cuban nation, not the government
that was standing together in opposition to the United States. Nuez’s guajiro
demanded that the U.S. government lift the blockade, withdraw troops from
Guantánamo, and end SR-71 reconnaissance flights over Cuba or the boatlift would
continue. Nuez drew Carter as overwhelmed and loosing the battle to control the
situation. [See Figure 5.15] Nuez’s guajiro celebrated the boatlift as a major victory
against the United States and especially the Cuban exile community, a “second Bay
of Pigs.”28
The images in the U.S. press echoed Nuez’s illustrations, continuously
playing into Castro’s hand by emphasizing the criminal element of the Mariel exiles.
Estimates put the numbers of those Mariel arrivals who had a criminal record at
23,000 or close to one fifth of the total of Mariel arrivals. However, out of these
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“criminals,” less than five thousand had committed crimes that would have been
considered felonies in the United States.29 The exiles themselves also created negative
publicity. Refugee riots at Fort Chaffee and Miami as well as the murder and rape
committed by a refugee against his sponsor added fuel to the fire of bad press
surrounding the Marielitos. These images made it more difficult to place the refugees,
especially the single black males that made up a large portion of the newly arrived.
With Mariel, Castro and the revolutionary government successfully destroyed
the pristine image of the Cuban exile in the United States. Although the numbers of
criminals and mental patients who came to the United States as part of the Mariel
Boatlift was not as high as the press in both countries originally reported, crime did
significantly rise in Miami after Mariel. In 1980, crime rose by sixty-six percent.
Thirty-five percent of those criminals convicted of murder that same year were Mariel
Cubans. To add insult to injury, the Cuban government claimed that crime rates in
Havana dropped more than fifty percent since the Marielitos had left.30
After Mariel, U.S. popular culture would continue to depict Cubans as
criminals. On November 23, 1981, Time Magazine published a cover story entitled
“Paradise Lost” that blamed much of the rise in crime in South Florida on the newest
group of Cuban refugees. [See Figure 5.16] Time’s cover image looked like a
postcard that would have been sent from a person on vacation; however, on closer
examination the letters that made up “South Florida” were photos of crime and
29
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violence. One of the photos was of a Cuban protesting while held in a processing
camp during Mariel. The other images of drugs and violence linked South Florida and
by association the Cuban exile community to the crime that was now decimating the
Miami. The Time article described Miami as a city in chaos, the drug capital of the
United States, with dealers and refugees running wild, ordinary citizens arming
themselves to the teeth with guns and bullet-proof cars, and a city morgue so
overflowing with bodies they had to be stored in a refrigerated truck borrowed from
Burger King. According to the author, Marielitos were “believed to be responsible for
half of all violent crime in Miami.” Before Mariel, Cuban immigrants were model
immigrants, fiercely anti-communist hard-working white families, who like Ricky
Ricardo wanted nothing more than to achieve the American Dream. Mariel replaced
these images with cocaine cowboys, Miami Vice, and, most notoriously, Scarface’s
Tony Montana.31
The Brian DePalma 1983 film, Scarface, propagated many of the negative
views of the Mariel Boatlift. The film was written by Oliver Stone and starred Al
Pacino as Mariel exile, Tony Montana. [See Figure 5.17] Scarface was sharply
criticized by the Cuban community in the United States for its negative and violent
portrayal of Cuban exiles. The Miami Cubans protested the making of the film and
much of the production had to take place in Los Angeles. Although the film did not
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do particularly well when it first came out, Scarface became one the most revered cult
classics of all time.32
The film opened with composer Giorgio Moroder’s ominous music while
introducing the history of the Mariel Boatlift. The introductory notes read,
In May 1980, Fidel Castro opened the harbor at Mariel with the apparent
intention of letting some of his people join their relatives in the United
States…It soon became evident that Castro was forcing the boat owners to
carry back with them not only their relatives, but the dregs of his jails…
The film then showed footage from a Cuban May Day rally where Castro denounced
the Cubans leaving the island from Mariel. The crowds in the rally carried posters and
banners criticizing the United States. Castro was shown shouting the end of his
famous speech, “We don’t want you! We don’t need you!”33 The film then cut to
scenes of the boatlift with thousands of Cubans on boats heading for Miami. The
footage showed Cubans who were either very young or very old as well as the many
Afro-Cubans and young men. The opening segment ended with scenes of Cubans
frisked by border guards furthering the idea that the Marielitos were criminals.
The main character, Tony Montana, was introduced with U.S. authorities
questioning him just after he arrived in Miami. Montana was dressed in a Hawaiian
shirt and had a thick accent. When asked who taught him to speak English Montana
replied that he learned from watching U.S. movie actors, Humphrey Bogart and
James Cagney. Montana’s character was thus established as a product partially of
U.S. popular culture. The immigration officers asked Montana about his past,
32
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specifically if he had been in jail in Cuba. The whole time Montana responded to the
officers’ questions a photograph of President Jimmy Carter was in the background of
the scene visually implicating the president in the decision to allow criminals into the
United States. When the head immigration officer had finally had enough of
Montana’s lies he ordered that Montana be sent to “Freedom Town” one of the
immigrant camps. Montana fired back at the officer,
You a communist? Huh? How'd you like it, man? They tell you all the time
what to do, what to think, what to feel. Do you wanna be like a sheep…You
own nothing, you got nothing! Do you want a chivato on every corner looking
after you? Watching everything you do? Everything you say…How you like
that? What, you want me to stay there and do nothing? Hey, I'm no fuckin'
criminal, man. I'm no puta or thief. I'm Tony Montana, a political prisoner
from Cuba. And I want my fuckin' human rights, now! Just like the President
Jimmy Carter says. Okay?
Unimpressed by Montana’s diatribe, the immigration officer saw Tony Montana not
as an individual but as part of the larger political problem caused by Carter and
Castro. He responded, “I don't believe a word of this shit! They all sound the same to
me. That son of a bitch Castro is shittin' all over us. Send this bastard to Freedom
Town.” The view that Castro had dumped the dregs of Cuban society on the United
States was one of the primary negative images of Mariel. Scarface cemented this idea
in the minds of many Americans.
To be released early from “Freedom Town,” a Cuban gangster in Miami
Frank Lopez offered Tony and his friend Manny a green card in exchange for killing
an ex-revolutionary leader, Rabena. Although Rebena had been a revolutionary, he
had fallen out of favor with Castro and had been deported on the boatlift. When
Montana learned about the deal he agreed, adding that he would “kill a communist for
fun,” but for the offered green card he would “carve him up real nice.” Tony’s
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sentiments echoed the fervent anti-communism of the exile community that believed
that any action against communism was justified. However, Tony’s act was not
ideologically motivated as much as self-interested. In the film, just as in the real
camps holding the Marielitos in Florida and Arkansas, the refugees rioted to get out.
During the riot, the refugees chant “libertad” as Tony and his crew herded Rebena out
to meet his fate. Montana stabbed Rabena demonstrating his the cold-blooded nature
that was about to be unleashed into U.S. society.
After Tony and Manny were released from the refugee camp they worked for
Frank Lopez, another Cuban who had already made it big selling cocaine. After
partying with Lopez, Tony and Manny drove home. Manny declared his hopes for
achieving the same financial success as Lopez. Tony, the bigger American dreamer,
declared that he wanted more. Montana wanted what was coming to him, “the world
and everything in it.” Montana’s character is the ultimate capitalist. Scarface in many
ways can be seen as an indictment of the American Dream gone wrong. Through
violence and drug dealing, Tony achieved his American dream of excess. However,
the materiality ultimately made him unhappy. Montana’s dream of having it all turned
into a nihilistic nightmare.
Later in the film as Montana sat in the best restaurant in Miami with his
estranged wife Elvira and his friend Manny, Montana broke down in an existential
crisis. Montana wondered aloud,
Is this it? That's what it's all about, Manny? Eating, drinking, fucking,
sucking? Snorting? Then what? You're 50...I got a junkie for a wife...I can't
even have a kid with her, Manny. Her womb is so polluted, I can't even have a
little baby with her!
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The film is also a family tragedy. Tony lamented his wife’s inability to have a child
but Elvira is his wife because he had killed Frank Lopez, Tony’s boss and Elvira’s
first husband. He is estranged from his own mother who refused to accept his offering
of money. His sister, Gina loves him, but ultimately comes to fear him. When Tony
saw his best friend Manny and Gina together he killed Manny and Gina was killed by
hitmen trying to kill her brother. By the end of the film Tony has killed everything he
loved and died because of his own greed and arrogance. In many ways Tony Montana
was the anti-Ricky Ricardo, just as the Marielitos were the anti-Golden exiles.
Further sealing the negative image of South Florida and the city of Miami in
the U.S. imagination was the immensely popular television series Miami Vice.
Michael Mann’s “MTV Cops” show ran from 1984 until 1989 and used the rising
crime rates in Miami as the basis of the show. Like Scarface, Miami Vice was also an
indictment of the American Dream gone wrong. As producer Anthony Yerkovich
explained
I thought of it [Miami] as sort of a modern-day American Casablanca. It
seemed to be an interesting socioeconomic tide pool: the incredible number of
refugees from Central America and Cuba, the already extensive CubanAmerican community, and on top of all that the drug trade... Miami has
become a sort of Barbary Coast of free enterprise gone berserk.34
Although Miami Vice portrayed the city of Miami as a city plagued by crime, the
show did not implicate the Cuban exile community in these crimes to the same extent
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as Scarface. In the show drug dealers were most often Columbian not Cubans. For
this reason the Miami Vice was not protested by Cuban exile community and allowed
to film almost exclusively in South Florida.
If Miami Vice’s writers did deal with Cuban criminals they were portrayed as
connected to corrupt groups who had betrayed the exile community such as the CIA.
In the episode entitled “Cuba Libre” Sonny had to infiltrate an anti-Castro
paramilitary organization “Segunda Brigada.”35 The group was stealing money from
drug dealers in order to launch an invasion against Castro. However, the group was
also blackmailing a Bay of Pigs invasion hero to help them. The show portrayed the
men in “Segunda Brigada” as corrupt and out of touch with the Miami exile
community. Although this was the only episode that explicitly featured Cubans as the
antagonists, the show balanced its storyline with a moral Cuban hero who abhorred
violence and was from the more honorable segment of the exile community. This
balancing act was most likely done to placate the Miami Cuban community.
Although Miami Vice did not directly implicate the Cuban community in the
problems associated with the city like Scarface, the images of crime in the hit
television show kept the idea of South Florida as a “Paradise Lost,” in the national
consciousness. After the arrival of the Marielitos, U.S. popular culture was no longer
automatically inclined to celebrate the Cuban exile community. Instead of portrayals
of Miami Cubans as “Golden Exiles” who helped build the city and their fortunes in
the 1960s and 1970s through hard work, after Mariel U.S. popular culture just as
likely to portray Cuban exiles as an internal crime risk that threatened the fabric of
35
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American society from within. Because of the changed perception of the Cuban exiles
in U.S. popular culture the likely hood of another Mariel boatlift became less likely
and with the end of the Cold War the usefulness of the Cuban refugee as a political
tool further decreased the willingness by either the U.S. government or the U.S.
public to automatically accept a large influx of Cuban refugees. This change in image
and perception would take on physical and political form in the last large wave of
Cuban migration to the United States—the Balsero Crisis.
Aliens and Elián: The Balsero Crisis and the Ultimate Exile
After the Mariel Boatlift, the outflow of Cubans stabilized. Cubans continued
to immigrate to the United States but at much slower pace. Even though the Reagan
administration increased negative rhetoric towards the Castro government by linking
the island to civil wars in Central America as well as reinstated the U.S. travel ban,
the administration still signed an immigration accord with the Cuban government in
1984 agreeing to accept twenty thousand refugees per year. As part of the accords the
Cuban government agreed to prevent further mass out migrations by patrolling its
borders and when possible apprehending Cubans attempting to migrate illegally to the
United States. The numbers of immigrants slowed to less than 10,000 people a year
throughout Reagan’s presidency a number far less than the 20,000 that had been
agreed upon.36
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Then at the end of Reagan’s second term an even occurred that would begin
the largest change in Cuban society since the revolution and call the very existence of
the revolution into account. In 1988, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced
sweeping economic changes for the Soviet Union. These changes eventually lead to
the dissolution of the council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the common
market of socialist nations. Cuba had started trading with the CMEA in the mid-1970s
and by the late 1980s was dependent on the Council for over eighty-five percent of all
of its trade. Because the Soviet Union was no longer able to subsidize the CMEA the
stability of the socialist bloc began to deteriorate and the privileged trading
arrangements that Cuba had enjoyed for over twenty-five years fell apart. By 1991
annual oil imports from the USSR to Cuba had declined from 13.3 million tons to less
than 1.8 million tons leaving the island with a critical deficit. Following the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cuban leadership found itself desperate for hard
currency. As the Miami Cubans became excited by what they believed would be the
final breaths of the Castro regime, the government in Havana braced itself against this
latest economic storm.37
Seeing the economic writing on the wall, in August 1990, Fidel Castro
declared that the revolution had entered a “special period in a time of peace.” The
term “special period” came from the Cuban government’s long-standing plan for
37
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extreme rationing in the event of a total U.S. naval blockade of the island. Although
the blockade never took place, the plan was now put into in order for the island to
reinvent the Cuban economy without Soviet aid. The Cuban government introduced
severe rationing of food, cooking supplies, gasoline, clothing, soap, and almost every
other imaginable product. Shortages of every kind during the first few years of the
“special period” became severe and by1994 many Cubans became desperate to leave
the island. On August 5, 1994, a riot broke out in Havana protesting the worsening
economic conditions and the government’s clampdown on Cubans attempting to flee
the island. As a result of the growing unrest, and citing the U.S. government’s failure
to honor the existing immigration accords that called for admitting 20,000 people to
the United States annually, the Cuban government announced on August 8, 1994 that
the Cuban Frontier Guard (the Cuban Coast Guard) would no longer prevent anyone
attempting to leave the country. In response to this announcement, over thirty
thousand Cubans departed the island on hand-made crafts in a little more than a
month. This exodus would become known as the Balsero (rafter) Crisis.38
Images of the Balseros provided the U.S. public with evidence of the severity
of the economic crisis that was taking place in Cuba. The rafters appeared to be the
most desperate of the exiles to leave Cuba, risking their lives to leave not because of
ideological commitment but often because of food shortages and general scarcity
caused by the economic depression. One of the most famous images from the crisis
was of Roberto Avendaño Corojo. Avendaño left Cuba on August 13, 1994, with four
38
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other companions. After five days at sea, tensions on the plywood raft became so
intense that Avendaño cut himself free and paddled away on a single inner tube.
Forced to drift alone for an additional ten days and fight off sharks with a knife,
Avendaño was eventually spotted by a U.S. citizens on a sailboat. The people on the
boat provided him with water and radioed the U.S. Navy and waited with him for the
Navy cutter to rescue him. On August 28, 1994, he was sent to Guantánamo Bay
where he waited several months before he was allowed to immigrate to the United
States. The people on the boat had taken Avendaño’s photo while he waited for the
Navy ship. The image of him alone on an inner tube made him a poster child for the
crisis. [See Figure 5.18] The exile community reproduced Avendaño’s image on
several posters to emphasize the desperation of those Cubans fleeing the island. [See
Figure 5.19]
Avendaño’s and his fellow Balseros, unlike the first waves of exiles who
came to the United States on airplanes or the Marielitos who arrived in U.S. boats,
had actually fled the island on homemade rafts. Images of Cubans on rafts before the
Balseros, obscured the reality of how the majority of Cuban refugees had actually
arrived in the United States. The U.S. media popularized the false images of the first
waves of Cuban exiles fleeing Cuba and communism on rafts as a way to enhance the
Cold War propaganda impact. The image of the Cuban rafter was repeated so many
times that it became accepted as part of the Cuban exile identity. Ironically once the
Balseros provided a reality to that image the Cold War was already over.39
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At the beginning of the Balsero Crisis, President Bill Clinton, decided to
handle the influx of refugees different that Jimmy Carter. In 1980, Clinton had been
Governor of Arkansas and received severe criticism for the Cuban riot that had taken
place at Fort Chaffee. Political analysts have pointed to the riots as one of the reasons
that Clinton lost reelection in 1980. Reversing the U.S. government’s thirty-year
stance on allowing Cuban immigrants free entrance, on August 19, 1994, the Clinton
administration declared that Cuban rafters would not be automatically allowed into
the United States and instead would be taken to a “safe haven” at Guantánamo Bay
for immigration processing. The decision sparked outrage from the exile community
in Miami but gave the U.S. government the needed time and space to control the
influx of people.
As the U.S. government was making decisions about how to best handle the
refugees, U.S. diplomats were working quickly with the Castro government to close
the flood of people leaving the island. On September 9, 1994, the United States and
Cuba signed new emigration accords and on September 13, 1994, the Cuban Coast
Guard resumed patrols to prevent people from illegally leaving the island. Although
the Balsero Crisis lasted less than a month, over 40,000 Cubans were picked up at sea
and eventually “processed” through Guantánamo Bay and eventually allowed to
immigrate to the United States. The new emigration agreements put an end to the
massive hemorrhaging of people from Cuba but some still risk making the journey
across the Florida Straits.
One such journey came to an end on Thanksgiving Day 1999, when thirtythree-year-old Nivaldo Fernandez Ferran and his twenty-two-year-old girlfriend
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Arianne Horta-Alfonso were found floating on an inner tube off the Florida coast near
Key Biscayne. Twenty miles to the north, a five-year-old boy, Elián González and the
body of sixty-year-old woman, Merida Loreto Barrios were found tethered to a
second inner tube. These three people were the only survivors from a group of
fourteen Cubans who had left the island from the port town of Cardenas east of
Havana three days earlier. The other eleven people including Elizabet Broton
González , Elián’s mother, drowned when the aluminum boat that had been carrying
became inundated with rainwater in high seas and sank. When Elián’s father, Juan
Miguel González , a resident and loyal Cuban, learned of his son’s survival, he
demanded that the boy be returned to Cuba. Although divorced from Elián’s mother,
Juan González shared custody of Elián and had not given his permission for the boy
to be taken to the United States. The resulting international custody battle created a
frenzy of images across the Florida Straits as Elián became the focus of billboards,
books, films, murals, museums (in both countries), political cartoons, posters, statues,
t-shirts, and even a South Park episode.40
The myths surrounding Elián González’s rescue became immense. The
popular descriptions and images about the rescue often obscured the reality of what
had actually happened to the boy. Most stories about the Elián’s discovery left out
that there were two other survivors. And that the body of Merida Loreto Barrios was
lashed to Elián’s inner tube. Instead, the story repeatedly recounted was that Elián
40
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was found alone in an inner tube, surrounded by dolphins protecting him from sharks,
and that God had brought him out of Cuba to freedom. Miami artists created paintings
and posters that echoed these religiously inspired stories that envisioned Elián
wrapped in swaddling clothes while being guided to safety by dolphins directed by
God’s hands. [See Figure 5.20] In these depictions, artists drew Elián as smiling, not
reflecting the horror that a five-year-old boy must have felt watching his mother
drown then to be left alone tethered to a dead body in the ocean at night. The myth
continues that Elián, despite having been at sea for days without any shelter, was
miraculously unsunburned. Although it is truly miraculous that the Elián survived, in
reality Elián was only adrift in the inner tube for a few hours.41 The images of Elián’s
rescue obscured the reality of the boy’s experience but added to the powerful
symbolism of Elián as emblematic of the Cuban exile experience more generally.
Elián in some ways was the ultimate exile, an innocent child, saved from communism
by the ultimate sacrifice of his mother and then saved again by god to begin again in
the United States.
The stories of the miracles surrounding the survival of the child led to Elián
being hailed as a messianic figure by many Miami Cubans. Some exiles saw his
arrival and fight for custody as an omen for the imminent downfall of Castro. Others
described him as a Cuban Moses who would lead the exiles back to the island. There
were reports that the Virgin Mary appeared at the house of the boy’s uncle and on the
41
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side of a nearby building. Believers in the Afro-Cuban religion Santería said that
Elián was a child of the Yoruba goddess Oshún or chosen by the god Elegguá to bring
down Castro. Elián’s deceased mother was also turned into a quasi-saint, who had
died like for all Cuban mothers who desired their children to be free. The image of
Elián as a religious figure brought many of Miami’s diverse religions together as each
bestowed their own meaning upon the child. These groups were also united in their
wish to not have the miracle boy not returned to Cuba and Castro.42
Like the Marielitos, it bears mentioning that Elián’s race played a part of the
exile community’s fervor surrounding the boy. Because Elián was white and the
majority of wealthy first wave exiles also identify themselves as white, his connection
to the upper echelons of exile society was immediate. It is reasonable to speculate that
because of Elián’s race he tapped into the sympathies of the first waves of exile
society more than he would have had he been of Afro-Cuban descent. Unlike the
refugees from the Mariel Boatlift whom the U.S. popular press and the first waves of
exiles had shunned for their ethnicity and reported criminal backgrounds, Elián was
seen as emblematic of Miami’s controlling elites and of the “golden exiles” of the
past.
The fight over Elián’s return to his father became much larger than a child
custody case. On the one hand the fight over Elián was simply a case of the exile
community not wanting to give any kind of victory to the Castro government.
Because Elián’s father was loyal to the revolution, Miami Cubans viewed him as
42
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Castro’s communist lackey not worthy of a god given Cuban exile son. In one poster
the slogan, “No one—not even a father—has the right to enslave another human
being. Freedom for Elián!” encapsulated the growing fervor surrounding the young
boy. [See Figure 5.21] Elián’s father’s desire to “enslave” him in Cuba was equated
to Castro’s enslavement of the entire island. Miami’s elite saw the Elián case as an
opportunity to deny Castro something that he wanted and joined forces to keep the
boy in Florida.
Elián’s custody battle became emblematic of the battle between Miami
Cubans and resident Cubans for the custody of the island itself. For Cubans on both
the island and in Miami the battle became an obsession. Each side demanded the
possession of the boy and declared their right to the child, much like both resident
Cubans and the exiles declared their rights over the island. The family metaphor of
who could best care for the Cuban child was similar to the arguments about who
could best care for the island itself, those in exile or the Castro government. Each side
claimed that they were the legitimate guardians of the child and could give Elián the
best life, just as Miami Cubans and revolutionary Cubans proclaimed their legitimacy
to know what was best way to govern the island. Miami Cubans proclaimed that
because Elián’s mother had made the ultimate sacrifice, literally dying to take her
child out of Cuba. Her wishes needed to be honored. Elián’s father was equated to
Fidel Castro, as a bad and neglectful father figure who did not have the boy’s best
interest at heart.
In Cuba, Elián’s custody battle became a rallying cry against the United States
and a symbol of the survival of the revolution through the Special Period. Overnight,
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Cubans erected billboards, printed posters and T-shirts all with the same message
“Liberen Elián” (Free Elián) and “Salvemos a Elián” (Save Elián). [See Figure 5.22]
Many of the images portrayed Elián behind bars, kept against his will in the United
States. The image of Elián imprisoned behind star covered prison bars was a Cuban
rebuttal to the exile community’s constant portrayal of Cuba as a prison. The Cuban
government also staged multiple mass demonstrations across the island to protest
Elián’s captivity in the United States. The demonstrations became so regular that in
February 2000 the Cuban government constructed an amphitheater in front of the
U.S. interest section for the express purpose of holding Elián rallies. Originally
named “The Plaza of Dignity of the Cuban People,” it is now officially known as the
“Tribuna Anti-imperialista José Martí,” (José Martí Anti-Imperialist Arena). A
central feature of the plaza is a large statue of José Martí,” holding a child in a
protective pose and pointing accusingly at the interest section. [See Figure 5.23] José
Martí is considered to be the father of the Cuban nation and was a staunch critic of
the United States.43 The statue of Martí holding Elián symbolized Cuba’s continued
struggle against the United States. Martí holds Elián, emblematic of the Cuban nation
in his arms accusing the United States of abuse and vowing to protect the nation
against the constant threat of U.S. imperialism. This plaza has provided the Cubans
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with a permanent site of protest in front of the U.S. interest section and has continued
to be used ever since.
As the custody battle over the child became a political battleground, U.S.
editorial cartoonists drew hundreds of illustrations connecting the more personal
battle of Elián’s father to reclaim his son from his Miami relatives to the larger
political and cultural struggle between the two countries.44 Instead of the fabled
dolphins, several cartoonists portrayed Elián floating in an inner tube surrounded by
“sharks” representing the various interest groups that wanted a piece of the child. In
Joe Heller’s cartoon the sharks—politics, anti-Castro interests, and anti-American
interests—circled the helpless child. [See Figure 5.24] Many U.S. cartoons dealt with
the perceived cultural clash between U.S. opulence that Elián had experienced and the
imagined austerity of what his life would be like in Cuba. U.S. illustrators depicted
Elián as having been spoiled by his time in Miami, a fantasy life of parties, toys, and
Disneyland that most U.S. children did not experience themselves. Having been the
center of attention in Miami, many exiles believed that it would be difficult for the
child to return to a normal and less privileged life in Cuba. [See Figure 5.25] U.S.
Editorial cartoonists also expressed concern that his Miami relatives were
manipulating the child’s actions and words to get Elián to say that he wanted to
remain in the United States. Several political cartoons encapsulated this idea of his
Miami relatives coaching Elián whenever he was on camera. Ultimately syndicated
cartoonist Taylor Jones’s image of Elián published in the Puerto Rican newspaper El
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Nuevo Día captured the essence of what Elián had become for Cubans on both sides
of the Florida Straits—a political pawn. [See Figure 5.26]
After more than a month of debate, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service ruled that Elián needed to be returned to his father by January 14, 2000.
Attorney General Janet Reno agreed with this ruling, as did President Bill Clinton.
The Miami Cuban community was outraged and compared this decision to Kennedy’s
“betrayal” of the exiles at the Bay of Pigs. In Miami, Cubans demonstrated and
demanded that the boy be given political asylum while Cubans in Havana continued
to march on an almost daily basis demanding the boy’s return. Negotiations between
the federal government and Elián’s Miami relatives went on for months, the boy’s
uncle refusing to hand the child over to the authorities. This descision was in keeping
with the general feeling amongst many exile Cubans that any action was justified so
long as it was intended to damage Fidel Castro. Finally, in an effort to end the
stalemate, Janet Reno set a mid-April deadline for Elián to be turned over to federal
authorities. Juan Miguel González, Elián’s father, flew to Washington DC to collect
his son. When Elián’s relatives failed to comply the Attorney General’s order to
handover Elián, Reno decided to take the boy by force. In the early morning hours of
April 22, 2000, federal marshals stormed the house of Lázaro González and took the
boy. The photo of the raid became an instant rallying point for the Miami Cubans and
Republican lawmakers. [See Figure 5.27] The exile community used the image to
point to the failure of another democratic president to protect them from Fidel Castro.
Metaphorically the photo was also an indictment of the U.S. government’s failure to
deliver the island of Cuba into the custody of the “legitimate” guardians of Cuba, the
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exiles. Washington republicans used the image of the raid to criticize the Clinton
administration for cow towing to a communist “terrorist” and would use the image
and the Clinton Whitehouse decision to court the exile community’s vote in the 2000
presidential election. Elián was reunited with his father in Washington, DC, but had
to wait in the United States while the courts finished debating his legal status.
While Elián and his father waited for U.S. courts to decide when they could
leave, Miami Cubans continued to protest with extreme public displays of disapproval
over the U.S. government’s decision. A South Park episode entitled “Quintuplets”
poked fun at the entire affair. In the episode, which amazingly aired only four days
after Elián was taken from Miami, a group of Romanian quintuplet circus performers
sought asylum in the United States. The Romanian leader, who looked a lot like Fidel
Castro, forced the quintuplets’ estranged father to demand that the girls be returned to
Romania. Cartman and the rest of the South Park gang staged massive demonstrations
to keep the quintuplets in the United States. But in the end, Janet Reno swooped in
dressed as the Easter Bunny with an assault rifle to extract the girls. 45
The cartoon encapsulated how ludicrous the Miami Cubans’ fanaticism
appeared to most people outside of the exile community. To U.S. citizens outside of
the exile community the decision to reunite a five-year-old child with his biological
father transcended any political battle. But as was so often the case within the
relationship between the exile community and the island’s resident population, the
personal was inherently political and the political was inherently personal. The battle
for Elián González became another case of the mirror imaging and rhetoric has been a
45
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constant battle between Miami Cubans and their resident Cuban counterparts. To the
exiles, Fidel Castro and Juan Miguel González were acting just like the Romanian
leader and father of the quintuplets in the South Park episode, demanding the boy’s
return, not because it was best for the boy, but because it was a political opportunity.
The same interpretation of the exile actions towards the boy existed in reverse for
resident Cubans. It was the opinion on the island that the exiles cared less for what
happened to Elián and more about scoring any victory possible over Castro and the
revolution no matter what the cost.
After two months of waiting in Washington DC, the U.S. courts ruled that
Elián’s Miami relatives could not file for political asylum on the boy’s behalf. Elián
and his father returned to Cuba on June 28, 2000. Castro ordered that there be no
public demonstrations; the posters and billboards demanding the boy’s return were
taken down overnight. The Castro instructed the island look upon the return of the
boy to his father and to Cuba as natural and logical ending to the affair and chose a
silent victory in the face of the Miami exile community’s screams of disapproval. In
Miami a museum/shrine was set up at Lázaro González’s house to continue to pray
for Elián while another museum was set up in Cárdenas to celebrate the victory of his
return. These museums each highlighted the personal battle for the custody battle for
Elián González as part of the larger political battle. In Cuba Elián became another
image of Cuba’s continued victory over U.S. imperialism. The return of the child
signaled that although their revolution had been battered by ten years of economic
hardship it would continue into the next generation. In Miami Elián’s loss was part of
the larger loss of the island itself. Elián’s return to Cuba signaled that the long
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awaited return to Cuba was still in the future. Each museum told its side of the story
but ultimately was the mirror image of the other.
The Elián González case dominated the U.S. and Cuban presses for over six
months. The international uproar over the custody of a five-year-old boy showed that
the images produced on both sides of the Florida Straits remained a potent source of
popular power. Elián in many ways crystallized the metaphoric power of family in the
images of the relationship between the exiles and the island and was emblematic of
the personal conflicts of Cuban exiles as intrinsically connected to the larger political
conflict between the United States and Cuba. The personal/political connection that
all stages of the Cuban exile shared became clearly visible in the images of the Elián
González case.
Conclusion
The Cuban exile community and the images about that community form a
unique part of the relationship between Cuba and the United States. The exiles bind
the two nations together through continued family ties to the island, as well as divide
the nations by acting as the most vocal opponents to any reconciliation between the
two estranged neighbors. The visual metaphors of family that have both connected
and separated the two countries are often rooted within the exile community. These
images, from Ricky Ricardo to Tony Montana, shaped U.S. perception not only about
the exiles themselves but also about the foreign relationship between Cuba and the
United States.
The relationship between the exile community and the island was most often
like a mirror, reflecting the other but in constant opposition. For the exiles the
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personal reasons why they left the island during different time periods was based on
the political relationship between the two nations. The personal contested family
connections between the United States and the island, like the custody battle for Elián
González, continue to reinforce the political and metaphorical battle between Cubans
for the custody of their island.
The exiles have been a curse and a blessing for both the Cuban and the U.S.
governments. Images of the Cuban exile community often reflect these dualities.
Those who left were traitors. Those people who stayed on to complete the difficult
work of the revolution heroes. By forcing a certain portion of the island’s population
to leave, the revolutionary government has effectively externalized dissent. While the
exile community has provided an economic lifeline for their relatives and the Castro
government through the remittances that are sent every year. The price of that
economic support has been the most potent symbol of resistance to the revolution, the
negative images of hundreds of thousands of people fleeing from Castro.
In the United States the exile community has also played a dual role in the
relationship between the two countries. The different waves of exiles have received a
variety of receptions from the U.S. government and the U.S. public. The first waves
were celebrated as “golden exiles” that rejuvenated the economy and culture of South
Florida while later groups of exiles were blamed for contributing to the criminality of
Miami and its image as the drug smuggling capital of the United States. The image of
Cubans departing the island has been a massive propaganda victory for the United
States. But at times the U.S. government has had to handle large waves of immigrants
with little warning or preparation. Besides their value as a propaganda tool, the exiles
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became the main source for soldiers in the U.S. clandestine effort to topple the Castro
government. However, after the exiles were tied to the Watergate scandal, the U.S.
media portrayed the exiles as fanatics who justified criminal behavior in their struggle
against Castro. Even after the United States and Cuba normalize relations, the Cuban
exile community will continue to be an influential group in the U.S. national milieu
and in the relationship between Cuba and the United States.
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Figure 5.1 José Manuel Roseñada (Roseñada), “Fleeing Red Hell” “Thank God I’m
Safer Now!” Zig-Zag Libre August 7, 1965, 2.
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Nino “Self determination put into practice…” El Avance Criollo August 25, 1961, 26

Joe “Cuba Territory of Everyman for Himself in America.” El Avance Criollo,
December 15, 1961, 20.
Figure 5.2
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Figure 5.3 Joe “Wretched Cuba” “The Ultimate Exile” “In the Military SchoolForward Compatriots, with a little salt you can eat them.” El Avance Criollo, July 21,
1961, 20.
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Figure 5.4 Nino, “Stop! Brother! Make a little room for me, I’m leaving too..” El
Avance Criollo April 6, 1962, 24.
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Figure 5.5 Silvio, Sabotage by exile planes on the Niagara sugar refinery, Zig-Zag
Libre, January 23, 1965.
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Figure 5.6 Antonio Exile planes bomb the Nico Lopez gasoline storage facility in
Havana, Zig-Zag Libre, August 31, 1963.
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Figure 5.7 Silvio, “This is the package that needs to be suspended,” Zig-Zag Libre
January 27, 1968, Cover.
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Figure 5.8 Zig-Zag Libre miniature copies available to be thrown from aircraft. ZigZag Libre, January 30, 1965.
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Figure 5.9 Antonio Prohías, “Spy vs. Spy,” MAD, October 1962. Reprinted in
Antonio Prohías, Spy vs. Spy: The Complete Case Book, (New York: Watson-Guptill
Publications, 2001), 48.
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Figure 5.10 Antonio Prohías, “Spy vs. Spy,” Mad, April 1962. Reprinted in
Antonio Prohías, Spy vs. Spy: The Complete Case Book, (New York: WatsonGuptill Publications, 2001), 47.
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Figure 5.11 Anti-Mariel Poster, Roberto Figueredo, “Que Se Vaya!” Comites de
Defensa de la Revolución (CDR), 1980.

345

Figure 5.12 Cuban/Hatian Task Force, “Refugiados Cubanos: Last Step to Freedom,”
1980, 4.
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Figure 5.13 The Cuban machete wielding guajiro is the hero of René de la Nuez
Robaina (Nuez), Humor de Pueblo Combatiente, (Havana: Editora Politica, 1980).
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Figure 5.14 Nuez was able to capture many of the moments of the Mariel crisis and
help depict the boatlift as a victory for Cuba and defeat for the United States. René de
la Nuez Robaina (Nuez), Humor de Pueblo Combatiente, (Havana: Editora Politica,
1980).
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Figure 5.15 Nuez depicted the various stages of the Mariel crisis. Always referring to
those leaving the island as scum. René de la Nuez Robaina (Nuez), Humor de Pueblo
Combatiente, (Havana: Editora Politica, 1980).

349

Figure 5.16 “Paradise Lost?” Time Magazine, November 23, 1981.
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Figure 5.17 Al Pacino as “Tony Montana,” Brian DePalma, Director, Scarface,
Universal Pictures, 1983.
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Figure 5.18 Unidentified artist, “This is Escape from Castro,” Miami, 1994. Poster of
Roberto Avendaño Corojo during the Balsero Rafter Crisis.
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Figure 5.19 Photograph by Matthew Horner, 1994, Balsero Roberto Avendaño
Corojo holding up a poster of himself in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.
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Figure 5.20 Alexis Blanco, “The Boy and the Dolphins,” turned into the Elián poster
“God Given Freedom,” 2000.
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Figure 5.21 Unknown artist, “No one—not even a father—has the right to enslave
another human being. Freedom for Elián!” Miami, 2000.
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Figure 5.22 Unknown artist, “We Will Save Elián,” Havana, 2000.
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Figure 5.23 Blair Woodard, José Martí and child pointing at the U.S. Interest Section
in Havana. “Tribuna Anti-imperialista José Martí,” Havana, Cuba, 2000.
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Figure 5.24 The special interest sharks circling. Joe Heller, “Elián González” Green
Bay Press-Gazette, January 2000, Available from http://www.cagle.com/news/elian/,
(Accessed October 16, 2007).
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Lalo Alcaraz, “La Cucaracha,” LA Weekly, February 2000

Figure 5.25 Marshall Ramsey, The Clarion Ledger, February 2000 Available from
http://www.cagle.com/news/elian/, (Accessed October 16, 2007).
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Figure 5.26 Taylor Jones, Elián as political pawn, El Nuevo Día, 2000, Available
from Cagle Cartoon Database, http://www.cagle.com/news/elian/, (Accessed October
16, 2007).
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Figure 5.27 Alan Diaz's Pulitzer Prize winning photograph of federal marshals taking
Alan Diaz, Elián González, Associated Press, April 22, 2000, Available from Wiki
Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Inselian.jpg, (Accessed May 9, 2009).
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CONCLUSION
In 2008, two historical elections took place that hold the potential to alter the
relationship between Cuba and the United States. On February 18, 2008, Fidel Castro
resigned as president of Cuba and as commander and chief of the Cuban armed
forces. Castro had maintained control of Cuba for almost fifty years and only resigned
because of a long battle with an undisclosed intestinal illness. On February 24, 2008,
the Cuban National Assembly unanimously elected Fidel’s brother Raúl Castro as
Cuba’s new president. Although Raúl’s election was a continuation of Castro family
rule on the island and not a complete elimination of Fidel’s influence, it was still a
sign that Cuba is fast approaching a post-Castro era, with the possibility of a new
relationship with the United States.
The second milestone election took place in the United States. On November
4, 2008, U.S. voters elected Barack Obama the forty-fourth president of the United
States, the first African-American to become president. During his campaign, Obama
promised to begin a new dialogue with the Cuban government and work towards
forging a better relationship. In the first few months of his presidency, Obama
enacted several changes likely to affect U.S.-Cuban relations. Obama ordered the
closing of the Guantánamo Bay Detention Center, eased restrictions on travel to the
island and remittances for Cuban-Americans, and ordered that the scrolling marquee
in the top windows of the U.S. Interest Section in Havana be turned off.
The marquee had been part of a four-year “billboard war” waged between the
U.S. Interest Section and the Cuban government. In 2004, the Cuban government
erected massive billboards in front of the U.S. Interest Section, displaying images of
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Iraqi prisoners of war and then-President Bush as a Nazi. The Cuban government
commissioned the billboards to protest the U.S. invasion of Iraq as well as the Bush
administration’s increasingly hostile rhetoric and actions towards the island. Since
9/11, at which time the Bush administration identified Cuba as part of the “adjunct
axis of evil,” the U.S. government had been systematically increasing diplomatic
pressure on Cuba. The installation of the scrolling marquee on the upper floor of the
Interest Section took place in 2006 and continuously flashed five-foot-high crimson
letters, spelling out messages in Spanish critical of the Castro government. The Cuban
government retaliated by building a memorial of 138 black flags, emblazoned with a
single star to honor Cuban martyrs killed fighting against U.S. imperialism. This
memorial was placed directly in front of the U.S. Interest Section, effectively
obscuring the marquee from view.
The removal of an electronic message board might seem minor in comparison
to the other two changes in policy by the Obama administration; however, it was the
only change that was aimed directly at improving relations with the Castro
government. The order to close the Guantánamo Bay prison was tied more to ongoing
conflicts in the Middle East, the continued involvement of the U.S. in Iraq, and an
attempt at repairing the international reputation of the United States. The order to
loosen travel restrictions on Cuban-Americans was primarily a domestic political
decision that was both safe and popular in the Cuban-American community and
Washington DC beltway. The decision to shut down the marquee, however, was a
direct overture from the Obama administration to the Castro government as well as a
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visible symbol to the Cuban people, and Latin America more broadly, that the new
U.S. government desired change.
In response to the marquee going dark, the Cuban government visually
responded the Obama administration’s gesture of good will. Raúl Castro’s
government removed the anti-American billboards from the front of the U.S. Interest
Section and changed the black flags of the Cuban martyrs to Cuban national flags. By
examining the visual culture employed by Cuba and the United States in the
“billboard war,” historians can come to a better understanding of the build-up of
tensions between Cuba and the United States during the Bush administration and
efforts to restore more positive relations at the beginning of Obama’s tenure in office.
Although the official textual record shows that little of substance has changed in the
relationship between Cuba and the United States since the Bush to Obama
transition—the embargo is still intact, Guantánamo Bay prison remains open, the
travel ban for U.S. citizens remains in effect—the visual record reveals that emotional
tensions between the countries have changed because of the removal of the discordant
images. The changing of the visual rhetoric between the two nations was an important
first step in re-envisioning the relationship between Cuba and the United States that
may lead to more substantive diplomacy in the future. The “billboard war” and its
resolution is just one an example of the role that visual culture has continuously
played in foreign relations of both countries.
This dissertation has documented the transformation of the visual culture of
U.S.-Cuba relations over the last fifty years. This relationship was characterized not
only by state-to-state diplomacy, economic exchange, and military intervention, but
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also by the dissemination of popular representations that produced and reinforced the
essence of U.S.-Cuban relations at a more intimate level. This work demonstrates that
through the study of visual culture—advertising, billboards, comic books, films,
photographs, political cartoons, posters, and television shows—and not just the
official textual record, the history of U.S.-Cuban relations can be seen as a personal,
as well as political, experience shared between two nations. While traditional
diplomatic history tells an official story of state-to-state relations, popular visual
culture provides insights of how the general public perceives and makes sense of
foreign relations. Within the visual culture of U.S.-Cuban relations, metaphors of
family, gender, race, and class—often not visible in the official record—give meaning
to the relationship between the two countries at a much more intimate level. Within
the different historical time periods and phases of the U.S.-Cuban relationship, imagemakers in Cuba and the United States have re-envisioned these intimate connections
between the two countries. It is this personal, intimate connection to foreign relations
produced by the visual culture of both Cuban and U.S. societies that I have evoked in
this project.
Before 1959, Cuba and the United States, because of their geographic
proximity, became allied in an economic, political, and cultural relationship that was
largely controlled by the United States. Cubans, especially the middle and upper class
in Havana, embraced a myriad of cultural forms, including baseball, Hollywood
films, and a wide range of consumer goods. Advertisements for U.S. products became
a primary means through which romanticized visions of U.S. culture were spread on
the island. These promotional images carried not only information on the products
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they were trying to sell, but also North American constructions of family, race, class,
and gender that became naturalized in Cuban society. Through these visual
constructions, Cubans came to judge their own personal and national progress based
on these idealized U.S. norms. While consumer images encouraged Cubans to
participate in a version of the “American Dream,” it was, in fact, unobtainable for
most Cubans, and severe poverty was still widespread on the island.
In the United States, the U.S. public came to know Cuba through images
contained in advertisements, television shows, and tourism. Tourism provided the
most personal connection between the two countries both in images and in practice.
Travel maps and guidebooks presented North America and Cuba as visually
connected to one another, with Cuba envisioned as an extension of the United States.
Tourist laws and regulations allowed U.S. visitors to come and go from Cuba with
almost the same ease as traveling domestically. In U.S. periodicals, tourism
advertisements promoted a vision of Cuba and even the Cuban people as subservient
to U.S. interests and as products to be consumed. The connections forged between
Cuba and the United States, though intimate, were inherently unequal and favored
U.S. citizens over their Cuban neighbors.
Increased cultural and financial inequality on the island coupled with the
corruption of the Batista dictatorship pushed Cuba into crisis in the mid-1950s and
plunged the country into full-scale rebellion by 1956. At the center of the revolution
was Fidel Castro, a Cuban lawyer, who became the primary leader of the 26 of July
Movement. Although it is often forgotten or purposely omitted from history, from
January 1957 until May 1959, a broad segment of the American public embraced
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Fidel Castro the Cuban revolutionaries as heroes. This oft-forgotten history is clearly
revealed by studying the contemporary visual culture. U.S. reporters flooded
American newspapers, magazines, and television shows with triumphant stories and
images about Castro and his bearded rebel heroes. Journalists, such as Herbert
Matthews, Robert Taber, and even Errol Flynn, reported on the Cuban revolution in
heroic terms that connected the rebels to U.S. constructions of idealized
masculinity—brave and decisive men, willing to risk everything for their ideals. The
U.S. media’s depictions of the 26 of July Movement rebels were similar to the images
of popular Western film stars and action comics of the 1940s and 1950s. These
images contained the basis for what the U.S. public imagined “real men” to be like.
The rebels were so accepted as masculine heroes that it was considered appropriate
for U.S. boys to dress up and play Cuban Revolution.
The U.S. media’s love affair and the myth of the heroic revolutionary ended
when the military rebellion turned into actual social revolution with executions,
Soviet alliances, fervent nationalism, and concomitant anti-Americanism. Throughout
1959 and 1960, Cuba and the United States engaged in a tug-of-war of rhetoric,
sanctions, reprisals, and increasingly negative images that ended with a complete
break in diplomatic relations in January 1961. The visual culture of this time period
reveals the intensity of the conflict and a sea change in perception between the two
nations. The images produced by both countries demonized and dehumanized the
other’s leadership, much like the images used in past hot-war conflicts such as World
War II. The metaphors of proximity and connectivity, once touted as a natural
advantage for trade, were transformed into visions of hazard and risk. The U.S. press
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ceased publishing images representing the masculine, heroic actions of Castro and the
26 of July Movement leadership and instead portrayed the Cuban leadership as
barbaric, insane, and homosexual. The failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs and near
disastrous nuclear stand off during the Cuban Missile Crisis gave physical
manifestation to the enemy aesthetic that now existed between the two nations.
Confronting their ally-now-made-enemy became an obsession on both sides
of the Florida Straits. Cuba and the United States produced a vast amount of images
in the battle for hearts and minds domestically and internationally. The U.S. media
continually warned its populace about the dangers posed by a communist nation “on
America’s doorstep.” The U.S. government vowed to prevent “another Cuba” from
happening in “America’s backyard”—the Western Hemisphere. Through these
metaphors of hearth and home under attack, U.S. political cartoonists and filmmakers
depicted the communist threat to the U.S. national family. Artists’ use of images of
family personalized the threat of Cuban communism both domestically and
internationally. To prevent communism from spreading to other Latin American
nations, the United States committed to the largest economic aid program for the
Western Hemisphere, the Alliance for Progress. This program contained a massive
propaganda campaign designed to spread the image of Castro as an adversary
throughout the hemisphere. U.S. Information Service comic book artists utilized
images of Latin American families under attack from communism or creating a better
life for themselves through the Alliance programs.
For the Castro government, the antagonistic relationship with the United
States bolstered the revolution internally and allowed the government to rapidly
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implement revolutionary reforms on the island. After January 1959, the revolution
turned from a military operation into an effort to reshape the meaning and purpose of
Cuban identity. It was in this new quest for a re-imagined Cuban national family,
based on socialist ideals as well as racial, class, and gender equality that the Cuban
revolution found its most lasting mission. Cuban artists celebrated revolutionary
social programs, such as national tourism and the Literacy Campaign, as working to
build a new Cuban identity. These images in advertisements, billboards, and films
supported the new vision of what it meant to be Cuban in a revolutionary context.
Artists also depicted Cuba’s social reforms in multiple visual mediums that allowed
Cuba to spread its message to other third world nations in order to aid their struggles
against U.S. imperialism.
Finally, the group most intimately affected by U.S.-Cuban relations is the
Cuban exile community; indeed, images of and about Cuban exiles form a crucial part
of the visual dialogue between the to nations. Images of family that have both
connected and separated the two countries are often rooted within the exile
community. These images—from Ricky Ricardo to Tony Montana—have shaped
U.S. perception about the Cuban-American community and helped to define the U.S.Cuban relationship. The images that the U.S. media produced about the different
waves of exiles at times distorted the truth about the Cuban immigrants. U.S. imagemakers celebrated the first wave of exiles from 1959-1975 for their financial success
in the United States and for having escaped Castro and communism. These first two
waves of “golden exiles” were indeed successful and helped to revitalized South
Florida. However, unlike what the images of these groups would suggest, most
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Cubans in the first two waves came to the United States already possessing the
financial assets, education, and experience to make this transition smoother. These
exiles were also more easily acceptable to the U.S. public because they were
predominately white middle-class families. The majority of these exiles did not
“escape” the island on tiny boats or rafts as they were so often depicted, but instead
arrived on two regularly scheduled commercial airline flights that flew daily from
Varadero, Cuba to Miami, Florida.
The later waves of exiles, in the 1980 Mariel Boatlift and the 1994 Balsero
Crisis, did not receive the same warm reception from the U.S. public. These later
groups of exiles were blamed for contributing to the criminality of Miami and its
image as the drug smuggling capital of the world. These later waves of exiles
included many more Afro-Cubans and desperately poor who received a colder
reception from the U.S. mainstream press. These demographics made the transition
for these later groups far more difficult. The U.S. government was unable to use
images of these exiles against the Castro government to the same effect; instead,
Castro turned the exiles into a Cuban propaganda victory. The images produced about
the exiles have kept the personal cost of the conflict between Cuba and the United
States central to much of the discussion about normalization. This personal stake in
the relationship was most recently evident in the custody battle for Elián González.
This battle over whether to allow a five-year-old boy to return to his biological father
in Cuba or be raised by his Miami relatives became metaphorical for the battle over
the custody of the island itself.
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This study of the popular culture of U.S.-Cuban relations provides a
heretofore-absent examination of the visual dialogue between Cuba and the United
States during a time of tremendous change and conflict. This dissertation explores the
development of an aesthetic of alliance and antagonism that has both bound and
divided the two border nations. From the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis, to the
Mariel Boat Lift, and Elián González, the images that make up this relationship
reflected and influenced the political and social dialogue between the two countries.
Following the revolution, this dialogue included re-envisioning Cuba and the United
States as dangerous places, demonizing their respective leaders, and seeking to
convince other nations of the righteousness of their cause. Revolutionary Cuba has, in
part, forged its national identity through the use of oppositional images created to
combat U.S. imperialism. For the United States, Cuba’s continued defiance has
rendered a visual justification for an aggressive foreign policy throughout Latin
America. The continued conflict has created a large exile community in South Florida
who have remained active participants in this international conflict. Just as the Obama
and Castro governments realized that by changing the images between the two
countries they could facilitate a more productive dialogue, the visual relationship
between Cuba and the United States will continue to be crucial in determining
whether the nations can find common ground or continue to view one another as
intimate enemies well into the twenty-first century.

371

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archival Sources
Auburn University, Special Collections, Auburn, AL
Biblioteca de La Escuela de Altos Estudios de Hotelería y Turismo, Havana, Cuba
Biblioteca Nacional José Martí, Havana, Cuba
California State University, Fullerton, Pollak Library, Fullerton, CA
Center for the Study of Political Graphics, (CPSG), Los Angeles, California
Georgetown University, Special Collections, Washington DC
Instituto Cubano de Arte e Industria Cinematográficos, Havana, Cuba
Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, GA
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, D.C.
Michigan State University, Comic Art Collection, East Lansing, MI
National Archives of the United States of America, Washington, D.C.
Paley Center for Media, Los Angeles, CA
The Ohio State, Cartoon Research Library, Columbus, Ohio
University of California Los Angeles, Film and Television Archive, Los Angeles, CA
University of California Los Angeles, Charles E. Young Library, Los Angeles, CA
University of Florida, Latin American Collection, Gainesville, FL
University of Miami, The Cuban Heritage Collection, Miami, FL
University of New Mexico, Center for Southwest Research, Albuquerque, NM
University of Southern California, Boeckmann Center, Los Angeles, CA
Yale University, Latin American Collection, New Haven, CT
Periodical Sources
Bohemia
Diario de la Marina
El Avance Criollo
Gaceta de La Habana
Gaceta Oficial de Cuba
Holiday Magazine
Life Magazine
Look Magazine
Miami Herald
New York Times
Time Magazine
Travel Magazine

372

Secondary Sources
Andrews, Bart. The “I Love Lucy” Book. New York: Doubleday and Company,
1985.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism. New York: Verso, 1983.
Arnove, Robert F. and Harvey J. Graff , eds. National Literacy Campaigns :
Historical and Comparative Perspectives. New York: Plenum Press, 1987.
Ayala César. American Sugar Kingdom: The Plantation Economy of the Spanish
Caribbean, 1898-1934. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1999.
Babun, Teo A., and Victor Andres Triay. The Cuban Revolution: Years of Promise.
Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005.
Barson, Michael and Heller, Steven. Red Scared! The Commie Menace in
Propaganda and Popular Culture. San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2001.
Bejel, Emilio. Gay Cuban Nation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Bederman, Gail. Manliness & civilization : a cultural history of gender and race in
the United States, 1880-1917. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Black, George. The Good Neighbor: How the United States Wrote the History of
Central America and the Caribbean. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.
Blasier, Cole and Carmelo Mesa-Lago, editors. Cuba in the world. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979.
Blight, James G. and Welch, David A. eds., On the Brink: Americans and Soviets
Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: The Noonday Press, 1989.
Bohning, Don. The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 19591965. Washington DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005.
Bon Tempo, Carl J. Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees During
the Cold War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Burke, Peter. Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images As Historical Evidence. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001.
Butler, Ed. Revolution Is My Profession. New York: Twin Circle, 1968.

373

Calvo, Hernando and Katlijn Declercq, The Cuban Exile Movement : Dissidents or
Mercenaries. New York : Ocean Press, 2000.
Casey, Michael. Che's Afterlife: The Legacy of an Image. New York: Vintage, 2009.
Chanan, Michael. Cuban Cinema. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004.
Chomsky, Aviva, Barry Carr, and Pamela María Smorkaloff. The Cuba Reader:
History, Culture, Politics. Latin America readers. Durham: Duke University
Press, 2003.
Clark, Toby. Art and Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: The Political Image in
theAge of Mass Culture. New York : Harry N. Abrams, 1997.
Colldeweih, Jack, and Kalman Goldstein. Graphic Opinions: Editorial Cartoonists
and Their Art. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular
Press, 1998.
Crane, Diana. The Production of Culture: Media and the Urban Arts. London: Sage
Publications, 1992.
Crawford, Stanley G. A Garlic Testament: Seasons on a Small New Mexico Farm.
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992.
Cushing, Lincoln. Revolución: Cuban Poster Art. San Francisco: Chronicle Books,
2003.
David, Deborah Sarah, and Robert Brannon. The Forty-Nine Percent Majority: The
Male Sex Role. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1976.
Dawson, Barry. Street Graphics Cuba. London: Thames and Hudson, 2001.
De la Fuente, Alejandro. A Nation For All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in
Twentieth-Century Cuba. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina
Press, 2001.
De la Torre, Miguel A. La Lucha for Cuba: Religion and Politics on the Streets of
Miami. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
De Los Angeles Torres, María. In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the
United States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.
DePalma, Anthony. The Man Who Invented Fidel: Cuba, Castro, and Herbert L.
Matthews of the New York Times. New York: Public Affairs, 2006
Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the

374

Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008.
Dorfman, Ariel and Mattelart, Armand. How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist
Ideology in the Disney Comic. New York: International General, 1971.
Dower, John. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York:
Pantheon, 1987.
Dreke, Víctor, and Mary-Alice Waters. From the Escambray to the Congo: In the
Whirlwind of the Cuban Revolution : Interview with Víctor Dreke. New York:
Pathfinder Press, 2002.
Dubois, Jules. Fidel Castro: Rebel—Liberator or Dictator? New York: Bobbs Merrill
Company, 1959.
Elliston, Jon. Psywar on Cuba: The Declassified History of U.S. Anti-Castro
Propaganda. Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1999.
Engstrom, David Wells. Presidential Decision Making Adrift: The Carter
Administration and the Mariel Boatlift. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefied
Publishers, 1997.
Escalante, Fabián. The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations, 1959-62. Melbourne:
Ocean Press, 2004.
Fagen, Richard R. The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba. Stanford studies
in comparative politics, 2. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969.
Fagen, Richard R., Richard A. Brody, and Thomas J. O'Leary. Cubans in Exile;
Disaffection and the Revolution. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1968.
Falcoff, Mark. The Cuban Revolution and the United States: A History in Documents,
1958-1960. Washington, DC: U.S. Cuba Press, 2001.
Falk, Pamela S. Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest. Lexington, Mass:
Lexington Books, 1986.
Fernández, Roberto G. Raining Backwards. Houston: Arte Publico Press, 1988.
Font, Mauricio A., and Alfonso W. Quiroz. The Cuban Republic and José Martí:
Reception and Use of a National Symbol. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2006.
Foertsch, Jacqueline. Enemies Within: The Cold War and the AIDS Crisis in
Literature, Film, and Culture. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001.

375

Foucault, Michel. “Of Other Spaces.” Diacritics vol. 16, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 22-27.
Fox, Claire F. The Fence and the River: Culture and Politics at the U.S.-Mexico
Border. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
Franklin, Jane. Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History. Melbourne:
Ocean Press, 1997.
Franqui, Carlos. Diary of the Cuban Revolution. New York: The Viking Press, 1976.
Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
Frick, Richard. The Tricontinental Solidarity Poster. Bern, Switzerland: ComediaVerlag-Bern, 2003.
Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1997.
Gallagher, Patrick Lee. The Cuban Exile: A Socio-Political Analysis. New York:
Arno Press, 1980.
García, María Cristina. Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South
Florida, 1959-1994. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.
García Osuna, Alfonso J. The Cuban Filmography, 1897 through 2001. Jefferson,
North Carolina: McFarland and Company Inc. Publishers, 2003.
García-Pérez, Gladys. Insurrection and Revolution: Armed Struggle in Cuba, 19521959. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1998.
Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage. New York: Bantam Books,
1993.
Gleijeses, Piero. Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
Gosse, Van. Where the Boys Are: Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New
Left. New York: Verso, 1993.
Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of
the New Imperialism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.
Greenblatt, Stephen. Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

376

Gott, Richard. Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
Gottschalk, Peter, and Gabriel Greenberg. Islamophobia: Making Muslims the
Enemy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008.
Guerra, Lillian. The Myth of José Martí: Conflicting Nationalisms in Early TwentiethCentury Cuba. Envisioning Cuba. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 2005.
Halberstam, David. The Fifties. New York: Villard Books, 1993.
Hall, Edward T. Beyond Culture. New York: Anchor Books, 1976.
Harle, Vilho. The Enemy with a Thousand Faces: The Tradition of the Other in
Western Political Thought and History. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000.
Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of
Cultural Change. Oxford: Blackwell Press, 1990.
Hayden, Dolores. The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
Hernandez-Reguant, Ariana. Cuba in the Special Period: Culture and Ideology in the
1990s. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Higgins, Trumbell. The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the
Bay of Pigs. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987.
Hixson, Walter. Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 19451961. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.
Johnson, John J. Latin America in Caricature. Austin: University of Texas Press,
1980.
Joseph, Gilbert, Legrand, Catherine, and Salvatore, Ricardo D. editors. Close
Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American
Relations. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.
Joseph, Gilbert, Rubenstein, Anne, and Zolov, Eric. editors. Fragments of a Golden
Age: The Politics of Culture in Mexico Since 1940. Durham: Duke University
Press, 2001.
Joseph, Gilbert M., and Daniela Spenser. In from the Cold: Latin America's New
Encounter with the Cold War. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.

377

Kaplan, Amy. The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Kaplan, Amy, and Donald E. Pease. Cultures of United States Imperialism. Durham:
Duke University Press, 1993.
Keen, Sam. Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination. San
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986.
Kimmel, Michael S., Jeff Hearn, and Raewyn Connell. Handbook of Studies on Men
& Masculinities. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005.
Kimmel, Michael S. Manhood in America: A Cultural History. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2006.
King, John. Magical Reels: A History of Cinema in Latin America. Critical studies in
Latin American and Iberian cultures. London: Verso, 2000.
Klein, Christina. Cold War Orientalism : Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 19451961. Berkeley : University of California Press, 2003.
Kunzle, David. CheGuevara: Icon, Myth, and Message. Los Angeles: UCLA Fowler
Museum of Cultural History, 1997.
Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1997.
Leiner, Marvin. Sexual politics in Cuba : machismo, homosexuality, and AIDS.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
Lester, Paul Martin, and Susan Dente Ross. Images That Injure: Pictorial Stereotypes
in the Media. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003.
Levi, Vicki Gold and Heller, Steven. Cuba Style: Graphics from the Golden Age of
Design. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2002.
Levine, Robert M. and Asís, Moisés. Cuban Miami. New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 2000.
Lipschultz, Ronnie D. Cold War Fantasies: Film, Fiction, and Foreign Policy. New York:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001.
López, Alfred J. José Martí and the Future of Cuban Nationalisms. Gainesville, FL:
University Press of Florida, 2006.
Lucas, Scott. Freedom’s War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union. New York:
New York University Press, 1999.

378

Lumsden, Ian. Machos, Maricones, and Gays: Cuba and Homosexuality. Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press, 1996.
Macaulay, Neill. A Rebel in Cuba: An American Memoir. Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1970.
Magnussen, Anne, and Hans-Christian Christiansen. Comics & culture: analytical and
theoretical approaches to comics. Copenhagen, Denmark: Museum Tusculanum Press,
University of Copenhagen, 2000.
Marchand, Roland. Advertising the American Dream: Making the Way for Modernity,
1920-1940. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
Matthews, Christopher. Kennedy & Nixon: The Rivalry that Shaped America. New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1996.
Matthews, Herbert. The Cuban Story. New York: George Braziller, 1961.
Matthews, Herbert. Fidel Castro. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969.
Matthews, Herbert. Castro: A Political Biography. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press,
1969.
Matthews, Herbert. Revolution in Cuba: An Essay in Understanding. New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1975.
McAlister, Melani. Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. interests in the Middle East,
1945-2000. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
McClay, Michael. I Love Lucy: The Complete Picture History Of The Most Popular TV
Show Ever. New York: Warner Books, 1995.
Melley, Timothy. Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000.
Miller, Mark M. and Henthorne, Tony L., Investment in the New Cuban Tourist Industry: A
Guide to Entrepreneurial Opportunities, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1997.
Moore, Carlos. Castro the Blacks and Africa. Los Angeles: Center for Afro-American
Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 1988.
Morley, Morris H. Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952-1986.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Mosse, George L. The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity. New

379

York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Nadel, Alan. Containment Culture: American Narrative, Postmodernism, and the
Atomic Age. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995.
Nuez Robaina, René de la. Humor de Pueblo Combatiente. Havana: Editora Politíca,
1980.
O’Neill, William L. American High: The Years of Confidence 1945-1960. New York:
The Free Press, 1986.
Paterson, Thomas G. Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban
Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Pérez, Louis Jr. Underdevelopment and Dependency: Tourism in the West Indies.
El Paso: Center for Inter-American Studies, 1975.
Pérez, Louis Jr. Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy. Athens GA:
University of Georgia Press, 1990.
Pérez, Louis Jr. On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture,
Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999.
Pérez, Louis Jr. Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial
Ethos. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008.
Pérez-Stable, Marifeli. The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993.
Poole, Deborah. Vision, Race, and Modernity: A Visual Economy of the Andean
Image World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Prohias, Antonio. Spy vs. Spy: The Complete Case Book. New York: Watson-Guptill
Publications, 2001.
Pratt, Mary Louise. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. New York:
Routledge, 1992.
Pulti, Santiago. Leyes Fundamentales: Cuba. Buenos Aries, Argentina: Editorial
Convergencia, 1975.
Quiroga, José. Cuban palimpsests. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
Quirk, Robert. Fidel Castro. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1993.
Ratliff, William E. The Selling of Fidel Castro: The Media and the Cuban Revolution.

380

New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction Books, 1987.
Reed, Gail, Island in the Storm: The Cuban Communist Party Fourth Party Congress.
New York: Ocean Press, 1992.
Rieff, David. The Exile: Cuba in the Heart of Miami. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1993.
Robin, Ron. The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the
Military-Intellectual Complex. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Rosenberg, Emily S. and Eric Foner. Spreading the American Dream: American
Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945. New York: Hill and Wang,
1982.
Ross, Andrew and Ross, Kristin, editors. Anti-Americanism. New York: New York
University Press, 2004.
Rowe, John Carlos. The New American Studies. Critical American studies series.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.
Rubenstein, Anne. Bad Language, Naked Ladies, and Other Threats to the Nation: A
Political History of Comic Books in Mexico. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.
Ruffin, Patricia. Capitalism and Socialism in Cuba: A Study of Dependency,
Development, and Underdevelopment, London: Macmillan Press, 1990.
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1978.
Said, Edward. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.
Salas, Luis. Social Control and Deviance in Cuba. New York: Praeger Publishers,
1979.
Savage, William W. Comic Books and America, 1945-1954. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1990.
Saunders, Dave. Direct Cinema: Observational Documentary and the Politics of the
Sixties: London, Wallflower Press, 2007.
Sawyer, Mark Q. Racial politics in post-revolutionary Cuba. New York : Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
Schieffer, Bob. Face the Nation: My Favorite Stories from the First Fifty Years of the
Award-winning News Broadcast. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

381

Schultz, Lars. Beneath the U.S.: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Schultz, Lars. That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban
Revolution. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
Schwartz, Rosalie. Pleasure Island; Tourism and Temptation in Cuba.
Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1997.
Scott, James. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965.
Seers, Dudley. Cuba; The Economic and Social Revolution. Chapel Hill, NC: Univ.
of North Carolina Press, 1964.
Serra, Ana. The "New Man" in Cuba: Culture and Identity in the Revolution.
Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2007.
Shukla, Sandhya Rajendra, and Heidi Tinsman. Imagining Our Americas: Toward a
Transnational Frame. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
Silbermann, Alphons and H.D. Dyroff. Comics and VisualCulture: Research Studies
from Ten Countries. New York: K.G. Saur, 1986.
Slotkin, Richard. Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century
America. New York: Atheneum, 1992.
Smith, Lois M. and Padula. Alfred, Sex and Revolution: Women in Socialist Cuba.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Smith, Wayne S. The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic History of the
Castro Years. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1987.
Stermer, Dugald and Susan Sontag. The Art of Revolution: Castro’s Cuba, 19591970. New York: McGraw Hill, 1970.
Susman, Warren I. Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in
the Twentieth Century. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.
Stepick, Alex. This Land Is Our Land: Immigrants and Power in Miami. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2003.
Sweig, Julia E. Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban

382

Underground. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Szulc, Tad. Fidel: A Critical Portrait. New York: William Morrow and Company,
1986.
Taber, Robert. M-26: Biography of a Revolution. New York: Lyle Stuart, 1961.
Taffett, Jeffery F. Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin
America. New York: Routledge, 2007.
Timmers, Margaret. The Power of the Poster. London: V & A Publications, 1998.
Truett, Samuel, and Elliott Young. Continental Crossroads: Remapping U.S.-Mexico
Borderlands History. American encounters/global interactions. Durham: Duke
University Press, 2004.
Urry, John. The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies.
London: Sage Publications, 1990.
Urry, John. Consuming Places. London: Routledge, 1995.
Valtman, Edmund S., Jyri Kork, and Peeter Kiik. Valtman: The Editorial Cartoons of
Edmund S. Valtman, 1961-1991. Baltimore, Md., USA: Esto, 1991.
Vatter, Harold G. The U.S. Economy in the 1950s. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, Inc., 1963.
Veeser, H. Aram. The New Historicism. New York: Routledge, 1989.
Villalba Garrido, Evaristo. Cuba y El Turismo. Havana: Editorial de Ciencias
Sociales, 1993.
Ward, Fred. Inside Cuba Today. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1978.
White, Mark J. The Cuban Missile Crisis. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996.
White, Mark, ed. The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History.
Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001.
Whitehead, Stephen, and Frank J. Barrett. The Masculinities Reader. Cambridge, UK:
Polity, 2001.
Welch, Richard E. Jr. Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban
Revolution, 1959-1961. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1985.

383

West, Allan. Tropics of History: Cuba Imagined. Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey,
1997.
Whitfield, Stephen J. The Culture of the Cold War. Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1991.
Williams, Raymond. Problems in Materialism and Culture: Selected Essays. London:
Verso, 1980.
Williams, Raymond. The Sociology of Culture. New York: Schocken Books, 1982.
Williams, William Appleman. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1959.
Wyden, Peter. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.
Young, Allen. Gays under the Cuban Revolution. San Francisco: Grey Fox Press,
1981.
Zanetti, Oscar and Alejandro García. Sugar and Railroads: A Cuban History, 18371959. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

384

